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This dissertation examines the complexity of religious and ethnic diversity in 
the context of contemporary China. Based on my two years of ethnographic fieldwork 
in Taktsang Lhamo (Ch: Langmusi) of southern Gansu province, I investigate the 
ethnic and religious revival since the Chinese political relaxation in the 1980s in two 
local communities: one is the salient Tibetan Buddhist revival represented by the 
rebuilding of the local monastery, the revitalization of religious and folk ceremonies, 
and the rising attention from the tourists; the other is the almost invisible Islamic 
revival among the Chinese Muslims (Hui) who have inhabited in this Tibetan land for 
centuries. Distinctive when compared to their Tibetan counterpart, the most noticeable 
phenomenon in the local Hui revival is a revitalization of Hui entrepreneurship, which 
is represented by the dominant Hui restaurants, shops, hotels, and bus lines. As I show 
in my dissertation both the Tibetan monastic ceremonies and Hui entrepreneurship are 
the intrinsic part of local ethnoreligious revival. Moreover these seemingly unrelated 
phenomena are in fact closely related and reflect the modern Chinese nation-building 
as well as the influences from an increasingly globalized and government directed 
Chinese market. 
The Chinese policy change since the 1980s and the transition to the market-
oriented economy have made the local ethnic and religious revival possible but also 
more complicated. Against the backdrop of the transition from a former frontier of two 
 empires to the modern nation state, I show how various contemporary events and 
historic memories have been uniquely experienced by two local ethnic communities. I 
then further analyze the political economic basis of this ethnoreligious revival, which 
demonstrates the dynamics of religion and ethnicity in the cultural complexity of a 
multi-ethnic nation-state on the one hand, and the role of nation-state and the global 
consumerism as a new form of civilizing agent and governmentality on the other. 
Finally, I argue that identifying the process of social production in complex and 
conflicting phenomena like this unsettles those conventionally defined ethnic, 
religious, and national boundaries through which I explore the conceptual limits of 
such theoretical concepts as modernity, post/colonialism and trans/nationalism.  
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 NOTES ON TRANSCRIPTION AND TRANSLITERATION 
 
One of the most complex things in this project is the use of language. Local 
Tibetans speak a dialect of Tibetan (Amdo) that is virtually unintelligible to the 
Tibetan speakers from Central Tibet (Lhasa). Educated monks in the monastery can 
understand or speak the Lhasa dialect. When some locals chose to learn Chinese, most 
of them started with either Gansu or Sichuan dialect instead of Mandarin due to its 
local importance. The local Chinese Muslims (Hui) are all fluent Tibetan (Amdo) 
speakers. While at home or inside their own community Hui speak a Chinese dialect 
(Gansu) that is very hard, if not unintelligible, to most Mandarin Chinese speakers. 
Furthermore, the Gansu dialect commonly used in the Hui communities in 
northwestern China has borrowed many words from Arabic and Persian over the 
centuries, which makes it even harder for anyone outside the Hui community to 
understand even their daily conversation. While Mandarin Chinese is now the lingua 
franca in this ethnic borderland, its paramount position has constantly been challenged 
in the everyday life by this enormous linguistic diversity. 
This dissertation is based on my ethnographic fieldwork conducted through a 
mix of all these languages and dialects. It is therefore even more problematic when it 
comes to transcribing those names and dialogues in text according to their proper use 
and original language—a reality that is often left ambiguous in everyday life yet could 
easily escalate to a political debate of any level. My principle in transcription is to 
preserve the actual or original use. When it is a mixed use of two languages/dialects, I 
present both at the first time and then leave it later in the language that is most 
commonly used by locals. I use the Wylie system to transcribe Tibetan names and 
dialogues in either Amdo or Lhasa dialect accordingly. That means, for example, 
Lhasa dialect speakers may find it quite different in an original Amdo dialogue. 
xv 
 Similarly I use pinyin system to transcribe Chinese names and dialogues in accordance 
with Mandarin, Sichuan and Gansu dialects. Thus Chinese speakers may find a slight 
difference according to different dialects used in the original dialogue. All transcribed 
names and dialogues are italicized and are identified as “Tib:” for Tibetan, “Ch:” for 
Chinese, and “Ar:” for Arabic. 
Transliteration in this dissertation is based on the original use of language or 
dialect. Even with the commonly accepted Wylie system there is still no unified 
spelling system to transliterate Tibetan terms phonetically, without taking dialect 
difference into consideration. I choose to use the transliteration that is either common 
to most English speakers (i.e., Tulku for sbrul sku) or close to the original 
pronunciation (i.e., Geke in Amdo dialect for dge skos) and give the standard 
transcription at the same time. These transliterations are capitalized with the initial 
letter but not italicized. Chinese names and phrases are spelled through pinyin system 
according its original use. In case of mixed use of different languages or dialects—i.e., 
Chinese names given to the original Tibetan names, Chinese terms borrowed in 
Tibetan dialogue, or different Tibetan names used in the same context—all different 
names are listed and a further explanation is given on the use and implication of these 
terms in different languages as well as in its specific context. Thereafter terms in each 
language are chosen according to its proper context. All names of the characters in this 
dissertation are pseudonyms. 
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 PREFACE 
 
STUDYING AND TRAVELING ACROSS THE BORDERS: A JOURNEY TO “NO 
PLACE” 
 
Tibet and China: From the US 
Once I was traveling in Tibet with an American student who asked me very 
frankly if I, as a Chinese, have had any special access or privileges to conduct my 
research in Tibet. Although I was already studying in the US at that time, it was not 
until that moment that I started to feel the resonance of some other questions that I had 
been asked before. 
 
You can learn Tibetan in China? 
How did you do your fieldwork (in Tibet)? 
Were they (Tibetans) afraid of you (Chinese)? 
Do you (as a Chinese) also need an official permission (to work in Tibet)? 
… 
All these questions have to do with the stereotypical ideas of Tibet and China, which 
cast a clear suspicion on a Han Chinese’s credibility in a Sino-Tibetan related 
question. As a Chinese scholar doing researches related to Tibet, first in China and 
then in the US, my academic career itself is a border crossing experience, which I call 
a journey to “no place.” I first had this feeling of “no place” after I arrived in the US 
and made my initial contact with the Tibetan exile community in Ithaca. Although I 
had extensive experience with Tibetan communities in China, my immediate feeling 
was that I—a Han Chinese from China—simply could not be positioned anywhere so 
as to have normal communication with Tibetans. Even my appearance in the Tibetan 
community already seemed awkward, if not threatening to some Tibetans and their 
deeply held ideas and ways of being.  
Ithaca is a place well known for its Tibetan characteristics—a well established 
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 Tibetan exile community, the well-known Snow Lion publishing house, and most of 
all, the Namgyal Monastery which traces its origin back to the Potala Palace (Lhasa), 
the Dalai Lama’s private monastery before the Chinese takeover of Tibet. After I came 
to Ithaca, I visited the Namgyal Monastery and met the resident Tibetan monks and 
some local Tibetans. Immediately after I was introduced as a Chinese student with 
studies related to Tibet and who spoke Tibetan, I felt reactions of both surprise and 
uneasiness from the monks and others. Subsequent discussions seemed strained for all 
of us. They did not last for long either as I was not a practicing Buddhist, which is the 
main subject in this monastic institute.  
Fortunately one monk in the monastery, who was exceptionally open-minded 
and friendly to me, took me to local Tibetan community events several times. On 
March 10th (the Tibetan Uprising Day) he took me to the local Tibetan celebration of 
this important date. As I greeted—in Tibetan—the Tibetan community leader of the 
event, he greeted me back with “kushola” (Tib: sku-zhogs)—the Tibetan honorific 
addressing for monks. He took me naturally for a Tibetan monk who escaped from 
China, since I was a new face and came with a Tibetan monk. After my Tibetan monk 
friend revealed my Chinese identity, it caused intense awkwardness for this Tibetan 
man, literarily struck silent for one minute without a word.  
Another time this monk friend introduced me to another young Tibetan monk 
originally from the Kham Tibetan area in China. He had just escaped from years of 
torture in a Chinese prison and arrived in the US after a short stay in Dharamsala. As I 
asked about his personal experiences I could feel that he got more and more emotional 
talking about everything Chinese. Finally he burst into tears, which made me feel that 
my appearance as a Han Chinese brought back all his traumatic memories at once.  
After several awkward experiences like these, I wondered how my Tibetan 
monk friend, unlike his fellow Tibetans, could accept me rather easily. He smiled at 
xviii 
 me and answered, “You look to me more like a Tibetan than a Chinese—in fact you 
look like a Tibetan monk.” Coincidentally, this is exactly the same explanation that I 
heard from my other Tibetan monk friends in Taktsang Lhamo years later when I did 
my fieldwork in China. In both cases the Tibetan monks who did accept my 
appearance could do so by consciously erasing my Chinese identity (at least from their 
point of view) and reconstructing a new acceptable identity for me in a Tibetan 
context. This dilemma of a Chinese identity (both ethnically Han and citizen of the 
People’s Republic of China) in a Tibetan context certainly epitomizes the long-term 
polemical debate on the so-called “Tibet question.”  
 
Tibet and China: From China 
In fact I started this journey to “no place” when I took up my first job in 1991. 
Just graduated from university, I was working for a finacial accounting software 
company—now an IT giant in China. At that time, the company divided its nation-
wide business into ten geographical districts most of which consist of two or three 
provinces. Each district was typically assigned two or three representatives whose job 
involved frequent traveling to the corresponding areas. There was only one exception, 
the “eighth district,” as it was called, which included seven provinces—Inner 
Mongolia, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Gansu, Qinghai, Shaanxi, and Tibet—covering nearly 
half of the geographical area of the Chinese map. Big as it was, this “eighth district” 
was considered the least productive among all the districts in terms of annual sale 
records because these regions are mostly ethnic minority areas, which are believed to 
be poor and backward. Thus not only did the company put little effort and investment 
in it—and with little expectation of revenue from it, but being assigned to work in the 
“eighth district” was considered the least desirable position in the company, if not a 
punishment, because of the allegedly “hardship” (Ch: jianku) of traveling there. When 
xix 
 I joined the company, the previous “eighth district” representative was finally able to 
get out after having been promoted to another district. It was naturally my turn as a 
newcomer to fill in his spot—with all my colleagues’ sympathetic words, that after 
some time I would get promoted in the same way.  
Before I took my first business trip to Lhasa, many of my friends and my 
family were very concerned about this trip suggesting that I should stay as briefly as 
possible since the sanitary conditions are very bad in Tibet and the high plateau 
environment is very harmful for human health with the serious effect being sterility, as 
I was told by a doctor friend. Meanwhile everyone asked me to bring back some 
souvenirs since it was still rare to find someone around traveling to Tibet at that time. 
The souvenirs I was asked to bring back were mostly “Tibetan” and not commonly 
seen in Chinese market—from little skull-shaped rotary chains, Tibetan incense, to 
yak horns, Tibetan antelope horns, bone trumpets (Tib: rkang gling) etc. One even 
asked me jokingly to bring a “snow lion flag” (the Chinese name for the Tibetan 
national flag) of which I had never heard at that time.  
My job in Lhasa was to train a group of about 30 local cadres from different 
local government bureaus to use the financial accounting software produced by the 
company. This group was composed of both Tibetan and Chinese students. As the 
course proceeded I noticed the class gradually and clearly divided into two separate 
groups—one Tibetan and one Chinese—with a different language spoken in each 
group. Moreover, each group discussed different topics and had different interests. 
The topics typical in the Tibetan group were:  
 
It is so nice today we should go to do our laundry by the Lhasa River this 
afternoon. 
… 
You also know Tashi? He’s my buddy. Let’s meet after the class in the sweet-
tea house at the corner of Barkhor.  
… 
xx 
 In the Chinese group, the predominant, if not unitary, concern was focused 
upon moving back to the neidi (“inland”, or Han centered Chinese cities), or neidiao. 
 
Do you know Xiao Li has moved back to Chengdu recently? 
Really? That’s fast! He must have some powerful guanxi (relations). 
Are you also trying to move? 
Yes, but I don’t have any good guanxi and don’t know if I can make it. 
…  
 
For those Han Chinese who did not come through the “Helping Tibet” (Ch: 
yuanzang) project on a term contract, moving back to neidi could be a life-long 
struggle under the Chinese population control system of household registration (Ch: 
hukou) and working unit (Ch: danwei).  
Yuanzang, or “Helping Tibet,” is both the name for a long-term government 
project and a powerful discourse in the Chinese public. This Chinese government 
invention, which began in the 1950s, has sent Han Chinese government employees 
(Ch: ganbu, or cadres) from major Chinese cities to work in Tibet for either a short 
term (typically three to eight years) or life-long. While this yuanzang experience for 
some could be just a temporary and necessary step to go higher in their political 
career, for most others it means a voluntary sacrifice, a forced exile, or even exclusion 
from the mainstream Han Chinese society. The most profound social impact of this 
project has been to stigmatize Tibet describing it as desperately in need of help to 
move out of poverty and ignorance and that only the Chinese people and government 
have the ability and willingness to help them do so.  
 
Tibet and China: From the Border 
Most of my friends and my family were surprised when I quit my job to study 
the Tibetan language. Indeed it was not so much quitting a well-paid job and become a 
no salary student that they could not understand, but was instead my choice of 
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 studying Tibetan language that made them feel that I was going nowhere. They saw no 
future for me aside from going yuanzang as a voluntary sacrifice. When I was finally 
accepted in the doctoral program in the US, many friends and colleagues joked to me 
that I was recruited by the Dalai clique and its western supporters. Only later did I 
learn the serious implication of this joke. The common knowledge on Tibet has been 
contextualized with drastic disjuncture in China and the West making it nearly 
impossible to go across this unbridgeable gap.  
What seems to be a light joke from my friends is nevertheless part of an 
atmosphere that is so pervasive and deeply rooted in both the Chinese public 
consensus and the official paradigm. I first encountered the serious consequence of 
this illusive atmosphere when I applied my Chinese passport to go to study in the US. 
Whereas a normal application process generally took two weeks to one month at that 
time, I was told that my case had received a “careful” treatment because of the 
combination of the nature of my studies and my destination. After more than eight 
months, I still did not receive an official approval or rejection until a PSB (Public 
Security Bureau) officer told me privately that they could not issue me a passport 
based on my application materials, neither an official rejection. However he suggested 
that if I could file another application with a different reason—tourist or business but 
not study—they would consider it. Doing so would mean they would have no 
responsibilities in case of any negative consequences. So finally after almost one year 
I got my passport as a “tourist” even though this distinction is irrelevant for travel. 
If the passport incident was just a warning of the danger to cross the 
unbridgeable gap, I had experienced the reality of crossing the border when I came 
back to Tibet from Nepal through the land border at Zhangmu (Tib: ’gram).  
After a whole day trekking and waiting on the Nepali side, I finally arrived at 
the Chinese border in summer day of 2001—only to find that the gate was closed. I 
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 was told that there was “No passing through after 7pm”. Just when I was wondering 
what to do, two PLA border soldiers came to me and listened to my explanation. One 
of them, an ethnic Tibetan, told me in a friendly manner that they could make an 
exception to let me through. But they had to do a routine check of my bags first. I was 
very grateful for their kindness and kept on thanking them for this.  
They checked my passport first and I noticed that once they saw my US visas 
their attitude started to be different and more alert. The Tibetan soldier asked me what 
I did in America. Obviously not quite satisfied with my answer of being a student, he 
continued to search my backpack in the manner of checking for drug traffic. I feet no 
unease until they found in my bag the Tibetan-English brochure that I had casually 
picked up in a Tibetan school in Kathmandu.  
The two soldiers became very serious. They called over three more soldiers to 
continue checking my backpack. After another round of rummaging through my two 
backpacks, everything inside was taken out and put on the table. They started to go 
through each item until another finding shocked them—a photo of the Dalai Lama in 
my diary book which I had placed there years ago and even forgotten its existence.  
I began to feel like a drug smuggler who had just been caught. I realized that I 
could get into some serious trouble with these two things in this situation. As I thought 
the Tibetan soldier seemed to be friendly to me at first, I tried to explain to him that I 
didn’t do this on purpose and I did not know these things are forbidden here. It 
shocked me to see how he reacted to my plea with almost a punch on my nose and a 
yell. “Didn’t you know that you have made such a huge mistake (Ch: nameda de 
cuowu)?! And now you want to escape your responsibility (Ch: taobi zeren)?!” Then 
he pointed to the photo of the Dalai Lama and pressed on towards me almost spitting 
on my face: “Do you know who he is? He is a fenlie fenzi (splittist)! He is the head of 
the Dalai clique!” Despite my terror at that moment, I somehow still found a bit ironic 
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 when he spouted his Chinese propaganda terms with an obvious Tibetan accent. I 
spent the night in a PLA-owned hostel but my bags and passport remained in their 
office. 
The next morning I was led to an interrogation room where a senior officer, the 
highest political commander at this PLA border station, was already waiting with his 
assistants. The appearance of a high-ranking officer usually suggests the seriousness 
of the case. The plain concrete walls had one line of a Chinese slogan that said “(if 
you confess with) frankness (it would) lead you to leniency (justice), (if you hold back 
with) resistance (it would) lead you to stern (justice)” (Ch: tan bai cong kuan kang ju 
cong yan).  
They started with yet another check of my backpacks and finding nothing new. 
The Chinese officer started to ask me questions while his Tibetan assistant began to 
read through my diary. He confirmed that it was because of the Dalai Lama photo and 
the Tibetan boarding school brochure I had been detained. Both are considered “illegal 
propaganda” (Ch: feifa xuanchuanpin) and cannot be brought into China—although I 
actually brought the photo into China through Beijing. The interrogation lasted for 
almost a whole day but I was finally released based on my “potentiality” and 
“attitude.” 
 
Research Across the Borders 
This dissertation designed to reflect the complexity of the contemporary Sino-
Tibetan situation. While religion and ethnicity are central in my field research and 
dissertation, the situation in contemporary Tibet/China have been driven by social, 
political, and economic forces on multiple levels—local, national, and international. A 
neutral or value-free observation in the ideal anthropological tradition is not really 
possible under this circumstance. On the contrary, my own status as a Chinese 
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 researcher on Tibet with both a Chinese and US educational background has provided 
me a unique perspective but yet “no place” with which to approach this complexity. I 
have gradually learned how not to take such richly and complexly developed notions 
as ethnicity or religion for granted. My experience of being given/denied multiple 
identities and of being challenged in various circumstances across borders has largely 
shaped my views without which this dissertation could not have been accomplished. 
As an ethnographer I have been working in the interstices of nation, ethnic 
groups, and economic development. This is the position I think best for my research 
and for the structuring of my dissertation. More importantly, it is how this position has 
been taken by the locals and how they in turn have established a status for me in the 
local context—an identity independent of my will—that heavily influenced my 
research (see chapter 1). This dissertation is thereby the result of multiple forces and 
shows multiple direction of current situation. Moreover the unfolding meaning of even 
contradictory phenomena continuously negates the essentialized notions of 
Tibet/Tibetan, China/Chinese, or ethnic minorities such as Hui. By focusing on the 
complex meaning and dynamic adaptation of religion and ethnicity in a fast changing 
Chinese society I attempt to explore the limits and flexibility of different borders from 
the perspective of “no place.”  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
March 2nd 1999 was the fifteeth day of the Chinese New Year in the Chinese 
lunar calendar. This calendar is widely used in most of the Amdo Tibetan region.1 
Thus it is also the fifteenth day of the Tibetan New Year—the most exciting day of the 
two-week long Tibetan New Year celebration of Monlam Chenmo.2 At night there 
would be an annual monastic exhibition of butter-made flowers and Buddhist figures,3 
illuminated by lamps, in the two Tibetan monasteries in the Sino-Tibetan border town 
of Taktsang Lhamo, known as Langmusi in Chinese.4  
The Druchu River5 bisects this small mountain valley town, which falls into 
the two adjacent provinces of Sichuan and Gansu in western China. Surrounded by 
clusters of Tibetan villages, two large Tibetan monastery complexes on each side of 
the river mark the local landscape unambiguously with their Tibetan authority. With 
the celebration of Monlam Chenmo in both monasteries, this quiet little mountain 
valley suddenly became crowded and filled with a sea of colorfully dressed Tibetan 
nomads and peasants who arrived in overflowing trucks and tractors from the 
                                                 
1 The ethnic Tibetan area was traditionally constituted by three different regions—Central Tibet, Kham, 
and Amdo—that are distinct from each other geographically linguistically and culturally (Goldstein 
1998; Aldenderfer and Zhang 2004). See Figure 4. Amdo is also sometimes referred to by its 
geographical location, as Northeastern Tibet. Tibetan monastic rituals and folk festivals in Amdo have 
been observed through Chinese lunar calendar, instead of the Tibetan calendar which has been used 
exclusively in Central Tibet. See, e.g., the lurol (Tib: glu rol) festival which is held at the end of the 
sixth Chinese lunar month in Rebgong, Qinghai province (Buffetrille 2002) (Epstein and Peng 1998); 
the folk singing festival La ye also at this time; and Khri ka lha rtse, a five day celebration of a local 
Tibetan protective deity, which also happens according to the Chinese lunar calendar (Anton-Luca 
2002). 
2 Tib: smon lam chen mo, or Great Prayer Festival. See more discussions on Monlam Chenmo in 
chapter 4. 
3 Tib: bco lnga mchod pa, or me tog mchod pa, see also chapter 4. 
4 Tib: stag tshang lha mo, Ch: langmusi or namo, see more explanations on this name and place later in 
this chapter. See also Figures 1-4 for geographical location. 
5 Tib: ’brug-chu, Ch: bailong jiang or the White Dragon River. 
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surrounding pastoral or agricultural areas. This colorful sea of Tibetan pilgrims, along 
with thousands of Tibetan monks performing elaborate religious rituals in the two 
monasteries, have also attracted more and more metropolitan Chinese tourists—most 
of them amateur artists, journalists, or backpackers—to this once remote borderland. 
At the same time the small local community of Chinese Muslim (Ch: Hui, Huihui, or 
Huizu) residents, who owned most of the hotels, restaurants, and shops in town, began 
their business season with the arrival of all these Tibetan pilgrims and Chinese tourists.  
The day after was a mass exodus day. With the end of ceremonies in the 
monasteries, Tibetan pilgrims started to leave with a white ceremonial scarf (Tib: kha 
bdags) and a colorful silk tie (Tib: srung mdud, or “protective amulet”) around 
everyone’s neck which were blessed during the ceremony. Some also tied them to the 
reflection mirrors of their trucks and tractors for a safe trip back home. The end of the 
ceremony and departure of Tibetan pilgrims also meant closure for the visit of the 
Chinese tourists. They gathered in the Hui restaurants exchanging their exciting 
experiences while waiting for the next bus to get out of town. Taktsang Lhamo went 
back to its normal life.  
Three weeks after this Tibetan ceremony, March 28th seemed to be just another 
quiet day in Taktsang Lhamo. The first call of Allahu Akbar6 from the top of the 
mosque minaret broke the dawn of the morning and announced a Muslim day in this 
Tibetan land. It was the tenth day of the twelfth month according to the Islamic 
calendar—the traditional Muslim festival day of Guerbang (Ar: ‘Id al-Adha, or “feast 
of sacrifice”). Having had a half-day fast (Ch: kongzhai) since the night before, 
hundreds of local Hui people—men, women, children—dressed up in their new 
clothes for their first prayer of Guerbang before the day breaks. The mosque prayer 
                                                 
6 Arabic, lit., “God is great”, used as a common call for a Muslim communal praying (Gladney 1991: 
396). 
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hall—that hosts only men during routine Friday prayers (Ch: zhuma)—was separated 
by a curtain making a special a place for women on this special day. The prayer hall 
was soon full and those who arrived late had to kneel down on the carpet outside.  
The green minaret of the local Muslim mosque is right down the slope at the 
bottom of the valley and lies between the two Tibetan monasteries. Beside the 
conspicuously erect minaret, the mosque also includes a Chinese style mansion that 
serves as a prayer hall with a courtyard for community gatherings. In the courtyard, a 
large blackboard recorded everyone’s name in the community and incidated the 
amount of money s/he has contributed to the mosque for this year’s Guerbang. Most 
of the Hui businesses in town were closed for the day. The town was quiet except for 
the intermittent praying from mosque. Late in the afternoon after one day of praying, 
the Hui community came out of the prayer hall and gathered along tables placed in the 
mosque courtyard. They were waiting for the last part of this annual ceremony—an 
abundant feast of meat—before they went back home. In contrast to the Tibetan New 
Year celebration this Hui festival is hardly known to the outsiders, let alone any 
visitors.  
This dissertation is an ethnographic account of religious revival and ethnic 
reconstruction on the Sino-Tibetan borderland during the age of “reform and opening-
up” (Ch: gaige kaifang) in China. In this cultural borderland the ethno-religious 
revival has occurred simultaneously in two local communities: Tibetan, the local 
majority population, and Chinese Muslim, or Hui, the local minority community.7 As 
                                                 
7 See chapter 3 for my discussion on the majority and minority relations in Taktsang Lhamo. In 1953 
the Gansu part of the Taktsang Lhamo was set up as a xiang level administrative unit and named 
Langmusi. The Chinese statistics resource (GZDF 1999) shows that in the early 1950s the Tibetan 
population in Langmusi was 691, Muslim Hui 55, and Han Chinese 44. In 1990 the total population in 
Langmusi was 3,161. However, the way these data were collected in the official Chinese survey does 
not always reflect the actual population, particularly when dealing with certain cases such as minority 
populations, floating populations or monk populations. For example, monks living in the monasteries 
often represent a large population percentage in places like Taktsang Lhamo. But the official Chinese 
census only counts monks according to their originally registered residence places (Ch: hukou 
suozaidi). Therefore the majority of the monk population in the local monastery who does not have an 
3 
such, the local ethnoreligious revival includes a strikingly visible part of Tibetan 
Buddhist revival—the one that usually attracts most of the outside attention, both 
Chinese and Western—and an almost invisible part of Hui Islamic revival that is 
usually confined inside its own community but which nevertheless occurs side by side 
with its Tibetan counterpart.  
The general revival of religion and culture in China usually refers to the 
recovery of religious and cultural institutions or activities—destroyed on a massive 
scale during the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-76)—after the 1980s. Brought on 
by a major shift of Chinese Communist Party (hereafter CCP) policy since 1978, this 
recovery started in China proper through an intellectual reflection on Chinese culture 
and identity in early 1980s.8 Later, when broader and deeper research had been done 
in this area, it has become apparent that religious and cultural revivals have also taken 
place in widely various geographic regions and among different ethnic groups.9 
Generally aligning my work with these studies, I intend to contextualize the 
understanding of religion and ethnicity in two specific conditions—a geographic 
                                                                                                                                            
official residential status will not be counted in the local population, where they actually live. Another 
problem is the separated administration of Taktsang Lhamo in Sichuan and Gansu versus the actual 
cross-border living condition, which results in much confusion in these official data.  
According to my fieldwork data, the total residential population in Taktsang Lhamo as of 
2003-2005 was around 6,000 including both Gansu and Sichuan villages and the monastic population. 
Besides the Tibetan lay people as the majority population, Muslim Hui population is around 1,968 (with 
1496 belong to the Sichuan mosque and 472 belong to the Gansu mosque). Resident monks (including 
the unofficially affiliated child monks) in the two monasteries were about 1,080 (with 720 in the Kirti 
monastery and 360 in the Serchi monastery). The Han Chinese population in town is mostly migrant 
workers (Ch: mingong) from Sichuan or Gansu arriving since the 1980s. Most of them come for a short 
term (1-3 years) as construction workers or small vendors in residence only during the summer season 
when most work can be done. Some of them work long term (5-10 years) such as those in the restaurant 
business. This part of the population is difficult to calculate and I roughly estimate it as 100-200 in the 
low working season (winter) and 300-500 in the high working season (summer).  
8 These cultural reflections include for example the “cultural fever” (Ch: wenhua re) or “finding root 
literature” (Ch: xungen wenxue) (Zhang 1997). 
9 For example, the revival of religious pilgrimage, rituals, and monastic education in ethnic Tibetan 
areas (Goldstein and Kapstein 1998), Muslim mosques built in central China (Jaschok and Shui 2000), 
the Islamic resurgence in northwestern China (Gladney 1991), and the reconstruction of a Confucian 
temple in a frontier Chinese village (Jing 1996). 
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borderland where two different religions and ethnic groups coexist, and a specific era 
of Chinese post-socialist reform.  
By focusing on two ethnoreligious revivals in this borderland, I challenge such 
conventional conceptions as a timelessly traditional Tibetan society with an 
unquestionable core of “Tibetanness” vis-à-vis a monolithic Chinese culture and Han 
ethnicity. I intend to extend the concept of borderland from a static geographical area 
of a middle ground where different ethnic groups encounter and coexist, to a dynamic 
process shaped by different forces in different times with a constantly shifting 
meaning. As such, this seemingly remote borderland is neither just a backwater in the 
hinterland of fast growing China, nor simply an exotic object in the new Chinese 
cultural market. Rather it is a ground for a contest among different motivations, 
desires, ethnic visions, and constructions of landscape. 
As crucial identity markers for both Tibetan and Hui, religion and ethnicity 
have played a vital role in the reconstruction of their identities as well as in their new 
visions of local place in a post-socialist Chinese state. The two communities have 
revived each tradition simultaneously with reference to the broader political economic 
context of the Chinese state as well as to global influences. Indeed it is both their 
competing interests and their reference to each other within the same post-socialist 
Chinese context that have provided a new common ground for the two communities—
either competition or negotiation—upon which they have struggled to reconstruct their 
own spaces and identities in an era of Chinese reform and social change. 
 
1.1 Tibetan Studies, Minority Studies and Chinese Studies 
Broadly defined within Chinese studies, the main subject of this dissertation 
can be linked to two specific topics: Tibetan studies and ethnic minority studies in 
China. Given the polemical debate on the so-called “Tibet question” powered by two 
5 
opposing nationalist projects from Beijing and Dharamsala, one immediate underlying 
question is the feasibility and credibility of a study like this. That is to say, to what 
extent can we relate “Tibetan studies” to “minority studies in China” (indeed to any 
kind of Chinese-related studies in that sense)? Or can we do that at all? Indeed these 
two polarized discourses have been claimed in such a self-evident manner that much 
previous scholarship has grounded their arguments on either of the two projects 
without any critical analysis.10 The polarization of the “Tibetan question” led by the 
two political agendas not only leaves little, if any, spaces in between, but it also leads 
directly to increasing difficulties and dilemmas in all Tibetan related studies.11 In his 
recent work on Sino-Tibetan relations through a historical perspective of Buddhism, 
Gray Tuttle (2005) observed that Western scholarship on Tibetan related studies has 
made surprisingly rare use of the widely available Chinese language resources related 
to Tibet and even less has attempted to make a linkage between the two. It seems that 
studying Chinese language or using Chinese resources in Tibetan studies is considered 
to be academically uninteresting or unimportant, or simply not credible due to the 
underlying political rivalry. This dilemma in Tibetan studies has been critically 
challenged by a new generation of scholarship on Tibetan studies and related 
subjects.12 During recent years even Tibetan studies itself has become a study subject 
                                                 
10 This is particularly true in much of the Tibetan scholarship. In China this means that “Tibetan studies, 
or Tibetology, have always been an internal sub-study in a unified multiethnic Chinese nation” (Wang, 
et al. 2003) which assumes the legitimacy of Chinese encompassment of Tibet both politically and 
culturally. In the West, on the contrary, most Tibetan scholarship takes the opposing view for granted, 
which parallels social and historical traditions between China and Tibet. Here I mean to critique a 
nationalist assumption in these works that has not been critically evaluated, e.g. (Smith 1996; Shakabpa 
1967).  
11 By this I mean that those who try to craft a space in between find themselves being rejected by both 
sides. For example, by writing his book on modern Tibetan history, Tsering Shakya (1999) was 
considered a “traitor” by many Tibetan nationalists. At the same time he was also condemned as a 
“splittist” in Chinese official discourse (Hu 1999) In very much the same manner as many other works 
like (Walt van Praag 1987) or (Shakabpa 1967), despite their notable differences.  
12 To list some recent publications (Tuttle 2005; Stevenson 2005; Kolås and Thowsen 2005; Schrempf 
2002; Upton 1999; Makley 1999).  
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under the scholarly investigation, both in China and in the west (Lopez 1998; Wang, et 
al. 2003).  
Studies on ethnic minority groups in China have been flourishing both in 
China and beyond, particularly during the last decade.13 What makes ethnic minority 
groups in China a fascinating subject is certainly more than the simple fact that this 
official 8% of the population in China, around 100 million people, inhabits more than 
half of the national territory. The immense cultural diversity under a seemingly unified 
multiethnic Chinese state illuminates many contemporary issues related to culture and 
society, nation and nationalism, hybridity and subalternity, center and periphery, and 
colonialism and post-colonialism. Most of the studies on these ethnic minority groups 
have viewed China as either a direct resisting object upon which an alternative version 
of history or identity has been constructed (Mueggler 2001; Bovingdon 2002) or an 
agent of a “civilizing project” which has engaged in a transformation of its subjects 
(Harrell 1995a). As a result one may come up with quite contradictory images of 
China: either a de-mythicized Chinese nation-state constituted by many “other 
Chinas” (Litzinger 2000) or a rather universalized China with many “smaller 
constellations and mountains of interesting facts” (Blum 2002).  
One prominent question in studying the ethnic minorities is whether China can 
be treated as a monolithic cultural entity and Han can be treated as a single racial 
category. This echoes the new generation of Tibetan scholarship that questions the 
                                                 
13 Minority studies in China took form in very different way from that in the west. For a general review 
on that in China, see (Guldin 1994). See (Blum and Jensen 2002) for a study on China through the 
perspectives of different marginalized groups. Studies on specific minority groups include, for example, 
Dai (Hansen 1999), Hui (Gladney 1991; Lipman 1997; Gillette 2000), Tibetan (Goldstein and Kapstein 
1998; Kolås and Thowsen 2005), Yao (Litzinger 2000), Miao (Schein 2000), Zhuang (Kaup 2000), Yi 
(Harrell 2001b; Mueggler 2001), Mongolian (Bulag 2002; Williams 2002), Uyghur (Bovingdon 2002; 
Smith 2002) etc. For other non-ethnic marginalized people, see for example, Chinese immigrant 
workers in the city (Honig 1992; Zhang 2001), an ethnically and linguistically non-Han people but 
officially not a minority group (Friedman 2004), culturally, geographically or economically 
marginalized Chinese community (Jing 1996; Liu 2000). 
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fundamental legitimacy of the two opposing nationalist projects.14 Here, the 
interdisciplinary scholarship on nation and nationalism provides us with a useful tool 
to reconsider the conundrum of China and its ethnic minorities.15 Drawing upon the 
theories of both ethnic minority cultures in China and the contemporary Chinese 
nationalism, I question the dualistic view of modern Tibetan culture in China as either 
a ruin of Chinese cultural and material modernity or a colonial Chinese appearance 
with an impenetrable Tibetan core. I ask questions such as: Have Tibetan culture and 
Tibetan society been as important as other ethnic minority groups in the modern 
Chinese nation-building process? How did the Chinese state and its policy contribute 
to the construction and reconstruction of ethnic minorities in China? What are the 
dynamics between ethnic minority groups (such as Tibetan and Hui) and the Chinese 
state? It is through the critique of modern nation-building and nationalism that my 
study intends to communicate between Tibetan studies, minority studies and Chinese 
studies. By situating subject of my study—Tibetan and Hui communities—in a 
cultural borderland, this dissertation joins this new scholarship on China to challenge 
the static notion of religion and ethnicity in the radical changing society of China. 
I consider this dissertation to be a borderland study from different aspects. Not 
only is the area I am focusing on a geographical and ethnic borderland both in pre-
nation state period and in modern Chinese nation, but I have also challenged different 
boundaries between the so-called Tibetan studies, ethnic minority studies, and Chinese 
studies. In addition, my own position—as a Han Chinese researcher on Tibet getting a 
Ph.D. from an American university—is itself a borderland experience that challenges 
many conventional conceptions. Thus it is also my intention to integrate my own 
                                                 
14 For a critique of nation building in case of China and Tibet, see, e.g., (Duara 1995; Upton 1999; 
Makley 1999; Blum and Jensen 2002; Tuttle 2005). 
15 Besides the classic theory on nation and nationalism (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 
1990), there has been a growing critique on nationalism particularly in the context of China, see (Duara 
1995; Fiskesjö 2006) .  
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position, situation, and dilemma into a more comprehensive borderland perspective 
which both challenges and enriches the areas of Tibetan studies, minority studies and 
Chinese studies. Despite my effort to re/interpret these categories with my personal 
experience, it is less intended to follow the line of a postmodern critique with an 
anthropologist’s confession of “writing culture” (Clifford and Marcus 1986), but 
rather to illuminate and transcend the many dichotomies and dilemmas in the studies 
of China and related issues (e.g. the Sino-Tibetan dilemma, minorities vs. Han 
dichotomies). Through my personal experience, which I consider itself a “border 
experience,” I introduce the evolution of my research subject in this dissertation—
cultural encounters in a borderland.  
 
1.2 A Chinese Experience of Minority Studies 
In 1995 I joined a Master’s program in Tibetan language and history at the 
Central University of Nationalities (Ch: zhongyang minzu xueyuan, hereafter CUN) in 
Beijing.16 Since attending CUN, I have been frequently approached with the same first 
question: “Are you a shaoshu minzu (“ethnic minority” or “minority nationalities”)?” 
Not quite satisfied with my simple answer of “no,” there are usually more questions 
such as: “How come a Han Chinese is studying in a minority university? Isn’t that 
(only) for those minorities? What can you (a Han Chinese) study in a minority 
university? What is the use (for a Han Chinese) of learning a minority language?” 
Despite the fact that there has never been any policy that prevents Han Chinese 
students from going to these minority universities, the Chinese public stereotype of 
ethnic minorities and minority institutions reflects the hegemonic state terminology 
                                                 
16 There is a study of CUN itself as a site where the ethnic minority subjects and their identities have 
been shaped through education (Clothey 2004a; Clothey 2004b).   
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that is related to the creation of ethnic minorities as new social categories after the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China.17
Founded in 1951, the CUN was initially created as primarily a training school, 
rather than a research institution, for ethnic minority cadres nationwide. The creation 
of minority academic institutions reflected the political symbolism of the new socialist 
China at that time. As a central minority institution that symbolizes the unity of all 
national minorities under the central leadership of CCP, CUN has since its inception 
included all the officially recognized ethnic minorities from all over China—compared 
to other provincial or regional minority institutions which usually include only the 
ethnic minorities represented in its own region. 
While minzu is simply a neologism borrowed from Japanese in the early 20th 
century as an equivalent to the modern western notion of “nation” or “nationality,” the 
term shaoshu minzu is heavily loaded with the CCP ideology after 1949. In the 
beginning of the People’s Republic, anthropology as a discipline was abolished in 
China as a “bourgeois residue.” Many aspects of anthropology, including the studies 
of ethnic groups, were in practice redistributed to some other state sanctioned 
disciplines and thus were maintained as archaeology and ethnology (Ch: minzu xue lit., 
“study of nationalities”). In 1952 a national campaign was launched to re-arrange all 
the universities and their departments in order to clean up the stain left by the 
bourgeois ideology and to transform them into a new socialist academy. It was during 
this time that all the minority-related programs and departments along with minority 
                                                 
17Even after I came to the US, this question has been constantly brought up to me by both Chinese 
students and Chinese scholars who are studying or teaching in the US institutions. The natural coming 
up of this question underlines the stereotypical idea of the “ethnic minority” and “minority studies” in 
China as well as the long-term hegemonic CCP discourse that has created this public stereotype.  
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research scholars were moved into the newly founded minority institutions all over 
China, including the CUN.18  
The CCP policy on ethnic minorities in China is far from simply a colonial one. 
Both the Communist government and its predecessor the Republican government have 
struggled hard with the question of ethnic minorities and their proper position in the 
building of modern China.19 Many recent scholarly works have revisited the first 
national project of “ethnic identification” (Ch: minzu shibie) after the founding of the 
PRC.20 From these works we can see that the CCP government has chosen neither a 
completely liberal policy—one that grants sovereignty to those non-Han ethnic 
minorities—nor a heavy handed policy to create a unified citizenship by forced 
assimilation. Instead, they have actively acknowledged, if not encouraged, the ethnic 
differences and have further managed these differences into a new national scheme.21 
It was also through this ethnic identification project that the CCP government 
encountered both the complexity of ethnic diversity and limitation of the “scientific 
Marxism” or the Soviet theory of ethnology.22 As a result a more flexible and 
sometimes improvised interpretation of those guiding theories was applied on the 
                                                 
18 There used to be a Tibetan language program in the Oriental language department of Beijing 
University before 1949. After the re-arrangement it was separated from Beijing University to join with 
the newly established Tibetan language program in the CUN. Many scholars in this program such as Yu 
Daoquan were also re-assigned to CUN at that time. The political symbolism of this re-arrangement 
was as significant as the academic strengthening of the Tibetan studies later in the PRC. 
19 Magnus Fiskesjo has discussed in details the ethnic policy during the Republican period (Fiskesjö 
2006). For other discussions on the Chinese politics towards ethnic minorities during the Republic 
period, see, e.g., (Goodman 1983) (Schein 2000). 
20 For more details and studies on the ethnic identification project, see (Fei 1981; Harrell 1995c; 
Litzinger 2000: 3-8; Tapp 2002). See also a special issue on the minzu shibie (ethnic classification) 
project in China Information July 2004, vol.XVIII, No. 2.  
21 Fiskesjo (2006) argues that this CCP management of ethnic difference is in fact a continuation from 
the unfulfilled Republican policy. It can be seen as a modern Chinese nation building policy that carries 
the imperial legacy. 
22 The Marxist ethnic theory then was mostly associated with the Stalinist guideline with four criteria of 
the nationalities and the Morgan-Engels’ model of social evolutionism, see (Guldin 1994). It was 
reported that more than 400 ethnic groups had initially applied (or the ethnographers did on their 
behalf) to be recognized as shaoshu minzu by the central government in the beginning of “ethnic 
identification” (Fei 1981). I thank Magnus Fiskesjö for pointing out this to me.  
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practical level. Based on these ethnographers’ reports, the CCP government eventually 
granted 56 groups minzu status including the majority Han which together make up a 
Zhonghua minzu (Chinese nationality). Where those 56 ethnic groups lived then 
became the national territory of the new People’s Republic of China. Through this 
interaction of recognizing and being recognized, the problems of these ethnic 
differences, though far from resolved, have nevertheless been effectively regulated in 
China. Ideologically it was rendered under a new discourse of multiethnic Chinese 
nation-state and a Han majority that was created as politically and culturally more 
advanced than the minorities. 
 
1.3 Moving to the Borderland: Names and Their Discontent 
I arrived at Taktsang Lhamo the first time during the Monlam Chenmo 
(Tibetan New Year) period in 1999. My basic intention was to investigate some places 
in Amdo for my later research purposes. After several years of experiences in central 
Tibet, I was immediately struck by the Amdo difference in many respects—language, 
food, dress, monastic system, and more. My Tibetan robe has got me more attention 
than other Chinese tourists.23 Some curious local Tibetans approached me on the street 
to check out if I was really a Tibetan. My newly adopted Amdo Tibetan dialect with a 
                                                 
23 During my several stays in this area, I (and later my wife) have always dressed in Tibetan gard. This 
is first because our robes were the first gifts from a local Tibetan friend. It was important to wear it both 
as an acceptance of the friendship and as an introduction to the local—at least the Tibetan—community. 
Another reason is more to the practical end. Being at an altitude of 3,300 meters high, the climate in this 
region is cold and windy with a long winter season, usually from October to May. A thick Tibetan robe 
serves as a must for every Tibetan in this region even during the summer as it could get cold even snow 
or hailstorm at any time (Ekvall 1939; Ekvall 1964). Since the beginning I have been fully aware of the 
attention I could get with a Tibetan robe and an obviously not local face, accent, or anything else. As an 
anthropologist, I am always very skeptical as to how “local” an anthropologist can actually become 
simply by dressing locally or even speaking the local language—not to mention my own position as a 
Han Chinese with an American background doing research in Tibet. On the practical level dressing in 
Tibetan robe has given me both advantages and disadvantages throughout my stay, which I will spell 
out more in the later chapters.  
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Lhasa accent led to even more curiosity. Many local Tibetans later referred to me as 
the “guy who speaks Tibetan language.”24  
My final choice of Taktsang Lhamo as my field site was based on many 
different reasons—some were theoretical interests and personal experiences while 
others were simply local conditions that offered real possibilities for research. In the 
course of approaching the historical, geographical, and cultural complexity of this 
borderland, I have found many geographical names, Tibetan or Chinese, deserving 
some clarification, including the very name of “Tibet.” 
In contemporary writings the word “Tibet” often refers to different 
geographical, ethnographic, or political concepts by different authors in different 
disciplines. The “premodern Tibet”, as Geoffrey Samuel (1993) calls it, refers to the 
Tibetan world before the Chinese annexation in 1950s, which was constituted by three 
major provinces—U-tsang (Central Tibet), Kham (Eastern Tibet), Amdo 
(Northeastern Tibet)—as well as some small vassals, tribes, or other population 
centers along the Himalayas (including much of today’s Ladakh, Sikkhim, Mustang, 
and Bhutan).25 Linked through mainly cultural, economic, and especially religious 
relations in a pre-nation-state fashion, the administrative or political relationships 
among these units has always been a source of polemics in the modern nation-state 
context. Like every empire in the world, Tibetan central power also expanded and 
contracted through out its history.26 Although the Tibetan power center in Lhasa has 
ruled “political Tibet”—mostly U-tsang in the traditional cultural geographical setting, 
or Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in today’s PRC—it was nevertheless only one of 
                                                 
24 In local Amdo dialect, bod skyad, or “Tibetan language”, refers unambiguously to only the Lhasa 
dialect. It is clearly different from the “language” (skyad) or the “Amdo language” (a mdo skyad) which 
is the language of local people.  
25 For a description of these different regions and their “premodern” history, see (Samuel 1993). 
26 During the Tibetan empire period (7th-9th century), the Tibetan army successfully controlled much of 
today’s Tibetan cultural world (Beckwith 1987). Many contemporary disputes on Tibetan political 
history originate from the period after the Tibetan empire collapsed. 
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the many “modal states” (Samuel 1990; Samuel 1993) or “galactic polities” (Tambiah 
1976; Tambiah 1985) in the premodern Tibetan world. Melvyn Goldstein (1998) uses 
the term “political Tibet” to describe a Lhasa-centered central Tibet represented by 
religio-political power (Tib: chos srid gnyis’brel) of the Dalai Lama since the 17th 
century. As a contrast he has used the term “ethnographic Tibet” to represent much the 
same range as Samuel’s “premodern Tibet” but has changed the defining criteria from 
a temporal standard to that of ethnicity and culture.27  
The Chinese annexation of Tibet in 1951 has rendered the major portion of 
“premodern Tibet” into the contemporary Chinese state. It has since been separated 
from the rest of the Tibetan cultural world. While many scholars still refer to Tibet 
with its traditional division and former integrity, this major entity of Tibet in China 
has been fragmented and re-organized according to the new Chinese system. In China, 
the word Xizang (Chinese equivalent of “Tibet”) conveys only a geographical concept 
of the current TAR, an administrative equivalence to a Chinese province, which 
covers the former “political Tibet” or U-tsang. Interestingly, despite the adversarial 
stand on Tibet between the Chinese government and the Tibetan government in exile, 
Central Tibet (or TAR in China)—its language, tradition, political status, etc.—has 
been used by both sides as the authentic representative of “Tibet.” Central Tibetan 
tradition is thus represented as the standard “Tibetan culture,” a representation with 
which more than half of the Tibetan population who lives outside the TAR would not 
naturally agree. According to an independent survey, not only is the Tibetan area 
outside TAR much larger than the TAR proper, but the Tibetan population living 
outside TAR is also larger than that living in the TAR (Marshall and Cooke 1997). 
The Tibetan areas outside of the TAR have long been the frontier of Central Tibet and 
                                                 
27 Hugh Richardson first used “political Tibet” and “ethnographic Tibet” to describe the political and 
cultural geography on the Tibetan plateau (Richardson 1984). See also (Goldstein and Kapstein 1998). 
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also the border zone between ethnic China and ethnic Tibet. These ethnic Tibetan 
areas outside the TAR have now fallen into four other Chinese provinces—Qinghai, 
Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan—in which, although Tibetan territory and population 
have been assigned as autonomous prefectures or counties, they constitute only a small 
part on the provincial level.  
The geographical vastness, cultural diversity, and complexity of political and 
historical development in the Sino-Tibetan borderland make it both an exciting and a 
challenging choice for my research subject and fieldwork site. Coming from training 
in Tibetan literature and history, I have always been attracted to religion and ethnicity 
in Tibetan culture from both historical and contemporary perspectives. During my 
Master’s studies in the Central University of Nationalities in Beijing I first became 
interested in the history of western Tibet. I was particularly interested in the Tibetan 
encounters with Christian missionaries in western Tibet and the subsequent fall of the 
Guge kingdom during the 17th century.28 It was through this that I was directed to a 
Chinese translation of Robert Ekvall’s 1952 novel—maybe more precisely an 
anthropological account of Amdo Tibetan life in the 1930-40s.29 However what struck 
me immediately in this book was not his exotic adventures in Amdo Tibetan life but 
rather an enormous confusion of names and maps.30 Until I finally got the original 
English version, I realized that the Chinese and Tibetan transliterations of the names in 
this book were hardly comprehensible because they were not translated through either 
the Chinese Mandarin Pinyin system—the standard Chinese alphabetical system used 
                                                 
28 See (Martin and Bentor 1997) for a comprehensive list of Tibetan historical literature on western 
Tibet. See (Wu 1992) for an account of early Christian missionizing attempts in western Tibet. Also see 
my review of Namkha Norbu’s book on the history of Zhangzhung in western Tibet (Zhang 2000). 
29 (Ekvall 1952). Born in an American missionary family in northwestern China, Ekvall had been a 
Christian missionary himself and had been living for many years among the nomad Tibetans on the 
Sino-Tibetan borderland before 1949. 
30 In fact the Chinese version of Ekvall’s book was translated as a fiction instead of any biographical 
account. I am convinced that the Chinese translator himself might not even know the actual place he has 
translated since the principle name of the place Taktsang Lhamo was translated into a random Chinese 
name instead of the official Chinese name Langmusi (Liu 1992). 
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only after 1949, or the Tibetan Wylie system—the standard Tibetan alphabetical 
system proposed by Tibetologist Turrell Wylie in the 1950s.31 This has made it very 
difficult to trace the original names, not to mention all the changes of names or places 
that happened after 1950s. Ekvall was born in China and Chinese was the first 
language he adopted.32 After he started to develop missionary work in Tibetan areas 
during the 1930s-40s, he studied Tibetan and eventually stayed among nomad 
Tibetans for many years. Later he was trained as a cultural anthropologist in Chicago 
and his novels were more ethnographic than fictional, which means all the names of 
the people and places in the books have a real model. Yet I still could barely relate any 
of the place names that appeared in his book to anywhere on a contemporary Chinese 
map. Even the map he provided on the front page of his book could hardly match the 
corresponding part on contemporary map of Gansu and Sichuan.  
The Republican period (1911-1949) was the transitional period from the 
former Qing Empire to a modern nation-state. It was also the beginning of Chinese 
nation-building process. One of the major changes during this period was the 
demarcation of national and provincial borders. Although the Gansu and Sichuan 
provinces had already been set up officially by the (Republican) Chinese government, 
the actual borders of these provinces faded in this wild Tibetan frontier where few 
Chinese had ever entered.  
Taktsang Lhamo—Tib: stagtshang lhamo, lit. “Tiger’s Cave Goddess”, locals 
usually refer to it as Lhamo—is the Tibetan name of this region traditionally part of 
Amdo. Before the 1950s, it had been mostly inhabited by Tibetan nomad tribes (Tib: 
tsho ba) centered on two Tibetan monasteries—Kirti Monastery (Tib: kirti dgonpa) 
                                                 
31 I should mention, however, that his later works, i.e. (Ekvall 1964), did comply with the Wylie system 
(Wylie 1959).  
32 The information hereafter about Ekvall’s biography comes from the online archival material from 
Wheaton College, http://www.wheaton.edu/bgc/archives/GUIDES/092.htm#602.  
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and Serchi Monastery (Tib: serkhri dgonpa), both belong to the Yellow, or Gelugpa 
sect. There was a small Muslim community with two mosques in this Tibetan village. 
Chinese Muslims, or Hui as they are called today, had been living in the Sino-Tibetan 
borderland as business traders since the late Chinese imperial period of the 19th 
century. While Taktsang Lhamo nowadays serves as an important middle stop on the 
Sichuan-Gansu highway between Chengdu and Lanzhou, travelers before 1950s had to 
make a big detour through northern Sichuan and southeastern Gansu just to avoid 
passing through this region. This vast borderland region, represented as a huge blank 
part on the map, was considered to be a dangerously wild land that was virtually 
unknown to the Chinese world at the time.33 Meanwhile it was also an uncharted field 
that had been excitedly imagined by the new Chinese nation builders but yet to be 
incorporated in the newly constructed Chinese nation-state. This task of national 
incorporation was finally accomplished by the CCP government in the 1950s. After 
the CCP takeover, this region has been administratively re-organized on the new 
Chinese map as part of Gansu, Sichuan and Qinghai, with many places re-named in 
Chinese.34  
It was not until much later when I first came across the small Sino-Tibetan 
town of Langmusi on the border of Gansu and Sichuan that I suddenly noticed that the 
local Tibetans referred to this place as Lhamo, a name that had been so familiar in my 
mind through reading all of Ekvall’s books.  
                                                 
33 See (ZGGL 1987) for a list of road maps before 1949 and also a history of road construction between 
Gansu and Sichuan. With the rise of nationalist consciousness in Republican China, Chinese officials 
and intellectuals had traveled in this “virgin land” and called for a nationalist attention to this uncharted 
field. Yu Xiangwen, a pioneer Chinese scholar in this region in the late 1930s, expressed a deep 
concern about how “ignorant we have been of this borderland before” (Yu 1947). Another Republican 
official, Ma Hetian, who was traveling in Labrang region north of this area during the same period of 
time, traced the ethnic origins of Hui Muslims in the region and local place names back to certain 
Chinese historical sources (Ma 1947).  See also (Fan 1938) for a Chinese journalist’s report to this area.  
34 This renaming of places includes not only Tibetan names but also many Chinese names as well. 
Many of the classical Chinese names have been replaced by modern, simplified Chinese names.   
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After the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, it took many more 
years for the CCP to actually take control of many areas now officially part of the 
Chinese national territory. When Taktsang Lhamo was officially “liberated” in 1953, it 
was immediately separated into two parts: one in Gansu and one in Sichuan, with one 
monastery and one mosque in each province. The Gannan Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture (GTAP) (Ch: gannan zangzu zizhizhou, a Chinese administrative unit under 
the Gansu province) officially incorporated the Gansu part of Taktsang Lhamo and 
renamed it Langmusi (Ch: Langmu temple)—a Chinese transliteration of the Tibetan 
name Lhamo (GZDF 1999). With the Great Leap Forward campaign in 1958, 
Langmusi was renamed as “Great Leap Forward People’s Commune” (Ch: yuejin 
renmin gongshe). In 1961, the Great Leap Forward came to an end and the name of 
Langmusi was renamed “Long March Township” (Ch: changzheng xiang). During the 
Cultural Revolution period Langmusi was again changed into “Langmusi 
Revolutionary Committee” (Ch: langmusi geming weiyuanhui). It has only returned to 
the name Langmusi as the seat of township (Ch: xiang) administration since 1983.  
Simultaneously, on the Sichuan side there has also been a parallel process of 
name changing. In 1954 the Sichuan part of Taktsang Lhamo was officially included 
in Ruo’ergai (Tib: mdzod-dge) county (Ch: xian, a Chinese administrative unit) as a 
district called Namo—another Chinese transliteration of the Tibetan name Lhamo 
(RGDF 1996). In 1958 the Namo district was renamed “Red Star Township” (Ch: 
hongxing xiang) in order to fit in with the Great Leap Forward campaign. Since then 
the seat of the township was moved out and the Sichuan part of Taktsang Lhamo was 
turned into two People’s Communes (Ch: renmin gongshe) in 1960. In 1983 People’s 
Communes became two villages (Ch: cun) of the Namo district that was resumed after 
the Cultural Revolution. Since the Chinese maps show only place names (in Chinese) 
down to the xiang level, today Taktsang Lhamo is only represented through the name 
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of Langmusi on the Gansu side. Most people have come to know this place by the 
name Langmusi as a town in Gansu province since it is the only name that appears on 
the Chinese map.  
The provincial separation of Taktsang Lhamo along with the new Chinese 
naming has had a profound impact in many respects. Langmusi (lit. “Lang mu temple, 
or monastery”) has been used in different contexts by different people to address 
different things—e.g., geographical region of Taktsang Lhamo, either of the two 
Tibetan monasteries and later even the Muslim mosque. Regular electricity has 
reached this region in 2000 and replaced the former local hydropower station that 
could only supply five hours of unstable electricity everyday. Since this regular 
electricity comes from Liujiaxia, one of the biggest national hydropower stations 
located in Gansu, it served the Gansu part of Langmusi. Because of the provincial 
administrative separation the regular electricity did not extend to the Sichuan side, 
which is practically just across the street, until almost two years later. Similarly, most 
of the local infrastructure—postal service, telephone service, hospital, etc.—is set up 
on the Gansu side by the Gansu administration. These facilities have served to 
reinforce the new creation of Langmusi as a remote and backward ethnic borderland in 
the fringe of China and at the same have diminished the traditional geographical and 
cultural conception of Taktsang Lhamo. More profoundly, the road construction from 
Lanzhou, the capital city of Gansu, to Langmusi which was finished in 2004 
completely changed the formerly equal access of Langmusi from Sichuan and Gansu. 
Tourist buses from Lanzhou now take a smooth ride of only seven to eight hours to 
arrive at Langmusi—compared to a two-day rough ride from Chengdu with a 
mandatory stay overnight on the way, similar to the Gansu side before this road was 
constructed.35   
                                                 
35 See more discussion of this road construction in chapter 6.  
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Since I conceive of this borderland as constructed by many different forces 
during different periods of time, I choose to use different names throughout this 
dissertation—Taktsang Lhamo, Langmusi, Namo, Kirti, Serchi, Langmu Mosque—to 
represent different constructive forces behind the use of each specific name. For 
example, I use Langmusi mostly to represent the Gansu administrative part of 
Taktsang Lhamo and Namo to represent the Sichuan administrative part. The name 
Taktsang Lhamo implies a traditional integrity in an Amdo Tibetan world. It 
represents both a geographical concept that goes beyond Gansu and Sichuan 
administrative parts today and also a cultural concept that has lost its original social 
and political context and thus only exists in local language and memories today. Every 
constructive force in this borderland is a vital part of the local landscape. Therefore I 
intend to use different names to partly reflect the immense complexity that goes 
beyond many geographical and ideological borders.  
The politicization of the “Tibet question” has resulted in the politicization of 
almost everything related to Tibet, including the place names. In contemporary Tibet, 
both scholars and tourists have to strike the balance between using a traditional 
Tibetan name to refer to a Tibetan place or to use a new Chinese name instead. It is at 
once a matter of political correctness in terms of retaining traditional Tibetan cultural 
integrity—thus accepting or resisting the Chinese cultural colonization—and a matter 
of practicality.36 I treat places and ethnic groups, particularly in this culturally 
diversified borderland, as dynamically constructed categories with changing meanings 
under different circumstances and times by different peoples. My use of Taktsang 
                                                 
36 When I traveled for the first time to the Ruo’ergai county in Sichuan by bus, I met two Dutch men 
who had a hard time explaining to the Chinese driver the place name they wanted to go. As they did not 
speak Chinese they told the driver the place name on their guidebook—mDzod dge, an English 
transliteration from the Tibetan pronunciation. Since it does not quite match the Chinese transliteration 
of the place Ruo er gai, the Chinese driver simply could not understand no matter how they explained. I 
also noticed similar cases happened in other Tibetan places.  
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Lhamo is first a way to address the geographical and ethnic inclusiveness of the region 
and peoples under investigation. It is also my intention to use Taktsang Lhamo as a 
categorical contrast to all the lately constructed names and concepts (i.e. Langmusi), 
which, I argue later, make up part of the new landscape and layer of meanings in this 
borderland. 
The first explicit choice I had to make on these different names was when I 
moved to this borderland to do long-term anthropological research. I had no choice but 
to pick one side—Sichuan or Gansu—in order to go through the “top-down” 
administrative processes to set my foot in my field site. When I chose to get in from 
the Sichuan side, I realized that I was expected by my host to have not just a “Tibetan” 
project but a “Sichuan Tibetan” project. Therefore despite the fact that my field site 
Taktsang Lhamo is practically administrated by Gansu, I chose to use all the names on 
the Sichuan side, i.e., Ruo’ergai County, Namo village—instead of GTAP and 
Langmusi—which makes it part of Sichuan and thus make it possible for me go 
through all the levels of administrations from Chengdu to Ruo’ergai and finally arrive 
at Namo/Langmusi/Taktsang Lhamo. 
 
1.4 “Little Tibet” With “Little Mecca”: Importance of Locality and Theory 
This dissertation comes out of anthropological fieldwork that can be termed 
classic—long-term participant observation based primarily in one location. As 
indicated by many scholars, however, this traditional sense of culture and 
community—defined as a group of people sharing common identity bounded to a 
geographical place—has long been problematic in many circumstances especially in 
areas like borderlands, multiethnic regions, postcolonial hybridity, and in the course of 
social cultural change (Gupta and Ferguson 1992). What characterizes Taktsang 
Lhamo as a borderland is not only its geographical location on the edge of the Tibetan 
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plateau but also an immense ethnic, regional, and religious diversity. In this sense, my 
study of Taktsang Lhamo as a borderland joins the challenge to the conventional 
concept of a bounded culture and community.  
For Robert Ekvall or other pre-1949 travelers to this region, this place was no 
doubt “Tibet” since Tibetans were obviously the majority population and all the major 
powers—social, economic and political—were in the hands of Tibetans, either 
monastic or lay.37 The Chinese Muslim Hui community was no more than some 
visible or invisible aliens in this Tibetan land. Fifty years later Chinese and foreign 
tourists (including myself at first) came to Taktsang Lhamo and they were also 
looking for some authentic Tibetan experiences in a Chinese backwater. As described 
in a Chinese tourist brochure, Taktsang Lhamo is “the last piece of pure land in 
Tibetan regions” (Ch: zangqu zuihou yi pian jingtu). It is advertised as both a 
“modernity-free” land not yet touched by Chinese modernization/colonialism and also 
a backwater that is to be transformed in the new national project called Great 
Development of the West (Ch: xibu da kaifa, hereafter GDOW).38 With the Chinese 
government introduction of the Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, this region 
has been officially labeled “China’s little Tibet, Gansu’s backyard garden” (Ch: 
Zhongguo de xiao Xizang, Gansu de hou huayuan). This name, given by the 
government, has been widely displayed and propagated as slogans in many public 
places—streets, government buildings, tourist spots—all over the Gannan cities as 
well as on many official publications and websites.39 The Chinese government logic 
of advertising the pristine nature of an otherwise underdeveloped backwater is 
officially called “culture makes the stage and economy sings the opera [on it]” (Ch: 
                                                 
37 This is evident through many of Ekvall’s books, i.e. (Ekvall 1938; Ekvall 1952; Ekvall 1979). 
38 The national project to develop the western part of China has been launched in 1999 by the Chinese 
government with the aim to develop all the “poor and backward” regions. For more on this project see a 
special issue of China Quarterly 2004, vol.178. See (Sines 2002; Goodman 2004).     
39 See, e.g., Gannan Prefecture Commercial Investment Website http://www.gnzzsw.com/index.asp.   
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wenhua datai, jingji changxi). That means culture or tradition is not more than a 
showcase, which is only useful so long as it helps developing the local economy. For 
Chinese or foreign tourists, this “little Tibet” not only guarantees an authentic Tibetan 
experience but also provides an alternative for those who can not go to the real “Tibet” 
that is said to have already been transformed—thus contaminated—by Chinese 
modernization/colonialism.40  
This “little Tibet”, however, also has another face—that of Islam. Gannan has 
long been the home of Chinese Muslim Hui and a major Islamic center in northwest 
China. Ever since the Chinese Tang dynasty (8th century) Arab traders have been 
roaming over the western part of China through the Silk Road. Many Muslims have 
established themselves in this part of China with their distinct religious traditions that 
have kept them distinct from both the Confucian dominated Han Chinese society and 
Tibetan Buddhist society. At the fringe of the Chinese empire, Gannan had been 
developed as regional centers for the Muslim population, Islamic culture, and Hui 
trading in northwest China (Gladney 1991; Lipman 1997). At the same time it was 
also the ethnic borderland between Confucian Chinese society and Tibetan Buddhist 
society. This cultural and ethnic encounter has for centuries resulted in cohabitation, 
conversion, and war. The history of Hui in northwestern China, as Jonathan Lipman 
has cogently argued, proves that it is both theoretically conceivable and practically 
meaningful to lead a life as both a Muslim and a Chinese at the same time.41 Since late 
imperial China (Qing dynasty) this region became known as “China’s little Mecca.” 
                                                 
40 Since the Chinese government has introduced many development projects in TAR, it is said that 
today’s Lhasa, or other places in TAR, has become too “Chinese.” With the absence of Dalai Lama and 
other traditional Tibetan authorities, Lhasa starts to loose its “Tibetan” appeal. I often heard this idea 
from Chinese and Western tourists, mostly backpackers, who came to Taktsang Lhamo looking for an 
alternative Tibetan experience. It also promenently appears in guidebooks such as Lonely Planet or its 
Chinese equivalents when it describes the attractiveness of borderland Tibetan areas such as Langmusi.  
41 See (Lipman 1996). There are also many other works on the integration of Confucian into Islamic 
tradition in the Hui society (Lipman 1997; Ben-Dor Benite 2005). 
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Not only have the new Islamic sects and teachings been flourishing in this region, but 
many Hui elites have become influential both locally and nation-wide.42 Today, with 
the ethnoreligious revival of the Islamic tradition and thousands of newly rebuilt 
mosques since the 1980s, Gannan as a culturally inherited “little Mecca” shows 
another face of the government’s invention of “little Tibet.”43
Previous scholarship on China has considered this place the periphery of the 
periphery—geographical, economic, cultural, and political—of the former Chinese 
empire. G. William Skinner, when constructing his regional system theory, was right 
to point out that a strict rural-urban dichotomy was not a feature of the traditional 
Chinese economic or conceptual landscape (Skinner 1977). Yet as this regional system 
theory is based primarily on southwest China—a major frontier region of China, it is 
curious to see no influence from any marginalized groups or societies, particularly 
non-Han ethnic groups, which have interacted economically and culturally with the 
neighboring Chinese society for centuries. Many recent scholarly works have pointed 
out this shortcoming by looking through the borderland or minority perspective.44
Following this line, I started my work from Taktsang Lhamo as a borderland 
that has two faces of “little Tibet” and “little Mecca.”45 It was not until the later phase 
of my fieldwork that I realized many difficulties in my research did not come from the 
                                                 
42 In his pioneer study on Muslim Hui people in northwest China, Jonathan Lipman has made the first 
comprehensive study on Hui history in northwest China (Lipman 1997). Dru Gladney’s later studies 
have touched upon many contemporary Hui issues in China such as religious resurgence and ethnic 
nationalism (Gladney 1991; Gladney 1998b; Gladney 1999). 
43 Gannan, officially a Tibetan autonomous prefecture, also has many Hui autonomous regions or 
counties where the Hui population is often the local majority. See (Gladney 1991: 47-58) for a further 
description of the orders and branches of Islam in Linxia.  
44 See, e.g., (Lipman 1997; Mueggler 2001). 
45 I thank my wife Isabelle Auffret who first brought this insight to me in the beginning of my 
fieldwork. As a foreigner who had no previous experience with either Tibetan or Hui, she was not 
subscribed to either side and thus immediately observed the important yet nearly invisible role of Hui 
community in this Tibetan land.  
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predicted “sensitive situation” of either Tibetan or minority issues in China.46 But it 
was rather my increasing interest in doing research simultaneously with both Tibetan 
and Muslim Hui communities that had put me in “no place.” In order to work in a 
local community it is important to have a locally recognized identity that would give 
me access of communication to various people. In my case, despite the fact that more 
and more people—both Tibetans and Hui—started to know me and accepted my 
“residential status” during my two years there, I found it was becoming increasingly 
difficult to work simultaneously with the two communities. Apparently this arises 
from the complex relations, including tension, between the two local communities, 
which stems from a complex local history especially during the violent transition from 
a frontier in the empire era to a marginalized borderland in a multiethnic Chinese 
nation.47 My interest in both communities and religions has put me in an unbridgeable 
gap between the two groups that was caught by their past and contemporary changes. 
My initial affiliation with the “Tibetan camp”—i.e., presenting myself as a Tibetan 
language student, introduced through my Tibetan monk friend, wearing a Tibetan 
robe, etc.—so naturally gave me a vision of a perfect “Tibetan landscape” that for a 
long time I did not even noticed the importance (or even the very existence) of the 
local Hui community, except some business owners. After I started to get in touch 
with the Hui community, I found it very difficult to get closer to individuals or the 
community as I constantly felt excluded as an outsider (Ch: kafei, or Ar: kafir, lit. 
“non-believer”) with either my formal Han Chinese identity or my new “Tibetan 
identity.”48
                                                 
46 In fact once I got the affiliation with Sichuan University and came back to Taktsang Lhamo with their 
introductory letter, I found that the local PSB had no interests at all in what I was actually doing with 
my fieldwork. 
47 See more discussion on this topic in the next chapter.  
48 Although local Hui never used this derogatory term on me (or local Tibetans), it is through many 
daily practices that a non-Muslim is naturally excluded from the Hui. For example, they can give me a 
gift or invite me for food at their home but will never accept anything from me, let alone food. See 
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At the same time, my going to the Hui community upset and puzzled many of 
my Tibetan friends, particularly monks. They felt that by going to the Hui mosque and 
talking to Hui people I was both betraying their friendship and defiling my new 
“Tibetan identity” they had given me.49 Meanwhile they also wondered why on earth I 
wanted to do that—as my monk friend asked me: “if you are staying in a Tibetan land, 
why do you want to go to a Hui mosque (Tib: khyod bod sa stod na he he dgon ba 
vgro don gang red)?” In fact this was also the question from the Hui community, 
though it was put in a slightly different way.50 Both the Tibetan and Hui communities 
here are more used to the fact that Chinese or foreigners (sometimes government 
officials) come to Taktsang Lhamo for a “Tibetan experience”—visiting Tibetan 
monasteries, experiencing Tibetan culture, taking pictures of Tibetan monks or 
nomads. While enjoying their “authentic Tibetan experience,” they use the material 
facilities provided by Hui—coming by a bus run by a local Hui family, eating in 
Muslim restaurants and staying in Hui family hotels. My work was confusing to them 
since it did not go with this locally recognized cultural and economic norm.51 
Sometimes I even ask myself this question. What if I focus on just one group, instead 
of both, and do a monographic research on it? What do I get—and by the same token, 
                                                                                                                                            
(Cesaro 2000; Gillette 2000) for more examples on food and identity among Hui in Xi’an or Uyghur in 
Xinjiang. In the traditional Tibetan context, Tibetan Buddhists (Tib: nang pa, lit., “insiders”) also 
excluded non-Buddhist (Tib: phyi pa, lit., “outsiders”)—usually Bon-po, the pre-Buddhist shamanism 
in Tibet. However as I found out, this mutual exclusion of Tibetan and Hui had nevertheless been 
coined into the local political and social structure until it was completely refigured after the Chinese 
post-socialist reform in 1980s. See next chapter for more details.  
49 By new “Tibetan identity” I mean that I was studying Tibetan language, wearing Tibetan robe, was 
called by my Tibetan name, and was thus treated by my Tibetan friends with most of the local norms 
that apply to Tibetans. 
50 Until later in my fieldwork, I heard that in the beginning of my stay here most of the Hui community 
thought I was a teacher brought here by the Tibetan monastery to teach them Chinese or English 
language. After I explained to more and more people that I was doing my own research on Tibetan and 
Hui community here, it did not clear the confusion. On the contrary they were more confused in terms 
of the nature of my research, as compared to language teaching which might be easier to understand. 
51 For the same reason, whenever we took photos from Chinese tourists coming here or even Hui 
residents here, we usually encountered their extreme uneasiness or curiosity. The assumed nature of a 
majority, unexotic people has excluded anyone in this default category from a reflection inwardly while 
gazing at “others.”  
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miss—if I focus on one ethnic group exclusively or even one aspect of the group, i.e. 
religion, education, etc., instead of the social and ethnic inclusion/exclusion against 
the backdrop of Chinese social economic changes? What do local people make of the 
ethnic tension or exclusion today? How do they make this ethnic borderland a 
meaningful and inhabitable place for them?  
Many recent studies on ethnic minorities in China have touched upon these 
questions from different perspectives. In their consistent effort of seeking the emic 
view, anthropologists have long challenged the “grand discourse” on their subjects—
the so-called “top-down” approach. These studies demonstrate that ethnic minority 
peoples living in a multinational state like China have led a meaningful life with a 
meaningful identity (at least to themselves) despite the fact that their minority status 
has been mainly constructed as an ethnic “other” by the state. In this spirit some of 
these works have chosen an indigenous point of view—that is, a “bottom-up” 
approach at the micro-level situation. They show how people themselves have made 
their lives meaningful and their place inhabitable. Instead of simply being passively 
and misleadingly represented by the state, these marginalized peoples have never been 
mere victims deprived of their own agency. On the contrary, they have taken 
advantage of everyday life practice—such as through ritual, language, religion, and 
even food—as means of resistance. Against these localized stories, the state is 
considered as a threatening power to be resisted, but “not as a system of institutions, a 
network of power relations, or a history of policies and programs, but as an aspect of 
the ‘social imaginary’” (Mueggler 2001). 
Scholars in this group reflect on the concepts such as China or Chinese and 
question the notion of a “cultural wholeness”—to the extent that their ethnographic 
researches would contribute as an organic part. Dru Gladney (2004) argues that the 
very notion of China or Chinese culture should be located by “dislocating” it. That is 
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to say, the very notion of “Chineseness” can and should only be defined through “the 
liminal others,” i.e., the ethnic minority peoples, who have always been situated 
between the Chinese and the non-Chinese (Gladney 2004). Stevan Harrell (1995) has 
framed this dynamic process of the state-people interaction as a “civilizing project,” 
which is defined as an unequal interaction between a civilizing center with its claim of 
a superior civilization and periphery peoples whose civilizations are set on a lower 
level and thus need to be raised by the more progressed civilizing center.52 By 
emphasizing the mutual ways of impact, this scholarship shows that modern nation 
state has actively constructed this new category of ethnic minorities in the service of 
nation-building—a process that minority peoples themselves have also been involved 
either consciously, actively or not. Therefore this dynamic process can only make 
sense by looking at both sides of the process and from a locally informed perspective.  
In light of these studies, my research on Tibetan and Hui communities in 
Taktsang Lhamo as “little Tibet” with “little Mecca” pinpoints both the flexibility and 
exclusivity of such notions as religion and ethnicity and leads to a fresh look at the 
Tibetan studies, minority studies in China and Chinese studies. The increasing 
academic interest in nation and nationalism, ethnicity and identity has fueled the 
studies on ethnic minorities in China and also led us to give a critical thought on some 
important conceptions such as nation-building, colonialism, subaltern, and hybridity.53 
The very meaning of religion and ethnicity (as well as many other boundary related 
                                                 
52 I will come to this theory again at the end of this dissertation (Harrell 1995c). 
53 The rising theory of nation and nationalism (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983), against the primordial 
view (Shils 1957; Geertz 1973) and the constructionist approach of ethnicity (Barth 1969; Hobsbawm 
and Ranger 1983), provides a more complex context for ethnicity by putting in a more important new 
participant—the nation state. Many scholars have since taken serious consideration of the role of nation 
and nation-building in the modern formation of ethnic identity (Keyes 2002). See, e.g., Prasenjit 
Duara’s treatment of modern Chinese history through the discourse of nation-building (Duara 1995), or 
Dru Gladney’s account of modern Hui identity formation in a Chinese nation-state (Gladney 2004). As 
a result, frontier has become a transitional zone or middle ground (Giersch 2001; Spenden 2002), ethnic 
identity has become hyphenated (Lipman 1996), and center-periphery structure has become “multiple 
cores and multiple peripheries” (Lipman 1997). 
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concepts) has constantly been under challenge and negotiation due to the interactive 
nature of everyday life in this ethnic borderland. My primary interest in ethnoreligious 
revival in China has been both enriched and complicated through the unfolding 
process of two religious revivals in the same context of rapid Chinese social change.54 
I particularly emphasize the complexity of these issues in which different layers of 
temporality have been caught separately in different times and spaces yet have also 
dialogically encountered each other across time and space.55  “Identities do not always 
emerge antithetically to the old,” as Dru Gladney (1994) suggested, “new identities 
may surface, old ones may be reinvented, and each will be in constant dialogue with 
each other.” It is indeed the inventive nature of these dialogic encounters that makes 
any single theory or approach—no matter how powerful it might sound—looks weak 
in front of this complexity. 
 
1.5 Subaltern Studies and Other Studies—With a Chapter Overview 
In a discussion of the polemics in Tibetan studies, Peter Hansen (2003) argued 
that the polarization, especially the politicization, of the Tibetan studies has “reduced 
the space available for scholarship that is not explicitly framed as political 
advocacy.”56 While I completely agree with this argument on the Tibetan studies 
                                                 
54 My previous experience in Tibetan areas taught me that if I want to conduct long-term fieldwork in 
any ethnic minority areas, as a Han Chinese researcher in an American university, there would be no 
less trouble than any other Western-based researchers. In order to get an official affiliation I have to 
demonstrate that I am doing a (at least potentially) “harmless” research—one that will not bring up the 
dissent among the local ethnic minority peoples and stay away from any potential anti-Chinese (or pro-
Tibetan independence) stand—as much as any western researcher has to demonstrate their friendliness 
towards China and the harmless nature of their research to the state ideology. Those who are doing 
political research, especially something related to sensitive issues, just have to get around it with 
different strategies, i.e. (Bovingdon 2002). Personal communications with Gardner Bovingdon. 
55 Bakhtin has famously termed these layers of temporality “chronotope” (Bakhtin 1981). 
Anthropologist Stan Munford has applied Bakhtin’s theoretical model of dialogic interaction in his 
studies on an ethnic and religious encounter between the Tibetan lama and Gurung Shaman in Nepal 
(Mumford 1989).  
56 This polemical debate was exemplified by a forum debate on Donald Lopez’s (1998) book in a 
discussion panel on the annual meeting of American Academy of Religion—which later appeared as a 
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situation, his later call for “subaltern studies for Tibet” as a solution for this current 
dilemma is more debatable.  
The “subaltern studies” movement started in the 1980s from a group of Indian 
scholars who mostly worked on colonial and post-colonial Indian history (Guha and 
Spivak 1988, Spivak, 1988). Through resistance to the grand discourse of colonialism 
and colonial scholarship, this subaltern studies group sought to reevaluate the colonial 
structure by rescuing the “subaltern” histories—a voice that had been left out, if not 
subjugated, previously in the colonial and nationalist discourse. As it developed, many 
scholarly works in this group pointed out that the simple dichotomy of the colonial 
power and the colonized subject not only jeopardizes our understanding of colonialism 
but it also poses problems for the understanding of the pre-colonial empire and post-
colonial state. To resolve this disjuncture that resulted from a dualistic treatment of 
power and resistance, they proposed to look at the multiple process of reproduction in 
a colonial or post-colonial structure from a subaltern perspective.57  
Ethnic minority scholarship in China has, in a similar fashion, sought to 
recover the marginalized voices through different perspectives such as contemporary 
literature, re/writing history, and religious and cultural revivals.58 In addition to the 
official ethnic minority groups, non-official ethnic groups as well as other 
                                                                                                                                            
2001 issue of Journal of American Academy of Religion (Germano 2001; Hansen 2003; Lopez 2001; 
Shakya 2001; Thurman 2001). 
57 For example, Ranajit Guha defined a colonial state as constituted by two contradictory, but 
nevertheless co-existent, paradigms: one that is contemporary, liberal, modern—the colonizer; and the 
other that is pre-colonial, pre-capitalist, traditional—the colonized (Guha 1997). This dualistic 
treatment of the colonial power and colonized others was later revised by addressing the multiple 
process of reproduction to point out the fundamental “tensions of empire” (Cooper and Stoler 1997). 
58 In his recent work, Dru Gladney (2004) actively proposed a subaltern perspective in the study of 
marginalized others in China. See also, e.g., a recent issue of Manoa on a description of modern Tibetan 
writers in China and their writings (Shakya 2000). In particular, this issue talks about the controversial 
Tibetan writer Don Grub Gya who committed suicide in his early 30s. His writings are well known for 
the critical attitude to both Chinese colonialism and traditional Tibetan conservatism. For other modern 
ethno-history writing, see (Harrell 1995b) for the case of Yi, which has involved the native minority 
scholars as the main actors of their own history writing. On religious and cultural revival see, e.g. 
(Goldstein and Kapstein 1998) for an account in ethnic Tibetan area. 
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marginalized groups have also been explored to question the monolithic assumption of 
the Han or Chinese society.59 In a more recent study on the multiethnic borderland in 
southwestern China, Stevan Harrell argued that not only the Han Chinese living in 
minority areas—what he called “majority minority”—are generally poorer than those 
living in the urban areas, but their situation is “no better or worse than their minority 
neighbors” (Harrell 2001c). More research has pointed out the possible problem for 
such a “minority studies” framework that presupposes the Han versus minorities as 
dualistically existing categories. Such concerns have been addressed through recent 
works on such subjects as ethnic Han people in minority regions (Hansen 2005).  
In both cases above, the subaltern studies group and the ethnic minority studies 
group, the problem I see lies in an uncritical attachment of an ideological label of “the 
subaltern” to any arbitrarily categorized ethnic groups (or other marginalized groups in 
the same sense).60 The question Hansen asked—why is there no subaltern studies for 
Tibet—can not be answered by simply re/naming the Tibetans (or similarly other 
minority or marginalized groups) as the “colonized” or “subaltern” and Tibetan studies 
(or minority studies) as “subaltern studies.”61 What poses a problem to the subaltern 
studies, namely the dualistic treatment of power and resistance, also exists here. To 
avoid this, many scholars have approached their subjects through a perspective in 
                                                 
59 For an example of a non-official ethnic group, see Sara Friedman’s research on Huian women in 
Fujian (Friedman 2004); for examples of other marginalized group, see Li Zhang’s research on 
immigrant workers in Beijing (Zhang 2001). Early in the 1930s, Owen Lattimore has mentioned a 
“refugee colonization” in Manchuria (northeastern frontier of China), in which the so-called “Chinese 
colonialist” were less pioneers or frontiers in the Western sense than some desperate refugees escaping 
from war or famine in Han centered Chinese areas (Lattimore 1935). I thank Magnus Fiskesjö for this 
information. 
60 In China this arbitrary categorization of ethnic minorities have been studied extensively, particularly 
through a revisit of the “ethnic classification” project of the early 1950s. See footnote 20 in this chapter. 
61 The temptation of looking for the “subalterns” is so enticing, particularly in the case of Tibetan 
studies, that the persistent longing for Shangri-la or other essentialization of Tibetanness can be 
disguised even in a critique to itself. See, e.g. the debate on Donald Lopez’s (1998) book by Robert 
Thurman (2001), David Germano (2001), and Tsering Shakya (2001). As Hansen (2003) argued, the 
debate "demonstrated the extent to which nationalism polices the boundaries of Tibet as an authorized 
subject of study.” Charlene Makley (1999) has also pointed out the nature of an essentialized 
“Tibetanness” disguised in a seemingly nuanced treatment of religious revival in Tibetan society.  
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which both power and resistance have been embodied. In a recent case study on the 
current relation between Tibetan nomads and the Chinese state, Fernada Pirie (2005) 
shows the nuance of this power resistance scenario in which, she argued “[r]ather than 
uniformly accepting or resisting the power of the government, the [Tibetan] nomads 
have developed ways of using it for their own purpose” (Pirie 2005b). Arguing against 
the dominant/resistant model, she concludes that the Tibetan nomads reaction to the 
Chinese state power should be treated along with its historical trajectory of their social 
organization and cultural ideas. 
The case of ethnic encounters in a borderland like Taktsang Lhamo not only 
blurs the boundaries between the so-called “colonizer” and “colonized,” but also 
problematizes the very existence of such a binary structure with an enormous 
complexity of local history and ethnic interaction—what Lipman (1997) has termed 
“the multivalence of subalterity.” My study shows that to simply label the ethnic 
minority with the “subaltern” or “colonized” is both unhelpful and potentially 
misleading in either Tibetan or other minority related studies. In the following 
chapters I try to approach this complexity from a dialogic perspective. Chapter 2 
shows the ethnic interaction in this borderland region against the multiple versions of 
the narratives on the local history. I particular emphasize the transition from the 
empire to the modern nation state which, I argue, is crucial in the modern creation of 
ethnic and religious categories. Chapter 3 focuses on the revitalization of ethnic and 
religious practices in Taktsang Lhamo after the Chinese Cultural Revolution. By 
exploring the reconstruction process of a local Tibetan monastery and a Hui mosque, I 
demonstrate an increasingly complicated ethnic and religious situation due to the 
change of social and political context. Chapter 4 uses some specific cases in the 
religious revival to illuminate the reconstruction of place in the ethnic borderland. 
Chapter 5 emphasizes the personal experiences and materialistic changes in Taktsang 
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Lhamo that reflect a change on the collective imagination of the nation. Chapter 6 
explains the political economic basis of the local ethnic religious revival and reveals 
an intrinsic paradox between tradition and change among the local Tibetans and Hui 
vis-à-vis the Chinese state. Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation with a reflection on 
some theoretical issues through a borderland perspective.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
TIBETAN MONASTERIES AND HUI TRADERS ON THE SINO-TIBETAN 
FRONTIER: FROM EMPIRE TO NATION 
 
 
Although China geographically covers three time zones, there is only one 
official time—Beijing time—throughout the country. This means the further westward 
one goes in the country, the later the day starts particularly during the winter season. 
When I caught the morning bus to Gannan in the West Lanzhou Bus Station in Gansu, 
the sky was still dark and full of stars. As a frontier province in northwest China, 
Gansu has not only the ethnic border with Tibet and Uyghur Muslim province of 
Xinjiang, but it is also well-known itself as a cultural meeting ground—the crossroad 
of different cultural worlds: Tibetan, Muslim, Mongolian, and Chinese, etc.—and a 
land of ethnic interaction as well as ethnic conflict (Lipman 1997; Nietupski 1999).  
After an hour out of Lanzhou, the day started to brighten enough for me to see 
the dry eroded loess of the mountain hills outside the window—a typical natural 
landscape in this part of China. As the bus started to pass through some towns, the 
landscape started to be filled with minarets of mosques and Muslim Hui people on the 
street symbolized by men’s white hats and women’s veils. This part of Gansu has been 
a main Islamic center in northwest China since the eighth century and is now the home 
of more than one million Chinese Muslim people officially identified as Huizu (Hui 
nationality) in the People’s Republic of China.62  
                                                 
62 According to the Gansu 2000 census (GSRK 2002), Hui population in Gansu was the second largest 
in China next to Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region and counts about 1/9 of the total Hui population in 
China. For the history of Hui in northwest China and the modern creation of an ethnic Hui identity see 
(Lipman 1997; Gladney 1998a).  
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My destination for the day was Hezuo (Tib: gtsod)—the capital of Gannan 
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture and also the transportation hub for this region. Hezuo 
is about 300 km southwest of Lanzhou and six-hour bus ride. At an altitude of 2,800m, 
the former pasture town of Hezuo was made the capital of the prefecture in 1956, 
whereas the capital before was set up in Xiahe (Tib: bsang chu), the seat of the great 
Tibetan monastery of Labrang.63 To reach my final destination Langmusi, the Gansu 
part of Taktsang Lhamo, I had to wait for the only bus leaving the next morning. 
Although Langmusi was only another 160 km southwest down to the Gansu-Sichuan 
border, it took more than eight hours by bus as the paved road from Lanzhou ended in 
Hezuo and became a dirt path meandering through the high mountains on the eastern 
fringe of the Tibetan plateau.64 The next day the bus finally arrived the nearest point to 
Langmusi where it stopped at a bridge. Just by the side of the bridge, a small mountain 
path led to the valley town of Langmusi five kilometers distant. A tricycle motor 
tractor, known to the locals as Lantuo, waited there the same time everyday to give the 
arriving bus riders a 15 minute bumpy ride to Langmusi in the open air for one yuan 
($0.12) per person.  
This chapter has to do with the history of this borderland. Although I had a 
previous training in Tibetan language and history, I went to Taktsang Lhamo with an 
original proposal to study the contemporary ethnoreligious revival and to investigate 
social memory through a practice-oriented approach.65 My hypothesis was that 
memory is constituted not only as individually conceived histories that are buried in 
peoples’ minds, but also as forms of social practice that are deeply embedded in a 
broad social and political context. By the same token, I approached the history of this 
                                                 
63 Due the predominant influence of Labrang monastery in the regional history, some have argued that 
the change of local capital to Hezuo is the CCP strategy for counterbalancing Tibetan monastic power 
in Labrang. 
64 This was ended with the construction of Lanzhou-Langmusi highway in 2004.  
65 For example, (Bourdieu 1990; Comaroff 1985; Ortner 1989). 
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borderland not just through a search in the classical literatures. I intended to collect 
different narratives and representations on the history of this ethnic borderland. What I 
found out turned out to be overwhelmingly complicated—and also more interesting—
than I expected, particularly when they are contextualized in the transition from the 
former empire (i.e., Manchu Qing dynasty) to the modern Chinese nation state 
(Republican and later Communist). In the pre-nation state era this ethnic borderland 
was the frontier where two empires—Tibetan Gelugpa power centered in Lhasa and 
Manchu Qing centered in Beijing—faded into each other. The transition to a modern 
Chinese nation since the beginning of the 20th century has drastically changed the 
political and economic structure of the region as well as the local peoples’ perceptions 
of themselves and their homeland.  
 
2.1 Tiger’s Cave on the Tibetan Frontier  
 
The reason this place is called Taktsang Lhamo is because, a long time ago, 
the place of this monastery had a mountain cave where a mother tiger and her 
five cubs inhabited. Today this Tiger’s Cave (Tib: stak tshang) is still there 
and many nomad people come to worship this cave. The so-called Lhamo 
comes from the Dalai Lama’s protective deity (Tib: dbal ldan lha mo) whose 
mouth called out the name Lhamo as one of the sacred sites in northern Tibet. 
Thus a combination of these two names makes the name of this place—
Taktsang Lhamo.  
Zorge Nyima66
 
Taktsang Lhamo is known for its two Tibetan monasteries—Kirti monastery 
and Serchi monastery. When I first arrived, the town center of Langmusi was just one 
                                                 
66 The quotation here is my translation of a monastery print version of Zorge Nyima’s famous work on 
local history. Zorge Nyima (?~1990) was a renowned Tibetan monk teacher from Kirti monastery. He is 
vividly remembered and greatly respected by the local monks as an erudite local historian. His book 
(Nyima 1985), though only a monastery print, has been a popular read among the monks and also been 
cited as a major source of local history, particularly the Kirti monastery lineage. I was also told by the 
monks that this book was banned by the government although I found nothing inside that could be 
interpreted as challenging Chinese authority.  
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dirt street at the bottom of the valley about half a kilometer long flanked by two lines 
of red brick houses, some of which were run by the local Hui as shops and restaurants. 
At the end of this street the path is separated into two directions: one goes into the 
Sichuan side of the town leading to Kirti monastery and the Tiger’s Cave, the other 
stays in Gansu leading up to the Serchi monastery on the slope.  
Despite the fame of the two monasteries, it is in fact this legendary Tiger’s 
Cave that makes this place famous and also the first reason for the pilgrims to come to 
Taktsang Lhamo. Even tourists these days are guided through this pilgrimage route. 
The cave not only gave this place its name but it has also been worshipped, along with 
the two monasteries, as an important part of the local sacred landscape. Both the cave 
and the Druchu River source by its side have been included as sacred sites on the 
circumambulation path around the Kirti monastery.67   
The Sichuan side of the town (Ch: namo) consists of three clearly separated 
quarters: a Tibetan village called Dongkha (Tib: dong kha), a Hui village called Gyago 
(Ch: huimin cun, Tib: rgya sgo) in Tibetan, and the Kirti monastery (see Figure 3). 
Dongkha has about 110 households, all of which are Tibetan, and Gyago has about 90 
households, all of which are Hui. The Druchu River which originates from the valley 
of the Tiger’s Cave first goes past the Kirti monastery on the upper part before it 
descends to the Gansu town of Langmusi.  
On my way to this cave I met Tashi, a Kirti monastery monk of my age who 
later became my good friend and informant. We accompanied each other as he was 
                                                 
67 Circumambulation (Tib: skor ra) is a common Tibetan religious practice which is performed by 
numerous circuits around the empowered sacred site as a daily form of praying and accumulating 
Karmic merit. All the Tibetan sacred sites—monasteries, sacred mountains, lakes, sacred city, etc.—
have one or more circumambulation paths signified by prayer wheels, flags, mani stone walls or piles, 
etc. Because of its deep engraving into Tibetan ethnic identity, not only has circumambulation been 
used as a symbolic protest against the Chinese rule (Schwartz 1994), some scholars even argue that it is 
daily practices like circumambulation—rather than any grand religious rituals such as Monlam 
Chenmo—that forms the deep consciousness of Tibetan self-identity (Makley 2003). 
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also on his way to this sacred site. Following the Druchu River up we passed through 
the Kirti monastery and reached an open field. During the cold winter morning the 
Druchu River is often covered with some thick white fog floating above it, which 
makes it look like a river of boiling water. Tashi led me to some small water mill 
houses built over the river. Until I came close to these water mills I realized that these 
water mills were in fact built as naturally turned prayer wheels. They are also part of 
the circumambulation route. Tashi went down to the house and carefully cleared out 
the grass in the river that had stuck in the wheels.  
Crossing the open ground we entered a narrow valley that is densely covered 
by pine trees that are hundreds of years old. This is the source of Druchu River and is 
also where the Tiger’s Cave is. The mountain opens a narrow cleavage where the 
Druchu River comes out. As we entered the valley it suddenly became quiet and dark. 
The high cliff and pine trees cut out most of the light from the outside. A cave is just 
down the cliff. Tashi told me this is the cave where the first Kirti Lama68 had 
practiced and the natural imprint on the wall was left by his hand. A four-meter high 
latse (Tib: la rdzas) stands in front of the cave entrance. A latse is a stone cairn with 
wood chips and arrows thrust on top and decorated with prayer flags. They are widely 
used as a part of sacred landscape in Tibet such as mountain peaks or mountain passes. 
Beside the latse there is a small stone platform used as an altar blackened by the 
frequent incense that is burned upon. 
The mouth of the cave is too low for anyone to walk in—we had to squat to get 
into the cave. It was so dark inside that I could barely see anything even with the 
flash-light Tashi brought. Depite the darkness, Tibetan pilgrims came in constantly 
                                                 
68 The term Lama here is a specific term to address a reincarnated living Buddha (or Tulku). It is an 
Amdo equivalent to Rinpoche in central Tibet. Other variants in Amdo are also prevalent in the local 
dialect. I chose to use in my study the local way of addressing instead of the commonly known Lhasa 
terms. 
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and offered ceremonial scarves (Tib: kha btags). Coming out of the cave, Tashi and I 
offered some incense in front of the legendary handprint and then followed others to 
the source of the Druchu River that lay beyond the cave. The source is a small stream 
coming out from the earth. Tashi scooped up some water with his hands, drank some 
and put the rest on his head—the Tibetan way of getting blessed from a sacred site. 
The water stream forms a small pond before it enters the valley. Following other 
Tibetan pilgrims, we came to the bank of the pond. Tashi brought some bread to feed 
the fish in the pond. Many people just watched the shoal of fish swimming leisurely in 
the crystal clear water.  
 
2.2 Taming Stories and the Importance of Borderland in Tibetan History 
Since Tashi and I shared the same interests in Tibetan history I asked him to 
tell me more about the local history. It didn’t surprise me, as a student of Tibetan 
language and history, that the local history for Tashi means exclusively the written 
sources on the history of the monastery and the lineage of Kirti Lama. I also knew that 
I asked this question to the right person because educated monks are supposedly the 
only authorities who are eligible to tell the “history” (Tib: lo rgyus).  
 
A long time ago, this was a terrible place: no Buddhism, no monastery, only 
the mountain demons and wild animals that were harming people. You saw 
the tiger’s cave there? There were actually tigers in there! Only when the First 
Kirti Lama came here from Lhasa, he tamed all these demons and wild 
animals. Because he brought the Dharma Law (Tib: chos) to this wild land. 
After that, this place started to have the current name Taktsang Lhamo and 
became a happy land.69   
 
The Tibetan word “tame” (Tib: ’dul pa) carries a special meaning besides bringing in 
cultivation out of the native wildness. In a Tibetan literary context, it first of all 
                                                 
69 Fieldnotes February 1999. 
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conveys the idea that a positive force (i.e., Bodhisattva) conquers a negative one (i.e., 
demon), not by destroying it, but by turning its negative—in most cases also 
powerful—energy into the service of the positive force and ultimately into a positive 
one. This genre of “taming” stories prevais in all kinds of Tibetan literature, such as 
religious developments (Tib: chos ’byung), biographies (Tib: rnam thar), historical 
texts (Tib: lo rgyud, or deb ther), particularly since the introduction of Buddhism in 
Tibet.70 This theme is particularly salient when the story relates to the previously 
unknown or barbarian borderland. I noticed later in my fieldwork that this story of 
local history told to me by Tashi comes exclusively from the few written sources on 
Taktsang Lhamo. It is also the “official” version of local history that one would hear 
from almost everyone in town—from Tibetan monks to illiterate Tibetan nomads, 
even local Hui Muslims.71   
In Tibetan history, Central Tibet and borderland Tibetan regions (such as 
Kham, Amdo or Ngari) have played different yet complementary roles in the religious 
development on this high plateau. One key feature of the borderland in Tibetan history 
is its role as a “reservoir ” for alternative religions and their practitioners—both 
Buddhists and non-Buddhists—which is a crucial feature in the religious and cultural 
complexity of Tibetan history.72  
                                                 
70 Charlene Makley (1999) argues that this concept of taming is a genderized heroic behavior in Tibetan 
context, which illustrates particularly Tibetan masculinity through monkhood.   
71 In my dissertation I have used mainly three Tibetan literary sources:  a monastic print of local history 
by Zorge Nyima (Nyima 1985); a monastery history and Kirti Lama lineage complied by the exile Kirti 
monastery in Dharamsala (KTGS 2000); and the 18th century Tibetan classic The Religio-Political 
Hisory of Amdo (Tib: mdo smad chos vbyung) written by Chagongpa (Tib: brag dgon zhabs drun dkon 
mchog bstan pa rab rgyas) (dKon-mchog-bstan-pa-rab-rgyas 1982). As a Tibetan frontier, Taktsang 
Lhamo has very few records in any official documents. The Religio-Political History of Amdo is an 
authoritative and comprehensive Tibetan source on the religious development and political history of 
Amdo. Other sources are mostly unofficial print materials from local monasteries about their 
development history and biography of their incarnate lamas. 
72 I thank Professor Mark Elliot for pointing out the idea of marginal survival in folklore studies as our 
panel discussant in Harvard East Asia Graduate Conference 2008. 
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Abundant Tibetan literatures have recorded the religious development on the 
Snowland.73 Before Buddhism arrived in Tibet, Bon—a pre-Buddhist indigenous 
religion in Tibet—first spread to Central Tibet from the extreme west of the Tibetan 
plateau (Tib: mnga’ ris) where the ancient Tibetan civilization of Zhangzhung (Tib: 
zhang zhung) originated long before the rise of the Tibetan empire (7th-9th century).74 
While the successive Tibetan kings passionately supported Buddhism over three 
centuries, the practitioners of Bon were severely persecuted and purged from Central 
Tibet. Many Bon practitioners were forced to escape to the then faraway borderland 
regions where the central power could not reach and they thus could continue to 
practice their beliefs. At the end of the ninth century Buddhism reached its apex in 
Central Tibet, when the last Tibetan king Langdarma came to power and started his 
radical anti-Buddhist campaign. He persecuted Buddhists just as his predecessors had 
done to the Bon before. This time it was the Buddhist turn to escape to the borderland, 
until the Tibetan empire finally ended with the assassination of Langdarma by two 
Buddhist monks. After a century of turmoil, near the end of the 10th century Tibet saw 
a revival of Buddhism.75 One major source of this Buddhist revitalization was a 
reintroduction of Buddhist teachings and texts that had been conserved in the 
borderland regions (Kham and Amdo) by those Buddhists monks who fled from 
Central Tibet.76 Not only has the borderland been a “reservoir” of those texts, but it 
also served as an asylum for those monk and scholars during extreme periods. While 
borderland was more tolerant and inclusive on the one hand, this is exactly the reason 
                                                 
73 This part of the Tibetan religious history is based on several Tibetan classic literatures: chos-‘byung 
mkhas-pa’i dga’-ston (A feast of the wise), deb-ther sngon-po (The Blue Annals), sba-bzhed (The 
history of Samye Monastery), mdod-smad chos-‘byung (The religio-political history of Amdo).   
74 So far the study of Zhangzhung civilization is mostly based on textual and archaeological sources. 
See e.g. (Norbu 1996; Bellezza 2002; Aldenderfer and Moyes 2004). 
75 In Tibetan history this is called the “second spread” or the “later spread” of Tibetan Buddhism (Tib: 
phyi dar) in contrast to the “first spread” of Tibetan Buddhism (Tib: snga dar) from India in the 8th 
century.  
76 For a bibliography of Tibetan language historical sources see (Martin and Bentor 1997). For a 
collection of western language sources on Tibetan history see e.g. (McKay 2003).  
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that characterized it as a wild and uncivilized place that is there to be “tamed” by 
civilized center.77 Taktsang Lhamo was one of those wild and uncivilized borderland 
with demons and animals harming people until it was “tamed” by the arrival of Kirti 
Lama and the Gelugpa Tibetan Buddhist monastery.78
 
2.3 Amdo/Gansu: A Frontier on the Edge of Two Empires 
After almost a full day of listening to Tashi talk of local history, I could not 
help noticing that he did not mention the local Muslim Hui in any part of this “local 
history”. Nor did he even the Serchi monastery, as if they have never existed at all. 
Even when I asked a related question about Serchi monastery Tashi simply answered 
“I don’t know” and then went back to the original subject.  
As I spent more time in Taktsang Lhamo, it did not take me long to find out 
that this antagonism of Serchi monastery is not particular to Tashi—all the monks 
from Kirti monastery I met later have the same attitude when they talked about Serchi. 
The same applies to Serchi monks when talking about Kirti monastery. Not only do 
the monks set up a clear line between the two monasteries, they also behave and act in 
their daily lives as if the other one does not exist on the same land. I learned after I 
settled down there that my monk friends in Kirti would be in low spirits if they knew I 
                                                 
77 Many Gelugpa monasteries in Khamo and Amdo today were in fact other sects that were converted 
into Gelugpa monasteries. In some cases this conversion, or taming process, was done with violence. 
For example, during the Qing dynasty, the official policy was to propagate the Gelugpa and suppress 
others. Thus many non-Gelugpa monasteries had been converted to Gelugpa during this period. In late 
eighteenth century after the Qing emperor Qianlong successfully suppressed the Tibetan uprising in 
Jinchuan (Kham) area, he had ordered the conversion of the central Bon monastery of Jinchuan, which 
he believed had nurtured the uprising again Qing (Chen 1987).  
78 Rongchen Gendun Gyantsan (1374-1450) was the founder the Kirti monastery. He was born in Amdo 
and educated in Central Tibet before he came back to Taktsang Lhamo. He is said to have tamed the 
local demons in Taktsang Lhamo and have turned them into protective deities of Buddhism. He has 
since been honored as the legendary founder of Kirti monastery and the beginning of the Kirti Lama 
lineage. It is said that because of his virtue even the tigers stopped harming people. The three Tibetan 
sources of regional history record similar accounts with some minor differences (Nyima 1985; KTGS 
2000; dKon-mchog-bstan-pa-rab-rgyas 1982). They have recorded the same appellation—Jagnapa (Tib: 
ljags nag pa, or “the one with black tongue”)—of this legendary lama.  
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had visited Serchi or attended their rituals. Moreover, as I discovered later in my 
fieldwork, even the local lay communities have clear divisions between Serchi goers 
and Kirti goers. A Tibetan couple who owned a small grocery shop in Langmusi told 
me their experience when they first opened their shop: 
 
One day a group of people (Tibetan) came in my shop. Suddenly one guy saw 
the portrait of Kirti Lama at the top of the wall in my shop. He told his 
friends: “Hey, look, they have Kirti Lama’s photo here!” Other guys 
immediately stopped what they are going to buy. They murmured a bit and 
quickly left without buying anything. […] I knew why they left. Because they 
are from the Serchi mtha’wa.79  
 
The Tibetan term mtha’ wa refers to a specific time and space—the pre-nation state 
Amdo, particularly during the Manchu Qing dynasty. During this specific period of 
time, Amdo was simultaneously the frontier of the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644-1911) 
and of the Gelugpa Tibetan power in Lhasa (1642-1951). On a practical level it was 
the local monasteries that had shared the local power through the system of mtha’ wa. 
Each monatery, Kirti and Serchi, had its own mtha’ wa including both Tibetan and 
Hui villages while the power boundary between the two was constantly contested. The 
tension between the two monasteries is thus rooted back to this imperial period. This 
leads to two points that I want to pursue further. One is the multi-ethnic nature of the 
Qing dynasty as well as the nature of ethnicity in Qing dynasty. The second is the 
dynamic nature of this meeting ground at the frontier of the two empires, which 
eventually set up the basis for a turbulent transition to the modern Chinese nation. 
                                                 
79 Fieldnotes October 2001. The word mTha’ wa, or lha sde, means the village owned by monastery 
politically and economically. Village households are subjected to tax or other corvee labor to the 
monastery. Many terms like this are either ceased to be in use today or stripped off the original 
meanings because of the change of social and political system. For example, the word lha sde changes 
into sde wa today which conveys a equivalent meaning of village or cun in Chinese. 
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The Manchu not only established the politically powerful Qing dynasty that 
extended its territory much wider than before, but it also from the very beginning 
sought to manage a multi-ethnic empire. In the past ten years scholarship on the 
Manchu as an ethnic minority polity has turned significantly towards a reflection on 
the ethnic identity of Qing, namely the questioning of the Chineseness of this Manchu 
dynasty.80 One major shift in this historical reflexivity is from the formerly China-
centered view of Qing to a Manchu-centered—or likewise Tibetan, Uyghur, 
Mongolian—perspective.  By exploring the ethnic policy and ethnic practices in the 
Qing dynasty particularly through minority language documents (Manchu, Mongolian, 
Tibetan, etc.), this scholarship has called into question of the so-called Sinicization of 
the Manchu ruler (Rawski 1996; Millward 1998). In other words, by assuming the 
Sinicization of the Manchu ruler we narrow ourselves to a Sino-centric view of the 
Qing studies and thus miss other perspectives, such as a Manchu perspective of Qing. 
Thus, since the Qing empire was far from “a single, unified political state”, the ethnic 
relationship in the empire has multiple facets related to many other issues such as 
economy and politics. Millward (1998) thus argues for a Manchu-centered perspective 
on Qing studies. What should be called into question then is not so much how 
Sinicized the Manchu Qing dynasty was. In his interpretation of the Qing vision of a 
multi-ethnic empire, Millward depicts the Qing vision of a universe that is represented 
by the Qing emperors. Below the apex of the pyramid, all the “ethnic blocs” (Manchu, 
Tibetan, Mongol, Han, Muslim, etc.) were arranged in a rather parallel relation than a 
hierarchical one (Millward 1998: 201). In other words, when we take a Manchu-
centered perspective at the Qing studies, ethnicity per se was not considered the first 
and foremost concern for the Qing. As shown in the case above, the local Tibetan 
                                                 
80 This group of scholarship is often called New Qing History, for example (Crossley 1997; Millward 
1998; Elliott 2001; Hostetler 2001).   
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reaction to the Kirti Lama portrait reflects the collective memory of the pre-nation 
state period when notions, such as mtha’ wa, were defined in political and economic 
terms without taking ethnicity into consideration.    
Much has been written on the significant difference between a discursive 
frontier in a pre-nation state empire and a clear-cut border in a modern nation state.81 
These works have pointed out from different aspects that the fluid nature of the 
frontier in the pre-nation state empire has contributed to the later problematic nature of 
border and territory in the modern nation state. The Amdo/Gansu frontier has been 
more complex as it had been simultaneously the frontier of two empires and yet had 
never really been part of either. During the long and complex history in Amdo, not 
only had many ethnic and religious forces—Tibetan, Chinese, Manchu, Mongol, 
Muslim, Gelugpa, different Sufi orders—claimed Amdo in different times, different 
ways and on different levels. More significantly, these political, religious, and 
economic forces had been intertwined with each other and formed specific relations 
with each other such that no one force could replace another. This multi-centered 
situation in Amdo/Gansu frontier and its complex relation with Tibetan and Chinese 
powers lasted until even after the CCP took power in China.  
Taktsang Lhamo represents a typical case of collective social memory in this 
sense. The tension between two local Tibetan monasteries, despite their fealty to same 
religious tradition, is deeply rooted in the social, political and economic organization 
back to the imperial period. The “shopping incident” above—where the Tibetans, both 
lay and monastic, would consciously avoid everything or everyone that has to do with 
their rival unit—has clearly shown the influence of a collectively memorized past in 
their everyday lives. In fact this confrontation between the two monasteries along with 
each communities had crossed the ethnic boundary as well. Hui village in Taktsang 
                                                 
81 (Anderson 1983; Duara 1995; Lipman 1997; Schein 2000; Harrell 2001c; Keyes 2002).  
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Lhamo was also separated according to mtha’ wa of two different monasteries with 
political and economic responsibilities while downplaying the significance of ethnic 
difference in this borderland.  
 
2.4 Tibetan Monasteries and Hui Traders on the Sino-Tibetan Frontier 
Chinese and Western tourists come to Taktsang Lhamo to see an authentic 
Tibetan place. Once they are here, they often have to deal with the Muslim Hui people 
first since the local Hui, despite being a local minority, are the owners of most 
businesses in town—from hotels, restaurants, grocery stores, tailor shops, small 
bakeries to the only bus line that goes in and out of town once a day.82 For more than a 
century the local Hui community has been living and running businesses in this part of 
the town which the local Tibetans refer to as Gyago.83  Today the big part of this town 
center falls into Gansu province, and only a small portion is in Sichuan.  
In contrast to the Hui-concentrated downtown, the two Tibetan monasteries 
occupy a large part of local landscape including the surrounding mountains, valleys, 
forests, and the two big compounds of monastic buildings and monastic communities. 
These are the destinations for visiting tourists, and the pilgrimage sites for local 
Tibetan and pilgrims. Businesses owned by the monastery were at one time limited to 
a Tibetan clinic run by the medical college of the monastery and some small tangka 
(scrolled Tibetan Buddhist painting) shops.84 This contemporary contrast of spatial 
                                                 
82 The situation was described as in 2001. Since then many Tibetan and Chinese have joined the local 
businesses, especially after the building of a local highway in 2004. See chapter 6 for more on road 
construction and tourism. 
83 Tib: rgya sgo, lit., “Chinese door”, it refers to the local Hui village that lives outside the Tibetan 
community. The local Tibetans call the Hui hehe which is a Tibetan transliteration of the Chinese term 
Huihui. But I noticed that the Tibetan term rgya (lit., “Han Chinese”) has been used in a very loose 
way. It basically refers to non-Tibetan rather than actually Han Chinese. When we initially arrived in 
Taktsang Lhamo local Tibetans referred to my wife, a western woman, as rgyamo, or “Chinese 
woman”. 
84 In 2003, a new hotel built by the Serchi monastery opened its door to tourists. This has inspired the 
Kirti monastery to build another hotel.  
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and economic disparity between Hui and Tibetan, however, disguises the former 
important role that the Tibetan monasteries played in the Sino-Tibetan frontier 
business. For centuries Tibetan monasteries were the local political and religious 
centers as well as trading centers.85 Big monasteries usually own a large part of local 
land, pastures, forests, livestock, as well as small monasteries (Tib: bu dgon) and 
subject villages (mtha’ wa).86  
As a frontier land of both Manchu Qing and of Central Tibet, Tibetan 
monasteries in Amdo were organized very differently from those in Central Tibet. 
They were largely independent from either authority and the complex relations among 
themselves usually overshadowed their apparent religious affiliation.87 These 
monastic entities often integrated a comprehensive structure of religion, politics and 
economy. Before the 1950s there were a wide variety of monks in Kirti monastery—
from the religiously oriented majorities to different administrative positions, financial 
management, tax collection, and as trading professionals (see Figure5).88 The monk 
                                                 
85 Eric Teichman, a British officer who traveled in northwest China during the 1917, wrote in his 
travelogue that “large monasteries on the Kokonor border [northeastern Tibet, or Amdo] are 
commercial as well as religious centers” (Teichman 1921). Republican Chinese officer Ma Hetian also 
observed the prosperous monastery market in Labrang when he traveled there in 1936 (Ma 1947: 53). 
86 In monastic relationships the bigger monastery, called “mother monastery” (Tib: ma dgon), had full 
power over some small monasteries, called “son monastery” (Tib: bu dgon). According to a state survey 
in 1955 (ABLD 1985), Kirti monastery property at that time was estimated as: 1) cash: 300,000 (silver 
tael); 2) cattle: 600 horses, 14 mules, 450 yaks, 300 milk cows, 3500 sheep; 3) land: 46 acres; 4) real 
estate, including temples and assembly halls: 800,000 (silver taels). There were also 18 small 
monasteries (Tib: bu dgon), 4 nomadic tribes (Tib: tsho ba), and 12 villages (Tib: mtha’wa) that were 
directly controlled by the Kirti monastery (Yan and Que 1993).  
87 Robert Ekvall observed this situation in the 1930s. When talking about the political division in 
Taktsang Lhamo, he wrote, “three tribes and two lamaseries divide among themselves the control of the 
region, and in the jealousies and rivalries of that divided administration lawlessness thrives” (Ekvall 
1938). In fact, since the establishment of Kirti and Serchi monasteries, religion has never brought them 
together in the way that Gelugpa monasteries in Central Tibet would ally with the religio-political 
government in Lhasa and with each other (Goldstein 1989). Although they both belong to the same 
Yellow Hat school (Gelugpa), religion has never stopped the rivalry—sometimes even violence—
between them which was mostly caused by the political or economic conflict (ABLD 1985: p140; 
Ekvall 1939). Many Western and Chinese travelers in the early 20th century noticed the significant 
independence of Tibetan monastic and lay units in Amdo (Ekvall 1939; Ma 1947; Rock 1956; 
Teichman 1921; Yu 1947). 
88 These included, for example, ombo who was the leading chanting monk (chief steward) of each 
college, jiwa who was in charge of the financial management such as monastic fund raising, tax 
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traders were selected to do business for the monastery often as a lifetime profession. 
They were in charge of a wide range of monastic business: loaning monastery money 
to generate interest, trading monastery cattle or other products, collecting taxes and 
contributions from their subject villages for the various religious events in the 
monastery. Although they were not paid in any material form, these monks, if they 
succeed in their business, would be considered as gaining equal merit as those who did 
through textual studies.89 At the same time, the monastery itself was also a main 
trading place. During the numerous religious ceremonies throughout the year, Tibetan 
pilgrims came from different regions to the monastic center for religious purposes, and 
also for trade (McKay 1998). This periodic gathering provided a good business 
opportunity for Tibetan traders, and also attracted adventurous outside traders such as 
the Hui. 
During the Qing dynasty, many Hui businessmen traveled back and forth in the 
Sino-Tibetan borderland between Gansu and Sichuan.90 This long distance trading 
resulted in the creation of several big trading posts along this route as well as the 
appearance of some professional Hui trading caravans. Taktsang Lhamo was one of 
the trading stops for the Hui traders and caravans between Gansu and Sichuan. In 1865, 
some Hui businessmen from the nearby Hui centered region of Hezhou and Taozhou 
started to settle down in Taktsang Lhamo.91 As the first non-Tibetan people settled 
down in Taktsang Lhamo, the Hui had to ask for the permission from the local Tibetan 
                                                                                                                                            
collection, and shangzod who was the personal manager of the Lama. Even after the political relaxation 
in the 1980s, only the religious part of these monastic functions had been restored while other political 
economic activities are strictly forbidden. For a review of political and religious organization of 
monastery and government in pre-1950s Lhasa, see (Goldstein 1989: 1-37).  
89 Field interview 2004. See also (ABLD 1985; Yan and Que 1993). 
90 The trading route was mainly between Songpan (north Sichuan) and Taozhou/Hezhou (Gansu) with 
some major stops in between, including Taktsang Lhamo (Fu and Xu 1967). 
91 These people’s names were recorded in the mosque as part of the local Hui community history. 
Fieldnotes 2003-2005.  
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monastic authority.92 Today, this ask-for-permission has been interpreted rather 
differently by Tibetan and Hui residents in Taktsang Lhamo. The Hui villagers 
explained this part of their history to me as a gracious invitation to the Hui from the 
Tibetan monastery. This Tibetan-initiated invitation, according to Hui, could be 
explained by the local need for more commerce and thus more skilled businessmen, 
like Hui.93 However the local Tibetans explained the same “ask” to me as an apparent 
evidence of paramount authority of the Tibetan monastery at that time. Therefore, the 
Tibetan acceptance of the Hui community in Taktsang Lhamo was rather a monastic—
thus also a Tibetan—benevolence granted to the Hui who came to Taktsang Lhamo as 
refugees escaping ethnic and religious violence in that period.94  
Since then a small Hui community had been accepted separately by the Kirti 
and Serchi monasteries as their own mtha’ wa. As the subjects of the Tibetan 
monastery, Hui villagers had the same responsibility and obligations as the Tibetan 
counterpart, such as paying tax, providing corvee labor, and contributing to the 
monastery.95 In return the monastic authority granted them a piece of land and the 
permission to stay. In addition, Hui villagers could seek the same protection from 
monastic authorities as Tibetan villagers in case of any trading dispute or even war 
with other political units. Ethnic and religious difference was tolerated and 
                                                 
92 About this asking permission (Ch: wen hua, lit. “ask the word”; Tib: mgo vdogs lit. “tie one’s head 
to”), Robert Ekvall who had been living in Taktsang Lhamo during the 1930-40s wrote in fine detail the 
hard time he went through to get the local monastic permission to live there. At the end it happened to 
be the rivalry between the Kirti and Serchi monastery that actually helped him to be able to stay there 
(Ekvall 1952). 
93 Muslim communities had settled in Tibetan borderlands throughout the Qing dynasty. Local Gansu 
gazetteers show, for example, that Jamyang Shepa, the head lama of Labrang monastery, invited 
Muslim merchants to settle down in Labrang area in order to promote local business. 
94 Field interview December 2003. For the ethnic violence and religious conflict in the Hui area at that 
time see (Lipman 1990).  
95 A Chinese official survey in 1955 (ABLD 1985) documented five major sources for the monastery 
income: 1) Lama of the monastery (Living Buddha) go out for religious services, i.e., get paid by locals 
for doing religious rituals; 2) Regular religious donation from the mtha’wa to the monastery (Tib: mang 
ja); 3) Jiwa (monk trader) collecting taxes from tribes and villages; 4) Religious service in special 
cases, such as death, sickness, natural disaster, etc.; 5) Corvee labor from the mtha’wa.  
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downplayed at that time. In fact, with the increasing religious needs of the Hui 
community, they even bought a local house and changed it into a mosque prayer hall, 
the first of its kind in this Tibetan heartland.96  
In his seminal study of rural marketing system in pre-1949 China, G. William 
Skinner (1964-65) makes clear a distinction between the economically—or “naturally” 
in his term—formulated communities (i.e., marketing community) and the politically 
imposed administrative units from the top (i.e., villages, counties). These two different 
conceptions of the basic community unit in China, according to Skinner, would never 
converge perfectly. He further argued that it was the “standard marketing community,” 
instead of the administrative village, that is more important in terms of social and 
cultural dynamics and thus deserves more attention (Skinner 1964-65: 31).  
This argument however is only partly true when it applies to a complex frontier 
context like Amdo. Throughout the Qing period, a distinct—yet not always visible—
Hui community had started to take shape all over the Sino-Tibetan borderland where 
Amdo Tibet and the Chinese northwest frontier fade into each other. The multi-ethnic 
and multi-centered nature of this frontier has often been taken as the source of the 
economic poverty and of a turbulent history of ethnic and religious conflict. The 
periodical escalation of religious and ethnic conflicts in northwest China was a 
significant phenomenon from late imperial times to the modern period.97 The multi-
ethnic and multi-centered nature, without an effective control from either Beijing or 
Lhasa, made it both highly profitable and highly adventurous to do businesses in this 
                                                 
96 It is recorded that they paid 50 taels of silver for the house and also invited a leading Ahong (Ch: kai 
xue a hong) for this temporary mosque (RGDF 1996: 783). 
97 The wider accommodation and domestication of the Muslims on the Sino-Tibetan borderland is a 
subject that is beyond the scope of this study. For a history of Muslim in northwest China, see (Lipman 
1997).  
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Sino-Tibetan frontier.98 It is also this nature that has significantly complicated 
Skinner’s differentiation between an economically/naturally formulated marketing 
community and a political administrative unit.  
Although the economic dynamic was primarily based on the Hui individual 
motivation of maximizing business profit, the actualization of economic practices had 
depended exclusively on the localized hierarchy of power, namely the Tibetan 
monasteries and social organizations on the Sino-Tibetan frontier.99 The two parallel 
concepts of community that Skinner put out actually merged into a more complicated 
entity within which ethnicity and religion could not play the dominant role before 
entering the age of modern nation state. Muslim Hui businessmen often spent much 
time to establish close relations with the local Tibetan monasteries and lay village 
chiefs to establish business connections there.100 The self-enclosed and self-sustained 
nature of many pre-modern Tibetan frontier lands made successful trade heavily 
dependent on the personal relationship with the local social political authority, namely 
the Tibetan monasteries and lay chiefs. Facility in Tibetan language became the first 
                                                 
98 The Hui successfully established (and in some places dominated) the trading route in the Tibetan 
borderland (Ekvall 1939). Their business adventures to the Tibetan land had lasted for centuries and this 
tradition has even been revived after the Chinese political relaxation in the 1980s.   
99 Many scholars have discussed the social political administration in Qing dynasty on the local level. 
Steve Sangren explains the administration below county level in Qing imperial government that “[i]n 
practice, magistrates relied a great deal on local leaders and the various organizations they headed to 
maintain order and to disseminate values amenable to the government” (Sangren 1987: p16). In contrast 
to Sangren’s amendment to Skinner’s argument, James Millward has treated it as a concrete problem 
since “he [Skinner] discussed only one of several Qing systems.” Millward discusses in details what 
Sangren calls “local leaders and the various organizations” (i.e. tusi, jasak, or beg systems) which, he 
argues, is “a blind spot” in the “China-centered” study of Qing. To have a better understanding of 
“China” in general, and Qing in particular, thus needs a shift of perspective to what he calls “a Qing-
centered history of the Qing” (Millward 1998). 
100 Robert Ekvall documented the ethnographic details about these differences between Tibetan traders 
in Taozhou and Muslim Hui traders who came to the Tibetan highland (Ekvall 1939). According to 
him, Tibetans, especially nomadic Tibetans, had little interest in getting involved with anything Chinese 
because of their pride in being a nomad. There was a very short period of time during the year that they 
would travel to Taozhou for trading the goods they needed. In contrast to Tibetan traders, Hui 
businessmen in Taozhou lived exclusively on trading with Tibetans. When they traveled to Tibetan 
areas, they usually relied more on their Tibetan hosts. Thus they spent more time and had more intimate 
relationship with local Tibetan than Tibetans in Taozhou. 
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requirement for the Hui traders who had regular contacts with the Tibetan frontier, 
which still holds true today. A popular saying among the Hui in Gansu—“learning 
Tibetan is worth silver” (Ch: xue le zanghua zhi yinzi)—tells the commercial 
importance of speaking Tibetan. In fact not only were most of the Hui businessmen 
here bilingual in Chinese and Tibetan, but those who spent a long time in Tibetan 
lands even settled down permanently and took Tibetan wives. Most of them, however, 
stayed strictly with their religious identity of Muslim.101 In this way the Muslim Hui 
community started to cohabit with the Tibetan community in the heart of Tibetan land. 
The main social contacts between the two peoples was through economic 
interactions—barter trade, monastic taxes, or commercial business,.  
 
2.5 From Frontier of Two Empires to Ethnic Minority in one Nation: 
Modernization or Sinicization? 
 
Before the liberation (1949), we Hui had a very good relationship with the 
Tibetans. We brought more businesses here and they (Tibetans) protected our 
businesses. At that time everything here was decided by the Kirti Lama (Ch: 
shen me du shi ger de la ma shuo le suan). There was no minzu maodun 
(ethnic conflict) and we didn’t even know what minzu maodun was. It has 
only changed since the gaige kaifang (reform and open door policy) period. 
Especially after the 1990s, our relationship (Hui-Tibetan) has become very 
jinzhang (tense).  
 
Zhang, a Hui shop owner in Langmusi in his 60s102
 
When I was a child, we had no idea what it means to be a shaoshu minzu 
(minority nationality), like Hui or Zang. All the kids played together and grew 
up together. So you see I can speak Chinese just like those Hui can speak 
Tibetan. But now it is very different. Most young monks in our monastery 
                                                 
101 Most written records and my field interviews show that when this kind of inter-group marriage 
happens, it is always the case that Tibetan wives would be converted to Muslims and start to have less 
(if not cut off) contact with her natal family. See (Ekvall 1939: 62). 
102 Fieldnotes, 2004. 
52 
don’t understand why old monks have such good relationship with those 
Huihui. 
 
Galzang, a Kirti monastery monk in his 40s103
 
 
Our frontier is part of our territory. Our frontier people is part of our people. If 
everything were united, there would be no such problem of frontiers. 
Unfortunately the Western imperialists who intruded into our country always 
started from our frontiers. During the recent two hundred years, they have 
used every means, from coercing to enticing us, in order to make our country 
collapse. This has become a very serious situation. When this hand of the 
[imperialist] ghost first came in, [Chinese] intellectuals realized the crisis and 
warned their countrymen. […] However, till the end of the Qing dynasty, the 
[Chinese] study of the frontier has declined. But the Western imperialist 
survey and publication [regarding our frontiers] have been flourishing. This 
made us feel both pained in our hearts and ashamed.  
 
Ma Hetian, 
a Republican Chinese official traveling to this region during the 1930s104
 
Both Tibetan and Hui in Langmusi insist that their ethnic relationship was 
quite harmonious in the pre-1950s period, and even in the beginning of the 
Communist era.105 This was a somewhat surprising discovery for me in the beginning 
of my fieldwork because of the apparent separation and rivalry between the two ethnic 
groups nowadays. It was not surprising, however, that the local Tibetan authorities had 
had much tension with central state power at that time since the late imperial times 
when various kinds of modernization effort from the Qing imperial government had 
reached many parts of its frontier region.106 William Coleman (2002) in a recent 
analysis of Tibetan uprisings against the central Qing modernization effort argued that 
                                                 
103 Fieldnotes, 2004. 
104 (Ma 1947), the translation is mine. 
105 All information and quotations here are based on my field interview during 2003-2005.  
106 Recent scholarship on ethnic identities in modern Chinese history has emphasized the important 
change from the former empire to the rising of a new Chinese nation state. This scholarship includes a 
wide range of cross-disciplinary and cross-regional literature from anthropology to history, political 
science, literary theory, etc., to name only a few of them: (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Gladney 
1991; Duara 1995; Harrell 1995a; Dikotter 1997; Lipman 1997; Bulag 1998; Schein 2000; Harrell 
2001c; Mueggler 2001; Keyes 2002; Fiskesjö 2006). 
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the frontier in the late imperial times had in fact become “a test ground for the new 
Chinese modernist and modernist ideology.” He argued that it was this outside 
modernization attempt that had radically changed a carefully balanced social political 
structure by many different parties—the “cultural nexus of power” in Duara’s sense 
(Duara 1988). It was this external interruption of the local power balance that had 
eventually led to the violent local reactions such as the Batang uprising and the 
increasing banditry in southern Kham during the early 20th century (Coleman 2002; 
Spenden 2002). 
When Sun Zhongshan first founded Republic of China in 1911, his notion of 
nation and ethnicity was based on the ideal unity of the five large ethnic groups in 
China—Han, Mongolian, Tibetan, Hui, and Manchu (Ch: wuzu gonghe, or “Five 
Races in Unity”). This ideal of racial solidarity envisioned by Sun led directly to a 
modern creation of a “Chinese race” (Ch: zhonghua minzu)—a dominant idea based 
on the confrontation between yellow and white races which has been shared by many 
Chinese intellectuals and political activists.107 The national consciousness of a unified 
China emerged as primarily a reaction to the humiliation suffered by China at the 
hands of Western imperialist powers and an intellectual adoption of Western 
modernity.108  
Since then a popular desire especially among Chinese intellectuals for a new 
united and strong “China” has been expressed against both the “feudal” representation 
of the formal Qing empire and the “colonial” representation of the Western imperialist 
powers. Many Chinese intellectuals started to look at these old frontiers from a new 
                                                 
107 See (Dikotter 1992: 124; Dikotter 1997) 
108 Sun Zhongshan clearly stated that “those so-called ‘independent provinces’, are secessions from the 
Qing Empire, but they are still unitary parts of a new [Chinese] nation, including Mongolia and Tibet.” 
Many scholars have indicated the importance of the Republican period (1911-1949) as a transition 
period from the imperial dynasty to the modern nation state (Duara 1995; Hon 1996; Chow 1997; 
Dikotter 1997; Tuttle 2005).  
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perspective of modernity and of a modern Chinese nation.109 What has been raised 
into the public realm by these incidents of attention to the frontier is not only a taste of 
the exotic in one’s own (imagined) homeland, it was more importantly an urgent need 
for modernization in the nation’s frontier regions that had been newly discovered as a 
crucial part of the newborn nation. This propagation of modernization led to the 
nationwide campaign of New Life Movement (Ch: xin shenghuo yundong) in which 
many traditions of Han Chinese and ethnic minorities became the main target.110 
Moreover this modernization process of the Republican became even more 
problematic on its ethnic frontiers. It was called a Sinicization process because Han 
Chinese were openly encouraged to move to the frontier minority areas and minority 
peoples were encouraged (or obliged) to give up their traditional customs and to adopt 
“modern” (Chinese) culture.111  
 
2.6 Modernization: A Tibetan Case 
It would surely be reductive if we simply depicted frontier people as recipients 
or victims of the Chinese modernization projects. An eminent example is the Fifth 
Jamyang Shepa (1916-1947)—chief reincarnation lama of the great Amdo Tibetan 
monastery of Labrang. In early 20th century the fall of the Qing dynasty and the rise of 
Chinese and Muslim warlords in northwestern China put the Labrang monastery 
directly in confrontation with both the Chinese modernization and military aggression 
                                                 
109 Various frontier reports or explorations became the rage in government sponsored projects, academic 
publications, as well as popular readings. See, e.g. (Fan 1938; Gu and Wang 1988; Ma 1947; Yu 1947). 
The Chinese journalist Fan Changjiang’s travelogue from the northwest frontier, which was originally 
published as a series in a major Chinese newspaper, Da Gong Bao, became so popular among the public 
that when it came out later as a book it was reprinted three times in less than two months (Fan 1938). 
110 In Han Chinese regions, for example, it was the prohibition of the foot-binding practice, and in 
ethnic minority regions, it was cultural suppression and Sinicization. See Gu Jiegang’s critique of the 
Republican policy of Pan-Hanism (Hon 1996). 
111 See Gu Jiegang’s critique of the Republican government. Sinicization policy included, for example, 
forcing non-Han people to take Chinese names, “Miao woman had their topknots cut off and their 
pleated skirts shredded by Republican troops” (Schein 2000), place names in non-Han areas were given 
Chinese equivalents, etc. see (Deal 1979; Dreyer 1976). 
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of Muslim warlords. According to his brother Apa Alo’s (Ch: Huang Zhengqing) 
account, the Fifth Jamyang Shepa was very interested in all kinds of modern things 
from the time he was young.  
 
The Fifth Jamyang Shepa learned photographic technique from [a western 
Christian missionary who came to Labrang]. When they left, he bought many 
foreign goods, such as iron stove, cameras, watches, globe, from these western 
missionaries. […] He could take photos and even develop them by himself. 
He researched the globe and gave all the countries and cities Tibetan names. 
[…] He liked to read pictorials from China and overseas. His domestic 
quarters, though Tibetan in style on the outside, are decorated and furnished in 
western style inside. He had it done according to those pictorials. […] He is 
also very interested in transmitter-receivers. He even compiled a telegraph 
code in Tibetan. When he was studying in Lhasa, we usually communicated 
through this Tibetan telegraph code.112  
 
As one of the biggest Gelugpa monasteries outside Central Tibet, Labrang had a well-
established system of monastic education. Having been exposed to various kinds of 
modern phenomena, the Fifth Jamyang Shepa was not satisfied with only the 
traditional monastic education. Despite being worshipped as a living Buddha, he saw 
clearly his own impotence in protecting and sustaining his religion without coping 
with what he considered to be inescapable changes. 
 
He [Jamyang Shepa] told me [Apa Alo] that our religion would not survive 
only by relying on the living Buddha. […] The combination of religious and 
political power in Tibet will not last in the long run. […] He said when he was 
in Lhasa he went to the Lhamo La lake—the most sacred lake near Lhasa 
where they look for the miraculous prophecy for the reincarnation of the Dalai 
Lama. In the magical manifestation of the lake he saw money being printed by 
machine in Labrang. He concluded that Labrang will surely be changed 
dramatically in the future.113
 
                                                 
112 (Huang 1989), the translation is mine. 
113 (Huang 1989), the translation is mine. 
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Coming back to Labrang in 1940 after two years of studying in Lhasa, the Fifth 
Jamyang Shepa started his own modernization effort in Labrang. He established the 
first modern vocational school for young monks in Labrang, where not only the 
traditional monastic knowledge would be taught but they would also include modern 
knowledge such as Chinese, mathematics, geography, history, chemistry, physics, 
painting, music, physical exercise, educational psychology,and sanitation and 
medicine. In 1945, his avant-garde idea of building a modern Tibetan vocational 
school, mostly for monks, in Labrang was financially supported by the Republican 
Chinese government. However this idea of a modern school with the support of the 
Chinese government was strongly opposed by the conservative monastic authority and 
eventually rejected as a threat to the Labrang monastery. With the decline of the 
Republican government and the unexpected death of the Fifth Jamyang Shepa, this 
monk school finally ended in 1947. This distinctive Tibetan attempt at modernization 
was completely diverted with the advent of the Communist power and the new PRC. 
 
2.7 Liberation and Classification: From Republican to Communist 
Despite the Republican government’s modernization effort it was not until the 
Communist period beginning in 1949 that most uncharted territories and unexplored 
frontiers were fully incorporated in the new Chinese nation. The Communist ethnic 
policy, though in many ways a continuation of the Republican project of Chinese 
nation building, openly criticized the “Han Chauvinism” in the Republican policy to 
justify the legitimacy of the new polity over the old Republican one (Fei 1981). In all 
the official Chinese rhetoric after 1949, both in Chinese and later translated into many 
other minority languages, “liberation” (Ch: jie fang, Tib: bcings ’grol)—the 
Communist victory over the Republican to achieve the national power—is the most 
significant temporal marker between “the old society” (Ch: jiu she hui, Tib: ’jig rden 
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rnying ba)—Imperial or Republican China before 1949, and “the new society” (Ch: 
xin she hui, Tib: ’jig rden gsar ba)—Communist China after 1949. As the illuminating 
point of “the new society,” the state policy of regional autonomy of ethnic minorities 
(Ch: minzu quyu zizhi) and ethnic equality (Ch: minzu pingdeng) served to highlight 
the Communist “liberation” of ethnic minority peoples in China and the authentic 
equality among all peoples in “the new society.”  
While the Republican government employed the Western notion of 
modernization to promote a unitary citizenship over ethnicity, the Communist theory 
set up “a universal standard of progress or modernity that exists independent of where 
the center might be on the historical scale at any given moment” (Harrell 1995c). This 
Communist standard of progress is based on the Morgan-Engels model of social 
development from primitive society, to slave society, feudal society, and capitalist 
society that universally applies to every human societies at all times. Thereby, 
according to this theory, ethnic difference among different peoples would ultimately 
cease to exist in the highest stage of development—Communist society.  
In early 1950s, this Communist theory of ethnic equality was first practiced by 
the national campaign of ethnic identification (Ch: minzu shibie) which, on the one 
hand officially acknowledged the cultural and ethnic diversities in China, but on the 
other hand pressured the very existence of ethnicity in a new socialist context 
(Fiskesjö 2006). As many have indicated, this ethnic identification was anything but a 
simple recognition process.114 It was indeed an ethnic reconstruction process—a 
process that actively engaged both the identifier and the identified. Those being 
identified may or may not agree with the new categories the state created for them, but 
they nonetheless hardly questioned the legitimacy of the category itself or the power 
of categorizing.  
                                                 
114See (Fei 1981; Harrell 1995c; Litzinger 2000: 3-8; Tapp 2002). 
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 2.8 Creating a Society Identity: Slave and Serf115
During the radical period of Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution 
afterwards, ethnic consciousness—even ethnicity altogether—was actively eliminated 
and replaced with class consciousness.116 The official discourse stated that people of 
all ethnic origins in China had been equally repressed and exploited by the “Three Big 
Mountains” (Ch: san zuo dashan)—Imperialism, Feudalism, and Capitalism—before 
they were liberated by the Communist Chinese government in 1949.117 Along this 
line, Tibetan society before 1951 was officially defined as a “feudal serf society” (Ch: 
fengjian nongnu shehui) dominated by the “three big lords” (Ch: san da ling zhu, Tib: 
gzhung sger chos gsum)—monasteries, aristocrats, governments—brutally exploiting 
the great majority of the Tibetan public who were described mostly as serfs (Wu 
1991).  
The Chinese application of Morgan-Engels model in Tibet explains the Tibetan 
society as a stage between the slave society and the feudal society before the 
Communist liberation in the 1950s. This has thereby created a unique identity for 
Tibetan society in the new Chinese state. Unlike elsewhere in China, where one of the 
four society models must apply, Tibetan society is unique in the sense that, it was on 
the more primitive stage compare to most other places in China, yet it requires a 
specific category for itself that no other society applies. According Ya Hanzhang, a 
renowned Chinese historian and Tibetologist, the Tibetan empire (7th -10th century) 
                                                 
115 I thank Magnus Fiskesjo for his thought-provoking comments on this subject. 
116 See, i.e., (Makley 2005) for a local memory of the Cultural Revolution in Labrang. 
117 In the Chinese Communist terminology, “Feudalism” includes the imperial Qing government, the 
local Tibetan monastic or tribal authorities (“feudalist serfdom”), and the Chinese and Muslim warlords 
(“feudalist warlords”). “Capitalism” refers mostly to the Republican government and the capitalist style 
enterprises in the beginning of the 20th century. “Imperialism” refers to the foreign powers that had 
come to China after the Opium war in 1840, which include foreign missionaries, industrial or business 
enterprises, or individual travelers (ABGK 1985; GZDF 1999). 
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was in the stage of slave society. After that Tibetan society evolved from slave society 
to “feudal serf society” (Ch: fengjian nongnu zhi shehui) and had since stayed in that 
stage until it was liberated by the Communist Chinese in 1950.118 This society identity 
for Tibetan has since been propagated through not only political propagation and 
popular media like film which at that time was still a scare resource meant only for 
government use.119 But it has also been “scientifically” proved by long term academic 
discourse, even based on ethnographic field research.120  
The new universal scale that Chinese Communist set up was in fact a powerful 
discourse—what Harrell (1995a) termed “the hegemony of definition.”  Not only had 
it created a new identity for the whole Tibetan society in China, but it also performed a 
“practice of time,” in Mueggler’s term, which historicized ethnic conflicts and 
tensions.121  In other words, under this new strategy of time, ethnic conflicts and 
tensions became something that only existed in the past or “the old society”—in 
contrast to “the new society” which was characterized by ethnic equality.  
 
2.9 Hui Accomplice in Tibetan Riots: the Paradox of Ethnic Equality 
 
Ethnic equality (minzu pingdeng) is the fundamental principle of Marxism to 
solve all the ethnic problems. […] From the political and legal perspective, 
ethnic equality is embodied in two aspects in our country: one is the regional 
autonomy in minority areas which means minority people can decide for 
themselves in their own affairs; the other is the equal right of all the minority 
groups whether big or small. (Ya 1984: 130) 
                                                 
118 Ya Hanzhang’s article appeared first in the Chinese official journal China Tibetology in 1988 and 
was later selected in a special collection on the Tibetan feudal serf system (Wu 1991). In fact the 
“feudal serf society” model was set up for Tibetan society as early as the 1950s when the ethnic 
identification (minzu shibie) was carried out in Tibetan regions.  
119 This include both the popular Chinese made movie Nongnu (serf) and also a series of documentaries, 
new reports, which carried the same ideological undertone.  
120 The first research of this kind was the minzu shibie (ethnic classification) in Tibetan areas during the 
1950s. (ABLD 1985) This academic effort to reconfirm the Tibetan society identity as a “feudal serf 
society” has been continued till present. (Wu 1991) 
121 Mueggler (2001) has used “practice of time” in his ethnography of a marginalized community in 
southwest China. Another anthropologist Charlene Makley (2005) applied Mueggler’s concept in an 
Amdo Tibetan society in Labrang. See also chapter 4 in this dissertation.    
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As I mentioned above, both Hui and Tibetan in Langmusi remember the 
harmonious relationship they had in the past, in contrast to the increasing tension 
between the two groups today. The initial settling of some Hui families in Taktsang 
Lhamo was based on their full compliance with the local Tibetan hierarchy. 
Furthermore, they were even incorporated as part of it despite of their ethnic and 
religious difference.122 The Communist ideal of ethnic equality means a change of 
local structure of social political power as well as a deep alteration of the traditional 
Tibetan-Hui relationship. This relationship has officially gone from ethnic hierarchy 
before the “liberation” to ethnic equality (minzu pingdeng) after the “liberation” and 
finally to ethnic conflict after the economic reforms in the 1980s.123 Indeed the 
transition in these periods did not gain the local popularity that the Communist leaders 
had expected. On the contrary, it involved much violent resistance and violent 
reactions—including the widespread Tibetan rebellion against the Chinese 
government in the late 1950s, as well as the later “putting down of those rebellions” 
(Ch: pingpan) and “democratic reform” (Ch: minzhu gaige) by the Chinese 
government.  
What has interested me, as I found out later in my fieldwork, is the case of 
“Hui accomplice” in those Tibetan rebellions. Not only does this show the irony of 
“ethnic equality” that had replaced the former ethnic (Tibetan) hierarchy, but it also 
creates the pretext for the ethnic conflict later on—which I call the paradox of the 
ethnic equality. 
                                                 
122 One of the many mutually recognized roles between Tibetan and Hui was that Hui acted as an 
intermediate because of the Tibetan unwillingness to deal directly with Han Chinese. Robert Ekvall in 
his biographic novel (1952) reported this unwillingness of Tibetans to deal directly with the Chinese not 
only in business affairs but also in political affairs. After the Gansu warlord Lu Dachang (Ekvall 
recorded as Cheng Lu Chang) looted the nearby monastery and killed all the monks, monastic 
authorities in Taktsang Lhamo decided to negotiate with him in order to avoid the same fate. They 
chose Ekvall as their representative for negotiations because of his Chinese language ability and his 
extensive relations on the Chinese side (Ekvall 1952: 139-152). 
123See more on this subject in the next chapter. 
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After about six months living in Langmusi, I became familiar with my Hui 
neighbor Ali, a restaurant owner in his forties. Ali’s family is one the earliest Hui 
families who settled down in Langmusi. Being a Kirti monastery mthar’ wa, his 
family could do much more business in the surrounding Tibetan regions under the 
protection of Kirti monastery. From late imperial period throughout the Republican 
time, this part of China was characterized by endless wars and unstable living 
condition. Having a protected business resource saved the life of a family or even a 
community. Therefore, as Ali said, the Hui community in Taktsang Lhamo was more 
grateful to the Tibetan protection than resentful of their exploitation of tax and labor.  
Like all the Hui in Langmusi, Ali speaks perfect Tibetan and has many Tibetan 
friends and customers including monks and lamas in the monastery and nomad 
families on the grassland. He told me this is all because of his farther who speaks even 
better Tibetan and, more importantly, had good relationships with many important 
monks and lamas in Kirti monastery including the Kirti Lama—the chief incarnate 
lama of the Kirti monastery who is now in exile in India.124 Most old generation 
Tibetan monks in Kirti monastery know very well Ali’s father and have good respect 
on him. As I gradually found out, this respect has come from a special period of Kirti 
monastery history.  
From 1954 to 1957, Taktsang Lhamo and many surrounding regions had been 
constantly under the pressure of the national campaigns of “democratic reform” (Ch: 
minzhu gaige) and “socialist reconstruction” (Ch: shehuzhuyi gaizao). These 
campaigns aimed at depriving the political and economic privileges enjoyed by the 
                                                 
124 I never got to meet Ali’s father since he was not living in Langmusi any more. After he came out of 
the jail, he worked with Ali in a transportion business in the early 1980s. Not long after he discovered 
he had serious health problems because of the years in jail. He has since moved to the nearby big city of 
Linxia for the convenience of medical treatment. Ali told me that his father seldom wanted to tell this 
part of his history to anyone, even to his close relatives. It was only during the years when they drove 
together from Chengdu to Lhasa that he would tell these stories on the truck in order to keep him awake 
during those weeklong journeys with day-and-night driving. Fieldnotes April 2004. 
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local monasteries. In response many surrounding areas had reported violent resistance 
(called panluan or “rebellion” in Chinese documents) to the new Chinese system.125 
During the high tide of Chinese military campaign of “putting down of the Tibetan 
rebellion” (Ch: pingpan) in 1958 Kirti Lama decided to escape to Lhasa. The journey 
from Taktsang Lhamo to Lhasa then was very long and dangerous. It involved passing 
through many turbulent regions which were at that time dominated by the Han 
Chinese or by Muslim Hui. Besides his own entourage, Kirti Lama asked Ali’s father 
to accompany him because of his Chinese and Tibetan language ability as well as his 
Muslim Hui identity. On this long and dangerous journey Ali’s father was the Chinese 
translator for the Kirti Lama and helped him all the way to Lhasa.  
When they finally arrived in Lhasa, it happened to be the year of the Tibetan 
uprising of 1959. Kirti Lama decided to go exile to India and he encouraged Ali’s 
father to go with him.126 But this time Ali’s father refused because of his family in 
Taktsang Lhamo. When he returned to Taktsang Lhamo one year later, Ali’s father 
was immediately arrested in the name of “accomplice of rebellion” and sentenced to 
fourteen years in prison. He came out of prison near the end of the Cultural Revolution. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
125 In the biography of a local Tibetan chieftain, Ou Erxiao, who has from the beginning been a 
Communist supporter in this region, he recounted the severe situation when they first tried to carry out 
the party policy in these regions. “Many local [Tibetan] leaders were very skeptical and did not 
understand [the Communist administration]. Some of them even turned anti-revolutionary. Some in 
Zorge openly opposed the party policy saying that there had never been any imperial dynasty in the 
history that had controlled our system” (GNZX 1989). There are also many exile Tibetan writings about 
the resistance to the Communist change, see e.g. (Huabaier 1994). 
126 There have been many Hui Muslims, especially those who had close connections with Tibetans, who 
went in exile to India during the Tibetan uprising. In Langmusi, at least two Hui families I know have 
relatives who left at that time and are still living in Nepal. Some of them even changed their identities 
and claimed to be Tibetan later. There were also others who tried to move to Arab countries and settled 
down there (LTXZ 1997). 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RECONSTRUCTON OF MONASTERY AND MOSQUE: “MAJORITY 
MINORITY” AND “MINORITY MINORITY” 
 
 
The old monastery of Namo,  
on the border of Gansu and Sichuan; 
In the old days,  
the smoke of incense and the sound of drums and bells,  
permeated the great temples and monastic buildings; 
Praying for everybody,  
too busy were the monks and nuns. 
  
All of a sudden, wind and cloud gathered on the clear sky;  
In the name of “breaking the old and building the new,” 
gods and deities were expelled from temples,  
monasteries were demolished, 
only some ruins of an old wall left; 
Ten years of desolation,  
trees have been growing old and incense smoke disappeared in the sunset; 
 
Today, the landscape is still the same but the Buddha has gone to the West.127
 
A Chinese writer wrote this poem on the ruins of the Kirti monastery when he 
visited Langmusi just after the Cultural Revolution in 1981. The change of weather 
here implies the “ten years catastrophe” (Ch: shinian haojie) of the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976), during which religion was one of the major objects of attack. 
The two monasteries in Taktsang Lhamo—Kirti and Serchi—were both destroyed at 
that time.128 Most high lamas went into exile following the Kirti Lama’s departure in 
                                                 
127 Sun Zhicheng, “Reflections on the ruins of Langmusi” (RGWS 1998: 38), text originally in Chinese, 
the translation is mine.  
128 The “Red Guard” and “working groups” started to attack monasteries since the Great Leap Forward 
campaign in 1958 onwards until they were completely demolished during the Cultural Revolution. 
Fieldnotes January 2004.  
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the late 1950s, with a few left who were later tortured and imprisoned. Other monks 
were forced to return to their hometowns as lay workers or peasants for the new 
socialist country. The Lhamo mosque was used as a storage building for the local 
commune called the Red Star Brigade (Ch: hongxing shengchandui). All the religious 
activities were strictly forbidden until after the death of Mao in 1976.129  
The downfall of the “Gang of Four” and the re-emergence of Deng Xiaoping in 
the late 1970s marked the official ending of this radical period in Chinese history and 
signaled the beginning of a new age characterized by political relaxation and 
economic reform. Both Tibetan and Hui in Taktsang Lhamo could once again practice 
their religion publically. The religious revival under this condition has not only 
brought deep changes in both Tibetan Buddhism and Hui Islam, but more profoundly 
in the understanding of religion and the view of ethnic relations vis-à-vis the Chinese 
state in a radically changed social political context.  
In this chapter I examine the religious revival in this borderland through the 
main theme of monastery and mosque reconstruction. The end of the Mao era and the 
beginning of the Deng era gave the Tibetan and the Hui a completely new context 
within which their destroyed religions were able to revitalize. It is this new social 
political context that both the new Tibetan Buddhist revival and Hui Islamic revival 
have taken place. More importantly, this coexistence of Tibetan Hui religious revival 
in Chinese social political transformation has formed a new Tibetan-Hui relation. On 
the one hand, Tibetans—the local majority in this ethnic minority region—have 
reconstructed their space by excluding Hui and Chinese as the ethnic other. On the 
other hand, Hui—the local minority in this ethnic minority region—have rebuilt their 
                                                 
129 My Hui neighbor in Langmusi told me that the situation was the worst during the Cultural 
Revolution. Hui people in the Commune were purposefully put to raise pig in order for them to get rid 
of their “old” (religious) belief. If anyone in the Hui community was reported to do a Ramadan fast, the 
“working group” would come to his home and force him to eat. Fieldnotes March 2004. 
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community by rebuilding their core values, namely Islam and entrepreneurship. A new 
ethnic and economic confrontation between the local Tibetan and Hui community has 
gradually been overlaid the former political, economic and ethnic order. New 
boundaries and tensions between the two groups have since taken form. 
 
3.1 The Visit of the Panchen Lama: Religion and Politics Combined  
Orville Schell, in his forward to the Goldstein and Kapstein’s volume on 
Tibetan Buddhist revival in contemporary China, indicated the paradoxical nature of 
the alternating Chinese interludes between “loosening up” or “tightening down” 
(Goldstein and Kapstein 1998). The early 1980s has been characterized by many as 
the “loosening up” period when the CCP was more in favor of a soft policy towards a 
solution of the “Tibet Question.”130 It was under this condition that two important 
figures—the Panchen Lama and the Kirti Lama, both highly respected religious 
leaders—visited Taktsang Lhamo subsequently in 1982 and 1984. This served as an 
important catalyst for both Tibetan and Hui religious revival.  
The Panchen Lama is widely considered in Tibet as the incarnation of the 
“Buddha of Infinite Light” (Tib: ’od ba med), the second most influential religious 
leader of Tibet after the Dalai Lama. However the Panchen Lama’s status has been 
ambiguous and controversial among some Tibetans (especially those in exile) because 
of his cooperation with the Chinese government.131 It was not until more recently that 
                                                 
130 This “loosening up” period started from Deng Xiaoping’s return to power when the CCP initiated a 
series of effort to solve the “Tibet question” and ended in late 1980s when the riot in Lhasa escalated 
and ended with a Chinese martial law for one year. Hu Yaobang, the General Party Secretary then, 
visited Tibet in 1980. He openly advocated a withdrawal of Han Chinese cadres from Tibet and a 
promotion of ethnic Tibetan cadres for a real autonomy (Wang 1994). Soon after that the Chinese 
government invited the exiled Tibetan government for a dialogue. Many renowned Tibetan lamas had 
visited their homeland for the first time after they went exile (Goldstein 1997). See also (Goldstein and 
Kapstein 1998). The Kirti Lama also came back during this period to his monastery for the first and 
only time since he went exile in 1958.  
131 Many high lamas who did not go into exile have experienced the same criticism as “traitors of 
Tibet.” See also the life story of the famous Amdo Geshe Shes-rab rGya-mtsho (Stoddard 1986). 
However despite their cooperative attitude and the fact that many were appointed important positions in 
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some newly released documents have shown that the Panchen Lama actually always 
was an active protector of Tibetan language and culture both during the radical period 
of the Cultural Revolution and after.132 After he came out of prison in 1980 and 
resumed his political position in the government, the Panchen Lama immediately set 
out on several trips to Tibetan regions including central Tibet, Qinghai, Sichuan, 
Gansu and Yunnan. These trips in the early 1980s formed part of his whole effort to 
promote Tibetan language and culture in Tibetan regions and particularly to revive the 
religious life in Tibet after the devastating period of the Cultural Revolution.  
The Panchen Lama’s visit to Tibetan regions can be characterized with the 
well known Tibetan term chos-srid gnyis-‘brel (religion and politics combined). As an 
important religious leader who held a high-level political position in the Chinese 
government, the Panchen Lama’s visit carried a two-fold meaning.133 For his 
followers, it was a religious trip with a highly renowned Buddhist lama. It was 
especially meaningful since this was the first blessing trip after a period of religious 
devastation. At the same times this trip was also a political visit from a high-level 
government official who represented all nationalities under the multi-ethnic state 
government. In this way his visit was not only significant for Tibetans but for all the 
peoples—Tibetan, Hui or Han Chinese—who lived in this ethnic minority region. 
Because of the semi-official and semi-religious nature of these trips, they were 
documented in some official journals and are also well remembered by the local 
people in the Tibetan regions he visited.134 I first got to know many details about the 
                                                                                                                                            
the Chinese government, most of them were severely tortured (some to death) during the Cultural 
Revolution. It was until after some recently released documents that these “Tibetan traitors” have been 
seriously reevaluated as the protectors of Tibetan culture. 
132 The recent release of the previous Panchen Lama’s secret report to the CCP in 1962 has shown his 
courageous critique of the CCP policy in Tibet with a wholehearted will to protect Tibetan culture and 
religion from being destroyed (Bskal-bzan-tshe-brtan 1997).    
133 His official title, resumed in 1980, was the vice chairman of National People’s Congress, the highest 
legislative body in the Chinese government. 
134 Information on these trips of the Panchen Lama comes from the local gazetteers (Ch: wenshi ziliao) 
of Gansu and Sichuan, and also from interviews during my fieldwork.  
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Panchen Lama’s trip to Gannan and Aba through some audiotapes that my monk 
friend Tashi had saved. These tapes are private recordings of Panchen Lama’s public 
talk in each place he went, which were later circulated privately among Tibetans. The 
content of these talks is mostly to encourage the local Tibetans to preserve their ethnic 
culture, particularly the use of Tibetan language, Tibetan education and the revival of 
monastic culture, under the new relaxed CCP policy.135  
Many people in Taktsang Lhamo today still remember vividly the day when 
Panchen Lama arrived in 1982. It was October 1st, when the Panchen Lama was on his 
way from Gannan to Aba with a half-day stop in Taktsang Lhamo. He was 
accompanied by some Tibetan officials from the Gansu and Sichuan provincial 
governments as well as several high lamas like Jamyang Rinpoche and Gongthang 
Tshang from Labrang monastery. Batar (Tib: dbal thar), a local Tibetan government 
official, wrote later in his memoir: “In October 1982, the news that Panchen Rinpoche 
would come to visit spread quickly to every family on the Zorge grassland. This 
golden season of autumn on the grassland was covered with auspicious clouds and 
bathed in colorful sunlight” (ABZX 1993). Hundreds of monks from the local 
monasteries and thousands of Tibetan nomads and farmers from local and surrounding 
regions waited for a “head-touching” blessing by the Panchen Lama.136 The process of 
touching thousands of heads lasted the whole morning.  
Ama Drolka in her seventies, a life-long resident in the Dongkha village of 
Taktsang Lhamo, told me during my short stay in her house about her experience at 
that time. “Before Kirti lama went to India, I was blessed by him twice. After that the 
                                                 
135 In his talk the Panchen Lama emphasized the importance of using Tibetan language and Tibetan 
language education in Tibetan regions, which had been forbidden during the Cultural Revolution. He 
also stated that since much of Tibetan culture is found in monasteries it is very important to rebuild the 
monasteries that had been destroyed and to revive the monastic life (ABZX 1993). 
136 A traditional Tibetan way of getting religious blessing is through having the top of one’s head 
touched by a lama’s hand during or after a religious ceremony (Tib: mchod mjal, Ch: mo ding).   
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Chinese government (Ch/Tib: gongjia) came. Being a monk was prohibited, 
circumambulation was prohibited, […] then since Panchen Rinpoche came the 
[government] policy (Ch: zhengce) has been changed.”137 The two Chinese loan words 
gongjia (government or state), or sometimes Apa gongjia (father state), and zhengce 
(policy) are both quite popular in the local Tibetan everyday dialogue. Yet they refer 
to two different periods in Tibetan/Chinese history—one from the Cultural Revolution 
period and the other from the post-1980s reform and open-up period. Charlene Makley 
(2005), when studying the local memories of Cultural Revolution in Labrang, 
discovered the term Apa gongjia (father state) to be an important “oppositional 
testimony” among the Tibetans.138 She argued that this term is “both a subject of 
actions and an object of local sentiments.” The Chinese loan word zhengce has 
become popular among Tibetans particularly because of the tremendous impact of 
policy change on local Tibetan people’s life since the 1980s. Ama Drolka’s narrative 
of temporal change—from gongjia to zhengce—indicates a conceptual change of time 
marked by the arrival of Panchen Lama. While gongjia is still used among Tibetans, 
mostly elders, more and more new Chinese terms, such as zhengce, have entered 
everyday Tibetan speech especially among the younger generation. These Chinese 
loan words, along with many Tibetan words that have taken new meanings in the new 
social context, have been used to represent a whole new age with new phenomenon 
and new feelings appearing everyday in an ethnic borderland of a multiethnic 
nation.139  
                                                 
137 Tib: kirti lama rgya bkar ma ’gro dus ngas lan gnyis mjal song, de dro gongjia thon da ni aku byad 
ma wa gi sko ra ’gro ma wa gi, […] pan chen ring po che thon dang di nas zhengce ’gyur song  
138 Makley investigated on this subject among the elder Tibetan villagers in Labrang (Makley 2005). 
The terms “magical state” and “social imaginary” have been previously used by anthropologists such as  
(Coronil 1997; Mueggler 2001; Taussig 1997).   
139 See more examples and elaborations on this point in chapter 5 and chapter 6.  
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The Panchen Lama’s visit to Taktsang Lhamo also changed the life of Hui 
people. As Batar continued in his memoir, “as soon as Panchen Rinpoche learned that 
there was also a Muslim mosque in this village, he said he would like to pay a visit 
there.” Although the Lhamo mosque has been in this Tibetan land for more than a 
century, this was probably the first time that a Tibetan lama came to visit this Muslim 
mosque. My Hui neighbor Min told me he also joined the welcome group in the 
mosque to offer a Tibetan ceremonial scarf (Tib: kha btags) to the Panchen Lama. 
During the visit Panchen Lama asked about the mosque rebuilding and the religious 
life in the mosque. He told the ahong—religious leader of the mosque, or Imam—and 
Hui villagers that all the nationalities in China should enjoy equal rights including the 
practice of their religion. He especially mentioned that we should pay close attention 
to the right of ethnic minority groups as well as those who live in the regions where 
they are minorities. “He is a real [political] leader for all of us [Tibetans and Hui],” 
Min concluded to me with emotions.  
What Min expressed here resonates with the contemporary Hui struggles living 
in Tibetan regions. Although Hui is officially an ethnic minority group that enjoys 
equal rights with their Tibetan counterparts, on the practical level these rights cannot 
always be secured only because they live in a Tibetan autonomous region. Since the 
CCP resumption of ethnic autonomous administration policy in ethnic minority 
regions (Ch: luoshi minzu quyu zizhi zhengce) after the Cultural Revolution, many 
local government positions in these regions have been filled with ethnic minorities—
those who represent the ethnic identity of their region.140 This at the same time has 
created a blind spot in the vast ethnic borderland regions with coexistence of multiple 
ethnic groups. Here I use the term “minority minorities” to indicate those who have 
                                                 
140 In case of central Tibet, for example, many Tibetan cadres have been promoted after the 1980 visit 
of the General Secretary Hu Yaobang (Wang 1994).  
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considered this ethnic borderland their homeland for centuries yet do not belong to the 
dominant local ethnic group to which the autonomous administration power naturally 
goes.141 In Taktsang Lhamo, Tibetan and Hui villagers started simultaneously to 
rebuild the Kirti monastery and the Lhamo mosque. Yet the official approval of the 
Hui villagers’ application for rebuilding the mosque was not granted from the Tibetan 
dominated Zorge county government until after the Panchen Lama’s visit. Since then, 
the first Islamic association of Zorge County was established and based in the Lhamo 
mosque symbolizing the beginning of the revival of Islamic life in this region.142  
 
3.2 The Kirti Lama’s Visit to Taktsang Lhamo 
The Kirti Lama has always been worshipped by Tibetans in Taktsang Lhamo 
as “our lama.”143 The strong regional identity represented by the loyalty to local 
monastery and Lama was expressed clearly during his 1984 visit. Despite his long 
exile since 1958, his followers—from monks in Kirti monastery to lay Tibetan nomads 
in the region—have never stopped seeking his blessings and help on various occasions, 
as if he were still present in the monastery.144  
                                                 
141 This term “minority minorities” comes from my fieldwork interview with a local Hui resident. See 
later in this chapter. It applies to both Han Chinese and other ethnic minorities (in this case Hui) who 
live in a minority region where they do not belong to the dominant ethnic minority group. See (Harrell 
2001c) and (Hansen 2005) for descriptions of Han Chinese as minority in the ethnic minority regions.   
142 The practice of ethnic autonomous administration policy in multiethnic borderlands is sometime 
more complicated than it looks while other time might be, on the contrary, very straightforward. The 
general principle is to privilege the local majority ethnic population or the historically dominant ethnic 
group in the local region. Yet autonomous region of one ethnic group might include many autonomous 
prefecture or county of different ethnic groups. Because of the pyramid structure of Chinese political 
administrative power, autonomous administration of all levels is ultimately rendered under the control 
of central government.  
143 Tib: nga ’tsho bla ma. In some ways this regional loyalty is much more concrete to the local 
Tibetans and thus has even surpassed the highest loyalty to either Dalai Lama or Panchen Lama that 
seems more far away. See chapter 2 for my argument regarding the multiethnic influence and the 
independent nature of ethnic and religious polity in Amdo history. 
144 Except during the Cultural Revolution, it has been a common local practice to ask people who would 
go on a trip to India (or back) to bring information to (and from) the Kirti Lama. Communication 
between Tibetans in China and those in exile has been deliberately cut and actively surveilled by the 
Chinese government. Regular mail related to Tibetans does not go through smoothly between China to 
India. When I arrived there for my fieldwork in 2003, home telephone service was just introduced to 
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Compared to the Panchen Lama’s visit, the Kirti Lama’s trip back to his home 
town in 1984 was of a much lower profile.145 The Chinese official policy was to treat 
the Tibetan delegation from the exile government as an “unofficial” or “non-
governmental” visiting group and to accommodate Tibetan Lamas according to their 
different statuses and local influences.146 Therefore the highest level host unit for 
these delegations in Beijing was the National United Front (Ch: zhongyang 
tongzhanbu, NUF)—a long-standing politically functional unit in the CCP whose 
work has primarily to render various non-Communist organizations, parties, forces—
either political or cultural—under the leadership of CCP. Given that the Kirti Lama is 
a religious figure with only regional influence, he was hosted by some prefecture level 
officials from Sichuan province. His itinerary in China was completely managed by 
the Chinese side, which eventually created some frustration from many of the Tibetan 
followers of the Kirti Lama. 
Although the news of his coming was not announced from the Chinese 
government side, many Tibetans around Taktsang Lhamo still got the word 
immediately. Basang, a Tibetan cadre in his 40s, told me that the news arrived in his 
home village—about one day trip by truck from Taktsang Lhamo—even earlier 
through some people who had come back from India.147 This exciting news led them 
to an immediate decision to meet the Kirti Lama at the first possible moment. Since 
                                                                                                                                            
this area. In the beginning when it was still quite expensive to have a telephone at home, one of the 
main reason Tibetan monks would install a phone was to call their relatives or the Kirti Lama in India. 
In 2005 when I was about to leave Taktsang Lhamo, internet service provided by China Telecom came 
to town. Some monk friends started to ask me to teach them how to use computers so that they could 
communicate easily and inexpensively with the exile Tibetan community in India. 
145 This part of information was solely obtained through my field interview with Tibetans from many 
different regions around Taktsang Lhamo. There is no official document record about this trip either in 
Chinese or in Tibetan. 
146 For detailed analysis of these Tibetan delegations to China see (Goldstein 1997). 
147 This source of information has relied on the people who travel back and forth between the local 
village and India. Since this kind of travel always involves a lot of uncertainty and danger, the news 
source thus is also uncertain depends on the many situations. Yet this has been dramatically changed 
since the telephone service and later the high-speed internet access reached this area.  
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they could not get any further information on Kirti Lama’s itinerary, a group of young 
villagers lead by Basang decided that they would go to Chengdu, the capital city of 
Sichuan, instead of waiting in Taktsang Lhamo. The decision was indeed not easy. To 
Basang and his fellow villagers, Chengdu seemed to be very far both geographically 
and culturally. “None of us had been out of this village before, let alone to a big 
Chinese city,” Basang said, “we first took the village truck and then changed to a bus, 
it took us four to five days then to arrive at Chengdu.” Perhaps the most difficult thing 
for these young Tibetan villagers was that they didn’t understand any Chinese.148 In 
fact, they faced more challenges than simply some language difficulties. The Kirti 
Lama’s itinerary in China was arranged by the Sichuan government and as usual there 
was no public access to this kind of information. Basang and his fellow villagers 
believed that since Kirti Lama would be accompanied by the Sichuan government 
officials, Chengdu would certainly be his first stop before going further to Taktsang 
Lhamo. They were not the only ones waiting. During their stay in Chengdu, Basang’s 
group met several other groups of Tibetan people from other regions who, like them, 
were also waiting for the arrival of the Kirti Lama. 
After nearly one month waiting in Chengdu, Basang told me, to their great 
disappointment, they heard that the Kirti Lama had already arrived in Chengdu 
without any public announcement and had already left for Aba. “Of course all this was 
managed by the [Chinese] government,” Basang said angrily, “they just did not want 
us to meet Our Lama!” The frustration of this experience had stimulated even more 
passion from these young Tibetan villagers to meet “Our Lama” whom they had 
worshipped yet never met in their life. They had to go back to Taktsang Lhamo and 
finally were able to receive the blessings from the Kirti Lama.  
                                                 
148 Tib: rgya bskad ma shes ni zhis gi bkar gi 
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During the Kirti Lama’s visit to Taktsang Lhamo, not only Tibetans were 
excited to meet their Lama after nearly 30 years, it was also a big day for the Hui 
villagers in Taktsang Lhamo. Ali told me that his father, along with many other old 
Hui villagers, was asked specifically by the Kirti Lama to come for a meeting even 
though Kirti Lama had only one day in Taktsang Lhamo and he had thousands of 
Tibetans lining up for “head touching” blessing from him. The meeting was short. Ali 
recounted his father’s word that everyone there was very emotional but they had 
nearly no words to say. Kirti Lama asked about their life since he left and also told the 
current leading lamas in Kirti monastery that they (the Tibetan monastic authorities) 
should take better care of these Hui villagers.149
The traditional relationship (before the 1950s) between Kirti monastery and 
Gyago Hui village was one of a monastery-government and a subject village (Tib: lha 
lde). Under this relationship, Gyago Hui village, despite of their religious and ethnic 
differences, was treated not much differently from other Tibetan villages that were 
also the subjects of the Kirti monastery. The Chinese takeover of this region in 1950s 
had radically changed the ideological framework of the social political context for 
both Tibetan and Hui. The traditional hierarchical relationship was doomed as dark 
feudal residual and was replaced by the new socialist ideology. However this 
traditional relationship, particularly the ethnic relation between Tibetan and Hui, was 
not actually dissolved in the new socialist system. On the contrary, it has been 
preserved by being “frozen instantly.” Even during the Cultural Revolution, Tibetans 
and Hui were equally victims of the radical Chinese policy while Buddhism and Islam 
had suffered equal attacks from the constant socialist campaigns. Therefore the 
                                                 
149 This was confirmed to some extent when later some young lamas and monks from Kirti monastery 
told me that they couldn’t understand why the Kirti Lama asked them to be nice with these Hui people.  
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traditional relation including the hierarchy between Tibetan and Hui had been kept 
intact until the end of the Cultural Revolution.  
This frozen relation temporarily melted when Kirti Lama visited in 1984. 
Unlike the Panchen Lama’s visit, the Kirti Lama’s visit gave no actual political 
economic benefit to the Tibetan or Hui villagers in Taktsang Lhamo. Yet his arrival 
greatly awakened the local memories of the traditional social political hierarchy that 
was the hotbed of religious sentiments suppressed during the Cultural Revolution. It 
was also from this moment that the Tibetan-Hui relation started to be restructured 
under a radically changed social political context—one that not only unfreezes the 
traditional Tibetan-Hui relationship but completely changes the way they interact with 
each other vis-à-vis the Chinese government.   
 
3.3 Rebuilding the Monastery 
The rebuilding of the Kirti monastery has been under the leadership of Alak 
Lobsang,150 one of the reincarnate lamas at Kirti monastery who did not go into exile 
in the 1950s. Soon after the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, he was imprisoned 
as an “ox-ghost and snake-demon” (Ch: niu gui she shen).151 It was not until twelve 
years later—after the Third Plenum of the Eleventh CCP Congress officially 
announced that Cultural Revolution has been a “historical mistake”—that his case was 
redressed as one of the more than three million “mishandled cases” from the Cultural 
Revolution.152 The official Chinese policy to “redress these mishandled cases” (Ch: 
                                                 
150 Alak Lobsang now in his 60s has been both the religious leader and political representative of Kirti 
monastery in the Chinese government since the 1980s. The personal story of Alak Lobsang and the 
related history of Kirti monastery have been collected during my two years fieldwork in Taktsang 
Lhamo, including several interviews with Alak Lobsang and other related persons. See also chapter 6 
for more details. 
151 “Ox ghost snake demon” is a terminology first used by Mao Zedong in 1950s and later adopted by 
the Red Guards as a widely applied charge to any of their targets during the Cultural Revolution. It 
refers broadly to those “struggle objects” in all political campaigns, including intellectuals, religionists, 
landlords, rich peasants, rightists, anti-socialists, anti-revolutionists, anti-CCP, anti-Mao, etc.    
152 See more on this Chinese policy change in the introduction of (Goldstein and Kapstein 1998). 
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pingfan) includes two parts: one is to “rectify the name” (Ch: pingfan zhaoxue) of the 
victimized person on the ideological level; the other is to reinstate the previous 
working position of the person—often with some financial compensation and 
sometimes promotion—on the practical level. When Alak Lobsang came out of prison 
in 1980 he found he could return to his former religious practices. Religion was 
allowed again on the religious “Ground Zero” in Taktsang Lhamo but it has to be 
regulated in a whole new political and economic system.153 As most of the lamas in 
Kirti monastery had either passed away or been in exile, Alak Lobsang, despite his 
relatively low religious status, became the leading figure in rebuilding the Kirti 
monastery and the monastic community. He was at the same the official chairman in 
the new Kirti monastery Siguanhui (Democratic Administrative Committee of the 
Monastery).154
Siguanhui is a completely new institution at every religious institution after the 
official Chinese relaxation of restriction on religious practices since the 1980s. It 
applies to all kinds of religious institutions including Daoist temples, Islamic mosques, 
Buddhist monasteries, and nunneries. Its primary function is to bridge between the 
government administration and various religious institutions including the religious 
leaders and their followers. Siguanhui is usually elected by the religious community 
itself but has to be approved by the religious administration part of the government 
before it starts functioning (see figure 6).155 The primary responsibility of the 
Siguanhui is to keep the religious institution informed with the most up-to-date 
                                                 
153 The monasteries in Taktsang Lhamo were destroyed completely during the Cultural Revolution. 
154 Ch: siyuan minzhu guanli weiyuanhui, Tib: dgon ba dmangs gtso bdag gnyer u yon lhan khang. The 
Tibetan term is a translation from the Chinese.  
155 Since 1950s the Chinese government had tried to render the wide variety of religious organizations 
in China under a unified Siguanhui system. However it was not until the early 1980s that this system 
actually started to be applied to the most of the temples, mosques, or monasteries, mostly along with the 
religious revival in these religious institutions. Despite of being a self-elected committee, Siguanhui is 
nominally under the leadership of religious bureau in the government. Every Siguanhui member must 
be approved by the religious bureau after they are elected in the monastery. It is also the formal channel 
through which Chinese government policy is infiltrated in the monastic community.  
76 
directions from the government and also to inform the government with the latest 
news in different religious institutions in order to render them fully under state control. 
Although it is often the case that the head lama in the monastery is appointed as the 
chairman of Siguanhui, this election process initiated and managed by the government 
has fundamentally changed the nature of monastic structure—namely the separation of 
religion from politics and monastic self-sufficiency.156  
With the loss of the political and economic functions, the lack of monks and 
financial resources in the monastery made the initial rebuilding of the Kirti monastery 
very hard. Monastery income became entirely based on the voluntary contributions 
from the Tibetan public including the local invitation of lamas and monks to perform 
rituals.157 Alak Lobsang started by traveling frequently to different regions performing 
rituals for local families and communities and trying to recruit more monks at the 
same time. “The government gave 7,000 yuan (around $870) to the monastery 
restoration as a compensation to the Cultural Revolution destruction. But that’s almost 
nothing when you want to build a big monastery like Kirti,” Alak Lobsang told me 
later.  
In early 1980s many people in the remote villages still did not know that 
religion had been allowed again by the government. When Alak Lobsang arrived he 
found that the religious sentiment among the Tibetan public was reborn with much 
passion after more than ten years of repression during the Cultural Revolution. Many 
people came to Taktsang Lhamo even though they actually worshipped on a temple 
                                                 
156 See comparison between figure 5 and figure 6. The traditional Tibetan monastic structure which 
emphasizes on the combination of religion and politics (Tib: chos srid gnyis’brel) has been replaced by 
the separation between religion and politics (Ch: zhengjiao fenli) and the monastery self sufficiency 
(Ch: yisi yangsi, lit. “to breed the monastery with the monastery”) after the Chinese takeover. Melvyn 
Goldstein has documented the similar political economic challenge in Lhasa’s Drepung monastery in 
the post-1980s religious revival (Goldstein 1998: 35-39). 
157 Monastery income in the pre-1950s era was primarily based on tax from its lha sde (or villages that 
belong to the monastery) in addition to voluntary contributions (see the comparison of figure 5 and 
figure 6). For more on tax and corvée labor in pre-1950s Tibetan society see (Goldstein 1971a; 1971b). 
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under construction along with a small group of monks lead by Alak Lobsang. They 
donated whatever they had—usually self-produced food, such as tsampa158 from the 
farmers, meat and butter from the nomads—to the monastery and monks. In addition 
to material donation the majority of local people also donated their labor. This has 
eventually become the main resource for rebuilding the monastery. 
At that time Alak Lobsang received more invitations than he could handle to 
perform different rituals and blessings out of the monastery. Being invited to perform 
rituals in local families or communities is not only a routine task for lamas and monks 
and a sign of his religious reputation—the highly regarded lamas usually get invited 
more often and get paid higher—but it is also practically an important part of the 
monastery and monks income to cover their monastic expenses. Unlike in Central 
Tibet, where the centralized monastic system usually provided basic housing and food 
to all the monks, the monastic communities in most Amdo monasteries have a quite 
different way of economic support even though they share the same Gelugpa 
tradition.159 In Taktsang Lhamo monks have been primarily supported by their natal 
families or relatives both during the pre-1950s and since the 1980s. This support 
ranges from housing, food, to any kind of basic needs throughout a monk’s life.    
During his religious trips around the region, Alak Lobsang was also trying to 
recruit more monks for the monastery. “Many people were eager to resume their 
religious life and therefore were willing to contribute almost anything they had to the 
monastery,” monk Dungrub recounted to me, as part of the monastic history in his 
own experience. “I was part of the ‘contribution’ that my family gave when Alak 
                                                 
158 Tsampa (Tib: rtsam pa, ground barley flour) is a Tibetan staple food. It is prepared by mixing the 
already roasted barley flour with yak butter (Tib: mar), Tibetan tea (Tib: bod ja) and some dried yak 
cheese (Tib: phyur pa).  
159 Even when the monastery collected tax in the pre-1950s era, tax income was not the primary 
sustenance of the everyday life for monks in many Amdo monasteries. Instead, it was the family or 
other personal sources that supported most monks. This still holds true in most monasteries in Amdo. 
My comparison here is limited to the Gelugpa monastic system in Central Tibet and Amdo.    
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Lobsang came to my home town in 1980.” Sending a child to be a monk in the 
monastery has a long tradition in Tibet. It was the foundation of what Melvyn 
Goldstein (1998) called “mass monasticism.” Taktsang Lhamo and most parts of 
Amdo, sending a child to a monastery means a lifetime contribution from a family to 
the monastery since the family is supposed to support this child—as a monk—
throughout his life. Dungrub was eight years old when he came to live with one of the 
teachers in Kirti monastery.  
While some young monks were recruited by Alak Lobsang, others joined the 
monastery voluntarily. Because of the shortage of monks in the beginning, anyone 
who wanted to become a monk, whether voluntarily or sent by his family, was 
welcomed and hosted in Taktsang Lhamo. A big part of the monks’ time, besides the 
routine monastery gatherings and studies, was devoted to the construction labor of 
rebuilding the monastery temples as well as their own houses. The building materials, 
mostly timber, could be obtained easily and cheaply from the surrounding forest 
regions.160 Although the families were supposed to provide food and everyday needs 
for their monk sons, in the early 1980s the monastery often received more donations 
than they needed for the small number of monks present.  
 
3.4 Return of the Body and the Soul 
The rebuilding of the Kirti monastery constitutes the symbolic landscape of 
Tibetan Buddhist revival in Taktsang Lhamo. Yet it was not until the rediscovery and 
                                                 
160 Although the reform and open up policy has been applied in China since 1980, in a remote 
borderland village like Taktsang Lhamo, people did not see this affecting their daily lives until the early 
1990s. For example, the official ban of unauthorized (by the government) cutting and transportation of 
trees from the regional forest area, which has resulted in a sharp increase in living expenses for many 
locals, namely housing. It at the same times increased the tension between the monastery and the local 
village (especially Gyago Hui village). The local price level has started to rise dramatically, without 
necessarily the rising of local income, since the 1990s with the intense economic development.  
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return of the preserved body of the Fifth Kirti Lama to the monastery that both the 
body and the soul of the Kirti monastery came back in the local Tibetan people’s life.  
The Fifth Kirti Lama, Tanpa’ Gyantshan (Tib: bstan pa’i rgyan mtshan) (1681-
1755), is the most important figure in the Kirti Lama lineage since he is the one who 
transformed the previous “practice cave” (Tib: ri khrid) into the present day Kirti 
monastery (see chapter 2). After his death, his body was preserved in a stupa (or 
choten, Tib: mchod ldan) according to the Tibetan tradition for the high rank lamas or 
honorable figures.161 Since then this stupa has occupied a special temple in the 
monastery named the “temple of the body” (Tib: gdung khang). It had been the most 
important site on the circumambulation path in the Kirti monastery complex until it 
was completely destroyed along with the whole monastery during the Cultural 
Revolution.  
The stupa temple today is a small one, located on the top of the hill 
overlooking other temples around and the villages bellow. It is the most honorable 
location for a temple in Tibetan tradition. My monk friend Dungrub, who has his 
house next to the stupa temple, always feels blessed by living in such an honorable 
place. While the location is prestigious, it is in fact very difficult to live in this part of 
the monastery from a practical perspective. As there is no road access for any kind of 
motor vehicle he has to carry up everything he needs for daily life, from firewood, to 
coal, food, and water. Dungrub has been living here for nearly 15 years. He said he 
feels a special connection (Tib: las) to the stupa temple. It was he who told me this 
legendary story of how the Kirti Lama’s body had been saved by local Tibetan people 
and later returned to the Kirti monastery. 
                                                 
161 The Tibetan literature recorded this in detail as part of the Kirti monastic history (Nyima 1985: 33-
38). 
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In late 1950s the “working groups”—a group of working cadres from the 
government—came to carry out the “democratic reform” in Taktsang Lhamo. They 
aimed to destroy the “Four Olds” in the monastery. Many Buddhist scriptures were 
burned and Buddhist statues destroyed. During Mao’s national campaign of the “Great 
Iron Melting” (Ch: da lian gangtie), all metal objects—from the pots and pans in 
private homes to the Buddhist statues made of metal—were collected and melted for 
the collective use of socialist construction. During this campaign most of the metal 
objects in the Kirti monastery were destroyed. Immediately following this “democratic 
reform” was the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution during which all the buildings 
and temples in the Kirti monastery were completely torn down by the Red Guards who 
came from the regional capital of Zorge or Chengdu.  
According to Dungrub’s story, when they destroyed the Kirti Lama’s stupa in 
the stupa temple, the Red Guards did not know there was a sacred body inside it. The 
local Tibetans who pretended to help them secretly took the body and transported it to 
a local family. In the beginning the family didn’t know what to do with it. Since the 
Red Guards would search every family for any kind of religious objects, they had to 
hide this sacred object immediately. They first decided to bury it under the ground in 
their house. The working group came to search their house but did not find anything. 
The family believed it would not be safe to keep the body there. They exhumed the 
body and took it to another family in a remote nomadic region.  
The story goes that the Red Guards still suspected that some families had 
hidden some precious objects related to Kirti monastery. They returned determined to 
find something. In order to protect the real body, the father of the family made a fake 
body and placed it in a box claiming that was the thing he had been hiding. The Red 
Guard then decided to send the old man along with the fake body in the box to the 
regional center for further investigation. On his way to the regional center the old man 
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committed suicide by jumping into the Druchu River with the box. In this way the real 
treasure (the Kirti Lama’s body) was saved and the case was ended with the 
conclusion of “criminal’s suicide because of fear” (Ch: weizui zisha). 
Both the consealment of treasure and the story of its rediscovery have a long 
legacy in the Tibetan history. The best known is the Terma (or treasure) tradition and 
the Terton (or mystic charismatic treasure revealer) in the Nyingmapa sect.162 While 
the treasure in the Nyingmapa tradition is usually a hidden text from ancient times, 
revealed by a Terton who is himself (or later becomes) a charismatic leader, this 
treasure in the Kirti monastery is the actual body of the Fifth Kirti Lama. Unlike the 
charismatic Terton, this person and family did not become the treasure-saving hero 
and have been remembered only as an anonymous local family. I have heard various 
versions of this same story during my two-year fieldwork. None of them gives the 
actual name or place of the treasure saving family or of this old man who committed 
suicide.  
I tried to raise this question with Dungrub, asking whether he knew anything 
about this family or any person related to the incidents and why no one remembers 
their names. “Because that’s natural,” Dungrub answered without any hesitation, 
“anyone [Tibetan] would do the same in that situation. And after all it was not those 
people who saved the sku gdung [preserved body]. It was the sku gdung itself! If it 
were a normal human body it would have decayed long ago. The reason it can be 
saved and preserved [till today] is because that is a sku gdung!” In fact not only had it 
been preserved well as before, but it had even grown some new hairs on the body over 
                                                 
162 David Germano provides a vivid description of a modern movement of this ancient treasure finding 
tradition (terma) in eastern Tibet and its leading figure Kenpo Jikphun, a well known terton, (Germano 
1998). For other historical and textual sources, see (Gyatso 1993; Gyatso 1996; Thondup and Talbott 
1986).  
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years. Dungrub claimed to me that everyone in the welcome group saw this when the 
sku gdung was brought back to the monastery.  
Apparently sku gdung for Tibetans is something much more than just a human 
body. It is for all Tibetans not just a treasure that is eternally alive and blessing its 
followers with its self-evident omnipotent power. But it also gives the monastery its 
soul, just as the living form of this power—reincarnated lama (Tib: sbrul sku, Tulku or 
Alak)—does.  
The final return of the Fifth Kirti Lama’s body was a very emotional moment 
for the people of Taktsang Lhamo. Although it has not been recorded in any 
documents or publications, everyone in Taktsang Lhamo remembers this day in their 
heart. When Alak Lobsang started to rebuild the Kirti monastery and recruit young 
monks, many Tibetans were still not completely sure that religion was allowed again. 
It was not until the visit of Panchen Lama to the region that the family that had saved 
the Fifth Kirti Lama’s body finally felt assured that it was safe to bring the body back 
to the Kirti monastery. They met with Alak Lobsang and revealed this news, which 
immediately spread to all the surrounding regions. Alak Lobsang and the monastery 
decided to stop everything else temporarily to build a temple for the stupa (Tib: gdung 
khang) in the shortest possible time. Kalsang Tso, a Tibetan woman in her fifties, 
works as a nurse in a local government hospital in Tewu County. When I met her in 
the house of her brother who is a Kirti monk, she told me that since she and her 
husband are both government cadres they did not have enough time to do many of 
their religious duties.163 When they heard about the return of Fifth Kirti Lama’s body 
and the rebuilding of the stupa temple, she came here to donate her labor. She even 
tried to do double work in order to cover the part of her husband, who could not take 
the time. With more and more donations of materials and labor from local people, the 
                                                 
163 Tib: nga ’tshos gnyis las byed ba yin na khom ma mang po med gi chos mtsal mang po ma song  
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temple of stupa was finished within the same year and became the first holy center for 
Tibetan pilgrims. 
  
3.5 Revival of Islam and Hui Entrepreneurship 
Like most other visitors to Langmusi, the Chinese writer who wrote the poem 
on the Langmusi ruins in 1981 saw only the relics of a Buddhist land. This is no 
surprise given the mosque prayer hall is simply a Chinese style mansion surrounded 
by hundreds of Hui residence houses built in a similar Chinese red-brick style.164 At 
the end of the 1970s, there were about 70 Hui families living in the Gyago village 
(Hongxing cun, or Red Star village, as it was called then) on the Sichuan side and 
fewer in the Langmusi village on the Gansu side. Only one religious leader (ahong) 
was hired from outside with several young Quranic students (manla) studying with 
him.165 They are often invisible to the outsiders because they have no special dress or 
elaborate rituals like Tibetan monks. It is said that it was also because of this 
unassuming appearance that the prayer hall of the mosque even survived the Cultural 
Revolution as a storage house for the People’s Commune.166 The Red Guards and the 
“working groups” focused mostly on destroying the more visible religious symbols in 
the Tibetan monasteries. 
 Local Hui people always feel proud when talking about this subject because it 
reaffirms that Islam is a powerful religion, even indestructible, in the face of a decade 
of disastrous attack. When Lao Ding talked about this subject with me in his home, he 
pointed to his simply decorated house: “Look, what can you destroy here? No status, 
                                                 
164 The mosque minaret was only built in 1986.  
165 The ahong in the mosque usually serves a 3-5 years term. In Langmu mosque (Ch: Namo qingzhen 
si) there were 3-5 manla studying in the mosque when I was there. See chapter 6 on education.  
166 The mosque itself (a court yard complex before) was destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, only 
the prayer hall survived as a storage house. 
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no paintings, nothing. That’s what it is like in our mosque. We Muslims have our faith 
[religion] in our heart. No one can destroy that.”  
While the nature of Islam gets the highest credit for the survival of Islam as a 
religion and the revival of Islamic life in Hui villages, the second thing that gets 
credited is the Hui consensus regarding their natural talent for doing business. Hui 
villagers in Gyago settled down in the Tibetan area as trading middlemen beginning in 
the Qing dynasty. Even during the Cultural Revolution when all kinds of private 
businesses were strictly prohibited as capitalist, many Hui villagers were still secretly 
doing some trading just to survive, a practice later known as the “capitalist tail (to be 
cut).”167 At the end of Cultural Revolution it was in fact the trading tradition that came 
back first to the Hui villager’s life before the actual revival of Islam. In fact many Hui 
villagers commented on their “natural talent” in doing business as something engraved 
in the Hui identity, just like Islam. In his now classic treatment of Hui identity in 
China, Dru Gladney (1991: 118) argued that the revival of “Hui ethnic identity is 
inseparably identified with an Islamic tradition.” In contrast the Hui “national 
characteristic” of entrepreneurial ability is rather a result of the Chinese state effort to 
construct a unified Hui identity inside the contemporary multi-ethnic nation state of 
China (Gladney 1998b). Indeed these two characters have been actively promoted, if 
not imposed, by the Chinese state as the Hui ethnic character (Ch: minzu tezheng). 
Moreover, Hui themselves have over many decades internalized these identities—not 
just as a passive recipients but also as active manipulators for their own cause—a 
process that Gladney has called the “social life of labels.”  
The trader or businessman identity for the Hui in Taktsang Lhamo is 
inseparable from the ethnoreligious identity of Hui and Muslim. In fact these two 
                                                 
167 During the Cultural Revolution all kinds of private business were strictly prohibited and were treated 
as the “capitalist tail” to be cut off. It was reported that many “working groups” tried to cut this 
“capitalist tail” off Gyago village because of its long time trading tradition. 
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identities of businessman and Muslim are mostly complementary and mutually 
dependent. As Ali told me, “We Hui are born as Muslims with natural talent in doing 
business. But we only do certain businesses, such as serving as trading middlemen 
between Tibetans and Chinese (Han), running Qingzhen restaurants, bakeries, shops, 
or hostels.” What Ali depicts here is less a categorization of business than a religious 
demarcation of it. In other words, the Hui business identity is both ethnically 
territorialized and religiously confined or sanctioned—Qingzhen.168  This Hui identity 
of both Muslim and businessman has been recognized from both the Hui point of view 
and by others like the Han and the Tibetans.  
In 1978 Ali’s father opened the first small grocery shop in the village. Soon 
after, other Hui villagers opened some shops, small restaurants and some family based 
Qingzhen bakeries. As the Tibetan monastery reconstruction work in Gansu and 
Sichuan brought more and more people back to the village these small businesses 
immediately found their way. After all, Hui villagers had always been here as business 
middlemen before private business was banned in Cultural Revolution. What they did 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s was nothing more than a return to their previous way 
of living.169  
These Hui business owners restarted their business activities by taking local 
products (mainly animal livestock) to the surrounding regions and taking some 
industrially made daily necessities back to Taktsang Lhamo. Ermai—now the owner 
of the biggest clothing shop in town—recounted his family business history to me 
with much pride. 
                                                 
168 Gladney’s (1991) ground-breaking work describes more in details on the Hui idea of “Qingzhen”, or 
Pure and Authentic. See also Gillette (2000) for a recent ethnographic account of an urban Hui 
community’s revival of Islam which also includes the idea of Qingzhen. 
169 Immediately after the relaxation of political policy in China in 1980s there have been many different 
kinds of revival of traditions. For example, a revival of Tibetan nomadic life style or “nomadism” in 
northwest Sichuan was observed as a result of the de-collectivisation and general withdrawl of the state 
(Manderscheid 2002). 
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Before liberation, my family had about one hundred yaks and horses which 
were the main means of transportation—just like today’s trucks! Every year 
we used these yaks and horses to bring in [Taktsang Lhamo] vegetable 
cooking oil, “big tea,”170 wheat flour, and salt. Sometimes it was a trip of 
hundreds of li171 and sometimes it could be thousands. We also brought out 
sheep, yak or wool, meat, milk, and hides. There was no road and the society 
was not stable (Ch: shehui bu wending)—robbery, local warlords, all kinds of 
imposed taxes… It was very hard at that time.172   
 
In the early 1980s the road conditions in Langmusi still had not changed much 
from before. A mud path was built in the 1950s mostly for the state-owned vehicles to 
pass through this remote village before it was officially claimed as part of the newly 
established PRC state.173 Trucks or any motor vehicles were still prestigious in the 
early 1980s, and were only owned by the few government units or state owned shops. 
For the locals it was still yaks and horses with wood-wheeled carts that moved them 
around. With the de-collectivisation and re-allocation of land and livestock to 
individual households (or “household responsibility system” Ch: baochan daohu), 
Ermai’s family got back their yaks and horses which had been confiscated before and 
used them again for transportation in their newly started business.174
“We soon earned some money from our business,” Ali remembered, “and 
although it was not a lot, at that time it was really a big amount of money to us and it 
                                                 
170 “Big tea” (Ch: dacha), as it’s widely called by Hui in Northwestern China, is also referred to as 
“Tibetan tea” (Tib: bod ja) by the Tibetans and as “brick tea” (Ch: zhuancha) by the Chinese, since they 
are usually packed in brick shape. It is a sort of roughly roasted tea leaves produced in central and 
western China and has been a major trading product between inland China and its borderland regions 
since early times. See chapter 2 on the “Tea horse Trade” in this borderland history.  
171Chinese distance unit 1 li =0.5 km 
172 Fieldnotes May 2004. 
173 This road was built from 1952 to 1954 during which time the PLA was still fighting with the local 
resistance—both the Tibetans and the KMT (Republican Chinese) army. (GNZX 1989) See chapter 6 
for more on the subject of road construction in Taktsang Lhamo. 
174 In a similar way many scholars have talked about the revival of nomadic way of life in Tibet 
immediately after the de-collectivisation in late 1970s. The revival is undertaken more as “a way of 
survival” rather than for any other cultural related reasons. See (Goldstein 1994; Goldstein and Beall 
1990; Manderscheid 2002; Wu 1999).  
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meant a lot to my family.” In fact not only Ali’s family made some money from their 
business, nearly all the small businesses at that time became the first “rich families” 
(Ch: fuyuhu) in the village. After this initial success of a business venture, Ali’s father 
insightfully decided to invest in a truck for long distance freight transportation aiming 
mainly at the booming market of transportation from Sichuan to Lhasa through Gansu 
and Qinghai. Although it was only a second-hand truck that cost 7,000 yuan at that 
time, this investment was so huge that it had to be pooled from all the savings of eight 
families related to Ali.  
Chinese Muslims have a long history of doing business in both Central Tibet 
and its borderland regions. Since the beginning of Chinese economic reform, many 
Chinese Muslims (Hui) have taken the advantage to re-establish their businesses in 
Central Tibet.175 The reopening of the Tibetan-Nepalese border town of Zhangmu 
(Tib: ’gram) in the early 1980s has accelerated the demand of freight transportation 
from urban Chinese cities to Central Tibet and further to Nepal.  
The later years proved the risky investment that Ali’s father made was also a 
highly profitable one. Ali said they repaid all the debts in just one year with even some 
profit left. In the following years because of this initial success in the new national 
transportation market, more and more Hui families in Gyago village have joined this 
truck transportation business. In 1986 Gyago village decided that they would make all 
the “truck families” a company style group and named it “Red Star Truck Group.”176
The truck group transported everything from food, vegetables, industrially 
made goods, to cattle, and milk products. They all joined in the transportation market 
between Chinese cities (mainly Sichuan and Gansu) and ethnic Tibetan regions. This 
                                                 
175 For the history part see chapter 2, for cases of Muslims in contemporary Lhasa, see (Jest 1995; 
Moevus 1995). 
176 The group lasted for more than ten years and was disbanded in the late 1990s (RGWS 1998). Many 
Hui families sold their trucks and started to invest in local hotels, restaurants, or other tourist-related 
businesses.  
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is no coincidence. My Hui neighbor Min, who used to be a member of the truck group, 
said that the fact that they live in a Tibetan region makes all the difference.  
 
We speak Tibetan like our native language. Even though it is not the same 
dialect in Lhasa, they [Tibetans] treat us differently when we speak [Amdo] 
Tibetan. We are also used to the high land climate and especially Tibetan food 
like tsampa, yak butter tea, which Han Chinese find it very hard to adjust 
to.177
 
The success of Hui business in Gyago village benefited directly the revival of 
Islam. The most visible landscape of this revival is the rapid rebuilding of the mosque 
and then the minaret, which did not exist before. At the same time it also complicated 
the relation between Hui and Tibetans in Taktsang Lhamo by triggering a conflict, 
both religious and economic, between the two officially equal ethnic groups in a 
Chinese nation—a conflict that never existed before. 
   
3.6 Rebuilding the Mosque: Temptation and Tension 
The Tibetan community in Taktsang Lhamo has been traditionally separated 
based on two monasteries—Kirti and Serchi. This has also provided the basis for the 
later Chinese administrative division between the Sichuan and Gansu provinces in 
Taktsang Lhamo. The Hui community, despite being much smaller, also followed this 
Tibetan separation and became two subject villages (Tib: lha sde).  
Before the 1950s when the Tibetan monasteries functioned as the local 
authoriy, the Hui community was administratively separated into Kirti lhasde and 
Serchi lha-sde—the Hui villages that were the subjects of the Kirti monastery or the 
Serchi monastery. From the religious perspective, however, there was initially only 
one Muslim community gathering in one mosque. This mosque followed the Gedimu 
                                                 
177 Fieldnotes 2003. 
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(Ar: qadim, or "old") tradition—the oldest Islamic tradition in China, what Gladney 
(1999) called “the first mode of Islamic reform.”  
Since the 1930s a new Islamic reformist movement, Yihewani, has been 
spreading quickly in northwest China.178 Taozhou (today’s Lintan in southern Gansu) 
was one of the most Yihewani-influenced centers and was also the hometown of many 
early Hui residents in Taktsang Lhamo. Through the Hui connections back to their 
hometown, Yihewani had slowly spread to the Tibetan borderland area. From the 
1940s a small group of Hui in Taktsang Lhamo started to split off from the majority 
Gedimu mosque and gathered for religious practices in another family house.179 
Before they could build their own mosque, Hui villagers found the world was 
suddenly changed with the advent of the new Chinese communist state. Soon after that, 
the purges of Cultural Revolution purportedly erased all the religious marks and 
religious-based differences on the societal level. As a result the religious conflicts 
between Gedimu and Yihewani did not get the chance to emerge when they were 
already suppressed in the total erasure of ethnicity and religion during Cultural 
Revolution. 
At the end of the Cultural Revolution, with the disbanding of the People’s 
Commune, the formal storage house was returned to the Hui community in Gyago 
village. Hui people started to gather and pray in this house unofficially and sometimes 
secretly until the Panchen Lama’s visit in 1982. Min, who was present in the Hui 
welcoming team for the Panchen Lama, recalled that period to me as passionate and 
harmonious.  
                                                 
178 Yihewani (Ikhwan al-Muslimin), a reformist Islamic movement influenced by Wahhabi ideals in 
Arabian pennisula, was originated in Gansu by an Arab-returned Chinese Muslim Ma Wanfu (Lipman 
1997: 201-211).  
179 The actual time of Yihewani’s arrival in Taktsang Lhamo was not all clear from my several 
interviews with some old Hui villagers. It was clear however that Yihewani had not yet set up a broad 
network in this village before it was crushed, along with other religions, by the Communist revolution.  
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In the beginning we were not sure this [re-opening of the religion and mosque] 
was true. Many of us were still afraid that the working groups or those Red 
Guards would come back again […] until the Panchen Lama came and told us 
we can believe our religion again […] because he was the highest political 
leader in the government who had come here.  
 
With the Panchen Lama’s nod to the Islamic practice in Taktsang Lhamo, the 
local Tibetan government official from Zorge County immediately sanctioned 
the rebuilding project of the Lhamo mosque. However unlike the Kirti 
monastery who got some government compensation for the rebuilding, the 
mosque rebuilding did not get anything from the government except a 
permission on paper.   
 
At that time, we [Hui and Tibetan] were so happy that we could practice our 
religion again. No one thought about anything else. They [Tibetans] built their 
monasteries and we [Hui] built our mosques. We even helped each other—we 
helped them when they need labor and they helped us when we need building 
materials like timber.180
 
Gedimu mosque in China is known for its jiaofang system (or “mosque 
community,” also called sifang). Unlike Sufi or Yihewani, each Gedimu mosque has 
its own individual jiaofang with very weak inter-jiaofang connections. Two leading 
figures in the jiaofang system are in charge of religious and administrative affairs. The 
“teaching ahong” (Ch: kaixue ahong) is the Quranic teacher and religious leader in the 
mosque as well as in the whole community. He can only be hired from outside the 
community and serves on a contract basis for 2-6 years. The xuedong is usually one or 
more of the old reputable men in the community who serve the mosque to manage its 
                                                 
180 Min told me a real event in 1983 when a monastery stupa accidentaly burned, all the Hui villagers in 
Gyago had come to help to help put the fire out, without any hesitation. They also contributed free labor 
and construction materials afterwards. 
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assets, including land, buildings, religious expenses and contributions. Although the 
xuedong has only administrative power in the mosque and community, it is also the 
xuedong who choose a “teaching ahong” as well as the renewal of his contract. 
  The initial rebuilding of the Lhamo mosque was a renovation of the prayer 
hall which could host 400 people praying at one time. With the prayer hall finished in 
six months, the Lhamo jiaofang resumed and the communal religious life was 
restarted after a committee of three xuedong hired a “teaching ahong” to host the 
mosque. When I met xuedong Zhang in his office, he did not hide his enthusiasm 
about Islam and used the Chinese official terminology to describe it.  
 
Islam is a pure religion and purely a religion. It has nothing to do with politics. 
That’s why as Chinese Muslims we don’t have a problem of believing in 
Islam and following the [Chinese] government [policy] at the same time. This 
is called aiguo aijiao [love one’s country and love one’s religion ].181
 
The traditional religious and administrative separation in the Gedimu jiaofang 
system—between xuedong and ahong—coincidently parallels the new Chinese 
religious regulation system. Thus as a xuedong in the Lhamo mosque, Zhang is also 
the chairman of the Lhamo mosque Siguanhui. 
 In 1986, the Gyago village decided that they would expand the prayer hall in 
order to host more people. At the same time they also decided to build a new minaret 
(Ch: xuan li ta) for the mosque that had never existed before. Although religious 
practice has been officially permitted since the 1980s, all religious leaders and 
religious institutions still have to obtain official approval from the government before 
they can practice their religion legally. “We got the government approval to build this 
minaret,” xuedong Zhang said. When more Hui villagers were successful in the new 
                                                 
181 Ch: aiguo aijiao, lit., “love one’s country and love one’s religion.” This is an official Chinese 
propaganda slogan intended to promote the loyalty of all religions to the state, as a priority of each 
individual religious group.   
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Chinese market, contributions accumulated quite fast and easily. In only two months a 
90 foot high minaret was erected inside the mosque courtyard. Unlike the prayer hall, 
which was mainly Chinese in style, the minaret was built with typical Islamic style 
covered with green glazed tiles. Moreover, this new landmark in the Tibetan land 
stands side by side with the Kirti monastery stupa across the street overlooking the 
monks’ dorm quarters.  
The Tibetan landscape has traditionally been built into a vertically hierarchized 
space where the most sacred objects or figures should always be positioned on higher 
locations and nothing else can be placed equal or higher. Until the 1990s the human 
landscape in Taktsang Lhamo had been fairly plain due to the devastation of the 
Cultural Revolution. Only the newly rebuilt white stupa and golden roof of the 
monastery temples stood out among the white-painted monk houses and other earth-
colored lay houses. However, the minaret, which had never existed before in Taktsang 
Lhamo, appeared to be an alien landmark and breaking the traditional dominant 
Tibetan landscape.  
 Complaints started to circulate first inside the monk community and quickly 
spread into all the local Tibetan communities. My monk friend Dzoba—who has his 
house facing the mosque minaret across the street—looks very disturbed every time 
there is a prayer call from the top of the minaret. “That’s so noisy and so disturbing,” 
Dzoba said to me, “and it is five times everyday!” The building of the minaret 
apparently triggered the resentful feelings of the Tibetan community, particularly 
monks, towards the Hui community. My talk with Dzoba and many other Tibetans 
shows that this resentful feeling has indeed been growing for sometime and the 
building of the minaret was just the catalyst.  
Taktsang Lhamo has always been considered a Tibetan land by both Tibetans 
and non-Tibetans. Now it is also a Tibetan autonomous prefecture under the official 
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Chinese administration. For most Tibetans it was only the initial benevolence of the 
Kirti Lama that Hui could settle down here in this Tibetan land. Since the 1980s the 
Hui community has rebuilt their mosque prayer hall, even faster than the Tibetan 
monastery, partly due to the Hui community contributions that were made possible by 
the fast growing Hui businesses in Taktsang Lhamo. Tibetans in Taktsang Lhamo 
believe that local Hui businesses made their money only from Tibetans, who are the 
primary, if not only, customers to the Hui hotels, restaurants, and grocery shops. This 
still holds true even today, even considering the growing number of Chinese tourists. 
In that sense, not only do Hui people live in Tibetan land at the mercy of the Kirti 
Lama but these Hui businesses also live on Tibetan patrons. When I talked about this 
with Dzoba, he admitted that although Hui have the same religious rights as Tibetans 
they should exercise this rather “quietly” (Ch: qiaoqiao de). In other words, Hui 
religious activities should be kept at a low profile—a standard that should only be 
judged by the Tibetans. 
However, most Hui I talked to clearly attributed their businesses success to the 
possibility of the larger social environment, namely the change to a market-oriented 
economy in China, and their “natural talent” for doing business as Hui. “We Hui have 
always been born like this [good at doing business]. Now we happen to have the best 
time [for doing business].” When they feel pressure from the Tibetans, they seek 
recourse from official Chinese propaganda. As Min replied confidently to my question 
on the minaret, “Tibetan and Hui are the same shaoshu minzu (ethnic minorities). Why 
should they build everything and we could not build a minaret? It [building the 
minaret] was approved by the religious bureau [of the local government]. Even the 
Panchen Lama told us we have the freedom now to practice our religion.”182
                                                 
182 Fieldnotes January 2005.  
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The tension between the two communities escalated when the other Muslim 
community in Taktsang Lhamo—Yihewani—started to build a second mosque on the 
Gansu side of Langmusi in the early 1990s. As the Yihewani community started late in 
Taktsang Lhamo during the 1940s, they are a much smaller community compared to 
the Gedimu jiaofang on the Sichuan side and have never had a real mosque for 
themselves either. 183 When the government policy was relaxed in the 1980s, the 
Yihewani community restarted their religious activities, along with other Hui and 
Tibetans, by gathering in a lay house that functioned temporarily as a prayer hall. 
When I met xuedong Ma of the Yihewani mosque—without a mosque building—in 
the courtyard of the prayer house, he seemed to be excited to have finally found some 
outsider who would listen to his complaints. 
 
We are a small mosque with only three hundred jiaomin (followers). It took a 
long time for us to get enough contributions for the building of a mosque or a 
minaret. We also have the government approval [to build a mosque and a 
minaret]. 
  
The courtyard they used for praying is one of the lay houses in the Gansu side village 
under the Serchi monastery. Nothing from the outside can be recognized as a mosque. 
The inside of the courtyard also looks like a normal family house. The main hall 
serves as the prayer house and some small side rooms as a washing room, a mosque 
office, and a maintenance room. On the other side of these rooms is a huge house 
skeleton that seems to be still in the process of construction. 
“We started to build our mosque in 1990 but they [Tibetans] stopped us,” Ma 
said, “this [house skeleton] is it. It has been left like this for more than ten years [since 
then].” Ma’s frustration is representative of the Hui community, particularly the 
Yihewani. Although they got the official approval to build their mosque, local 
                                                 
183 See footnote 3 in chapter 1 for the population in Taktsang Lhamo. 
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Tibetans still managed to prevent them from proceeding. Many Hui believe that as an 
ethnic minority in China they have already been in a disadvantaged position and living 
in a Tibetan autonomous region makes them the “minorities in a minority region” (Ch: 
shaoshu minzu diqu de shaoshu minzu). As Ma explained to me, 
  
The [Tibetan] officials could not turn down our [mosque] building project 
directly because that would not be in line with the national ethnic policy (Ch: 
minzu zhengce). But they could encourage the local [Tibetans] (Ch: xiamian 
de ren) to prevent us. We could not do anything because they [Tibetans] are 
just so many. Once you go out of here [to the countryside or to the pasture] 
you don’t see any Hui. In the end, they [Tibetan officials] could show up and 
stop us officially [from continuing our mosque construction] for the sake of 
avoiding ethnic conflict (Ch: minzu maodun).  
 
What happened exactly at that time is still a sensitive and emotional subject to both 
Tibetan and Hui community even after more than ten years.184  It is also a troublesome 
issue for the local government officials because it might distort the ideal ethnic 
harmony that the government has always tried to depict. Therefore everyone I have 
talked to seemed to give me an understatement of the incident. My Tibetan monk 
friend Tashi said in a casual way that a big group of Tibetan nomads from a remote 
pasture farm came around with anger one day when they heard the Hui were building 
a second mosque in Taktsang Lhamo. “But they are nomads. They are uneducated. 
What can you do to them?” he said. As a result, only the skeleton of a half-built 
mosque remains.  
 Although no one in the Hui community would tell me more details about this 
incident, I got to know in my later interviews that during the first half decade of the 
                                                 
184 Shijie ribao (World Journal), a Chinese language newspaper based in the US, reported similar 
incidents in Aba prefecture in early 1990s. It is said that the construction of local mosque in Aba 
Tibetan area had caused “a bloodshed incident” during Tibetan-Hui conflict (March 9, 1993). But I 
could not verify if this was relevant to Taktsang Lhamo or if there was any “bloodshed.”  See also 
(Makley 1999: 327-328) for a description of Hui-Tibetan conflict in Labrang area in the1990s. 
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1990s, many Hui families had emigrated out of Taktsang Lhamo because of the ethnic 
pressure and the unfair treatment they felt. Most of them tried to establish businesses 
in the Hui centered towns such as Linxia or Lintan, where most of them originally 
came from more than a century ago. Even though lots of them eventually came back to 
Taktsang Lhamo in the late 1990s for different reasons, many still left a house there as 
a “back way” (Ch: houlu) and some also left their children to be educated in a Hui 
environment. 185
 
3.7 The Tibetan Monastery and Its “Chinese Door”: Making Space and Boundaries 
When studying different community and ethnic groups, anthropologists have 
emphasized the importance of constructing otherness and exclusiveness (Barth 1969; 
Gupta and Ferguson 1997a; 1997b). In Taktsang Lhamo one sees this symbolic 
construction on the first sight of local buildings—mostly between monastic buildings 
and lay village houses. Temples are painted in a dark red color that only belongs to the 
monasteries. Monk houses are painted uniformly in white and lay houses have no right 
to paint in white or the monastic red.   
Beside the immediately visible color differences the spatial separation between 
the two communities is also very clear to the locals—both monks and lay Tibetans or 
Hui. Although there is no marked boundary between the Tibetan monastery and the 
Hui village, locals are very well aware of an invisible boundary that separates 
Gonnang (Tib: dgon nang, lit., “inside monastery”)—the monastery territory that 
includes all the temples, monks’ quarters, as well as the sacred landscape behind it—
from Gyago (lit. “Chinese door”)—the Chinese/Hui village or town outside the 
monastery territory. For monks in the monastery this is the line beyond which they are 
                                                 
185 See chapter 6 and chapter 7 for more discussion on the Hui conception of their position in Taktsang 
Lhamo as well as their new relation with Tibetans in the Chinese market oriented economy.  
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not allowed to go during weekdays, and particularly at night. For lay Tibetan or Hui 
villagers this is the beginning of the circumambulation path during the day and the 
boundary they are not supposed to cross at night, particularly in the case of women. A 
disciplinary monk—locally referred to as Geke in Amdo dialect186—patrols this line 
every night with his big stick tapping every step on the ground to ensure that no monk 
goes beyond this line and no outsider comes in. 
The term Gonnang and Gyago are nothing new in the local Tibetan language. 
They have been used among the local Tibetan and Hui symbolizing two different local 
spaces—one monastic and one secular. Before 1950s Gyago referred specially to the 
Hui community which at that time referred to the idea of a small Hui village in the 
Tibetan heartland. The Chinese takeover in the 1950s and thereafter gradually moved 
the former political center in the Tibetan monastery to the local Chinese government 
in the newly established town of Langmusi (see figure 3). Since then the concept of 
Gyago has also been extended to a larger space including both the Hui village and the 
Chinese administrative town center.  
However the real contrast between Gonnang and Gyago started with the 
religious revival and the economic change in town in early 1980s. While the Tibetan 
monastery was unambiguously the local political and economic center in the pre-
1950s era, the religious revival after the Cultural Revolution has enabled the 
development of both the monastery and the mosque as separate religious centers from 
virtually the same starting point. In the mean time Hui villagers have played a major 
                                                 
186 Disciplinary monk (Tib: dge skos, or zhal ngo) is a highly instituationalized system in the Tibetan 
monastic system. For example, in the pre-1950s Lhasa, a notorious group of disciplinary monks 
empowered by the Tibetan government during the Monlam Chenmo period was in charge of collecting 
various kinds of tax or fine from anyone in the city (Goldstein 1989) (Bell 1928) (Bell 1970). In Amdo 
dialect it is known as Geke and is slightly different from that in Lhasa. Today in Kirti monastery there 
is one Geke in each college and one general Geke of the monastery. There are also several assistant 
Geke known as Geyo (Tib: dge yog). See chapter 4 for more on the position and function of Geke in the 
monastery. 
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role in the local economy taking the advantage of the post-1980 Chinese reform policy. 
The non-monastic Tibetan communities in Taktsang Lhamo have been living 
primarily on herding yaks and sheep. It was not until the late 1990s that they started to 
catch up with some local businesses, targeting mostly the growing tourist market. 
Since then a real “Chinese door” has been opened with more and more “modern 
things” (Ch: xiandaihua de dongxi) and “luxuries” (Ch: xiangshou) pouring in 
everyday.187 For more than two decades local Tibetans’ attitude towards those 
“modern things” and “luxuries”—and their spatial container Gyago—has changed 
significantly. It is the process of this change along with the local reaction to this 
change, what Anthony Cohen called symbolic boundary making (Cohen 1982), that 
have created the new spaces and boundary between Gonnong and Gyago in the post-
reform context. 
My Tibetan friend monk Dzoba has always been proud of his early 
embracement of “modern things” and his “advanced thinking” in the monk 
community—from his fairly good spoken Chinese to his avant-garde usage of a 
mobile phone when a landline was still a luxury for most locals.188 Nevertheless he 
admits that it was also these things that made him embarrassed and the subject of 
ridicule by his fellow monks—when he came here initially in 1982.  
 
When I just arrived here everyone laughed at me immediately since I brought 
a quilt with me to sleep. People here are nomads, they use only tsharu for 
everything.189 They also laughed at me because I had chair at home. They said 
Tibetans should sit on the floor. Only Chinese use chairs. […] I like to drink 
xicha (lit., “fine tea”, refers to the green tea from southern China) and eat beef 
noodles (Ch: niurou mian) in Hui restaurants. That [kind of food and drink] is 
                                                 
187 These are two Chinese loan words used very frequently in local Tibetan language. My translation 
here (and hereafter) does not always go with the original meaning in Chinese because I translate them 
according to how local Tibetans have used and perceived these terms or ideas in their own context.    
188 See more on the subject of modernity and modernization in chapter 6. 
189 Tsharu (Tib: tsha ru, lit., “sheep skin”) refers to a thick Tibetan robe made with sheep skin typically 
worn by the Tibetan nomads in Amdo. It is used as a robe during the day and as a quilt at night.  
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very common in my hometown since that is a “half nomad half agriculture” 
(Tib: rong ma vbrog) region. But here they only eat tsampa and drink 
“Tibetan tea” (Tib: bod ja).190 If someone drinks xicha or eats Hui noodle, 
people would say: “he is really [like] a Chinese (Tib: kho rgya tag tag red).” 
 
For local Tibetans at that time to be like a Chinese was nothing but derogatory. With 
the increasing contact between the monastery and local Chinese authorities since 
1980s, especially after the establishment of the Siguanhui, many monks felt antipathy 
towards the Chinese influences, starting with the pressure to speak Chinese. At that 
time a newly invented Tibetan term—Gyagarma (lit., “the Chinese lover”)—was used 
widely in the monk community to label those who speak Chinese or those simply 
those who deal with Chinese frequently—i.e. working in Siguanhui, or have “Chinese 
habits,” like monk Dzoba.191 The practice such as highlighting those “Chinese lovers” 
in the monk community has verbally and subjectively created a “Tibetan” space in the 
Tibetan community as the antithesis to everything related to Gyago and “modern 
things.” However this newly created “Tibetan” space and its boundary with Gyago had 
been gradually diminished with fast inflow of “modern things” and “luxuries” through 
the “Chinese door.” Hui villagers have been the major intermediary between the 
expanding Chinese market and the increasing curiosity to the outside world among the 
Tibetan community, particularly young monks. 
One day at lunchtime I continued the talk about “modern things” at Dzoba’s 
house with Dzoba and a group of his fellow monks after their morning session. A 
young novice monk study with Dzoba was bringing some dried yak dung from the 
yard to make the fire in stove. Another young monk was preparing the dough to make 
a big pot of thugpa (Tib: thug pa, Ch: mianpian, noodle soup mixed with meat and 
                                                 
190 See footnote 42 in this chapter for Tibetan tea.  
191 Gyagarma as a derogatory term had been used mostly inside the monastic community. I never heard 
anyone (Tibetan or Hui) outside the monastic community mention this word. During the recent years, 
the use of this term has diminished significantly given that more and more monks speak Chinese, 
willingly or not, and have more Chinese connections.  
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vegetables) as lunch for everyone. Everyone else was waiting and chatting with a cup 
of Chinese green tea (xicha). “If you offer a guest Tibetan tea (bod ja) [these days],” 
Dzoba said to me, “people will talk about you as being mean and you will feel ‘face 
hot’ (Tib: ngo tsha gi, or shame).” Then he continued his comments on the change of 
monk attitude towards “modern things.” 
 
Now everything has changed. Who doesn’t like “modern things”? Who 
doesn’t like “luxuries”? Even the nomad families have TVs and VCD players 
at home. Young monks like to watch TV too. We don't’ have a TV in 
monastery so they go to Gyago [to watch TV]. Before most of the monks ate 
tsampa before the morning session and ate another tsampa with tea after [for 
lunch]. Only on weekend could we go out to have some noodles in the Hui 
restaurant. Nowadays most of them don’t eat anything before the morning 
session waiting for a good feed of thugpa or chaocai (Chinese stir fried 
vegetable or meat) after, unless they are too poor and can only afford to eat 
tsampa.  
 
Although monks occasionally receive donations in cash, their principal support comes 
almost exclusively from their families, which is only in the form of food (tsampa, 
butter, bread, sometimes meat), yak dung for fuel, or wood as building material. 
Therefore it is very hard for them to gather even a small amount of money for any 
kind of cash purchase—two yuan for noodles in the Hui restaurants, five yuan for tea 
in teahouse, or anything that they cannot obtain from their families or donation. With 
more and more “modern things” and “luxuries” in Gyago many monks these days feel 
the increasing need and pressure for money.  
Both the monastery regulation and the economic condition prohibit monks 
from having a TV in their houses. Many young monks thus try to sneak out during the 
weekdays or at night to the many teahouses in Gyago to watch Chinese TV series or 
American and Hong Kong movies. The teahouse has become the most popular place 
in Gyago since it provides free movies playing for those who do not come here to chat. 
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Sherab, the novice monk of Dzoba, told me that the most popular TV series many 
young monks saw at that time was the Chinese classic Xiyouji (Journey to the West, or 
The Monkey King) as it is a translated version in Amdo Tibetan and also because the 
story has to do with Buddhism. Another popular place in Gyago is the Hui restaurants 
where monks can gather together at different levels of price—from a bowl of two yuan 
beef noodles to an all-meat luxury feast that costs hundreds.192   
Contrary to the traditional antipathy towards the Gyago, today this “Chinese 
door” has opened an exotic place for Tibetan monks where they can satisfy much of 
their curiosity for “modern things” and “luxuries.” This has eventually created a quite 
mixed feelings in the monk community. On the one hand, old monks have started to 
feel that they have less and less control over their young novices these days. With all 
the attractions just out there across the street even the disciplinary monk cannot catch 
every young novice who sneaks out. On the other hand, going out of the monastic 
territory has also become more “dangerous” for monks. As most Hui businesses in 
town target the Tibetan customers, rumors circulated in the monk community that not 
only have things in Hui shops are overpriced but the Hui restaurants in town served 
their Tibetan customers dirty food. 193
On the Hui side, however, this space and boundary making is rather a core 
making process—“what they see as core meaning, institution, occupation, and/or 
activity” (Gray 1998)—than a demarcation of otherness. The different space and 
                                                 
192 I have more discussion on food, drink and modernization in chapter 6.  
193 Many stories have circulated even with actual names of the restaurant and the person in questions. 
The fact that there are never any Hui people eating in the Hui restaurants makes the Tibetans even more 
suspicious and proves rumors. Hui villagers themselves see no need to go to a restaurant as all Hui 
restaurants are family based and every family cooks virtually the same food. The rumor goes further to 
speak about the water contamination. The water source in Taktsang Lhamo comes exclusively from the 
Druchu River as there is no tap water supply. All the households and restaurants used whether the water 
directly from the river or the pumped water from wells for every daily use including drinking and 
cooking. Tibetans are located on the upper part of the river (see figure 3). They believe they have the 
better quality water. Hui live on the lower part of the river and have been using the polluted water since 
the river is also the place where local people wash their clothes, and throw ash and garbage. See chapter 
6 for more on this subject. 
102 
boundary making between the Tibetans and Hui comes from the different self-
conception in the local place: as “majority minority” and “minority minority.” More 
and more Hui shop and restaurant owners today place their hopes on the Chinese 
national development (such as the GDOW) that is increasingly integrating this once 
remote borderland into the national system, both economically and politically. Some 
local Hui businesses have already benefited from the growing numbers of Chinese and 
Western tourists—backpackers, artists, and journalists—during the recent years. More 
and more Hui believe that with further development of the local infrastructure by the 
government they can count on more business from outside. Yet the tension between 
the Tibetan and Hui communities has not been relieved with these developments. On 
the contrary, it makes the local tension subtler and ultimately fuses the ethnic tension 
with the wider political and economic domains.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
MONLAM CHENMO, THE CRAZY DRUNK TULKU, AND THE CULT OF 
BAZAL: CONSTRUCTING A TIBETAN PLACE IN THE POST-SOCIALIST 
CHINESE STATE 
 
 
The religious revival in Taktsang Lhamo goes beyond the reconstruction of 
monasteries and mosques. In post-Cultural Revolution China, an increasing assertion 
of ethnic, cultural, or local identity has been tied to a rising alternative base of power 
that marks different places.194 Anthropological studies on place used to be dominated 
by a presumed social geographical setting that self-evidently contains what 
ethnographers perceive as their research subjects. During the recent decades many 
scholars have started to challenge the “assumed isomorphism of space, place, and 
culture” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997b). As a result, more ethnographic writings have 
emphasized on how a meaningful place has actually been inhabited (Mueggler 2001) 
and how local people have re-worked, appropriated and contested their engaged place 
(Bender 1993).  
In this chapter I demonstrate the local construction of a Tibetan-centered place 
in Taktsang Lhamo after the 1980s. By Tibetan-centered place I mean to convey an 
interwoven concept of a Tibetan-fashioned local environment and a series of cultural 
phenomenon, moral values, social memories that are deeply embedded in it. These 
unfolding events and live figures under investigation—the revival of the annual 
                                                 
194 For example, a Han community in northwest China revived their Confucian tradition by the 
manipulation of historical memory in ritual (Jing 1996). The “Arabization” has provided the urban Hui 
residents in Xi’an with an alternative to the Chinese socialist ideology (Gillette 2000). An Islamic based 
religious revival has taken a Hui community of northwest China back to the fundamental Islamic rules 
countering the state ideology (Gladney 1998b).  
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monastic ritual Monlam Chenmo, a crazy and drunk reincarnation lama, and the cult 
of a local protective deity—have embodied that particular genre of social memories 
and moral values as a cultural phenomenon which gives rise to a local vision of a 
Tibetan landscape in a post-socialist Chinese state. Emphasizing the ritual construction 
of authority and place, I further argue that the “practice of time” has been an important 
strategy throughout this reconstruction process of ethnic and religious identities.  
The reconstruction of a Tibetan-centered place in Taktsang Lhamo has been a 
multi-vocal one, which involves confrontations and negotiations between Tibetan and 
Hui and vis-à-vis the Chinese state. I will show below that Hui people have also been 
involved in this Tibetan place reconstruction process. As Muslim Chinese living in an 
ethnic Tibetan borderland, Hui in Taktsang Lhamo have been situated in a “betwixt 
and between”195 position—caught between an ethnic Chinese state and a local Tibetan 
authority. The Hui ethno-religious revival in Taktsang Lhamo has not been simply an 
“Arabization” or “Islamization” process, as suggested in some scholarly works on 
other Hui communities in China.196  
For the Hui themselves this marginalized integration into the local Tibetan 
place has been reinterpreted from different perspectives: Islamic religion, Chinese 
ethnic policy and the Chinese-introduced ideology of modernization.197 In this way 
their marginalized living conditions in an ethnic Tibetan land within a Chinese state 
has somehow been compensated for by a contradictory subscription to both a Chinese-
introduced ideology of modernization, and an alternative religious belief of Islam. The 
revived Hui entrepreneurship, as the other significant aspect in the Hui ethnic revival, 
                                                 
195 This term was used by Victor Turner to describe a liminal situation in a ritual transformation process 
(Turner 1967).  
196 For example, Gillette has shown an Arabization in an urban Hui community in Xi’an (Gillette 2000). 
Gladney argues that the ethnic and religious revival in a northwest Hui community has a fundamental 
reference to the Islamic religion (Gladney 1991; Gladney 1998a).  
197 See chapter 6 for more on the modernization in both Tibetan and Hui communities. 
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has been developed parallel with the official Chinese-propagated market economy 
after the 1980s. The discrepancy and confrontation between a Tibetan-centered place 
construction and the Hui ethno-religious revival of Islam and entrepreneurship 
ironically rejoined in the Chinese nation building and Chinese modernization process, 
which has dramatically transformed the traditional social and ethnic relations in 
Taktsang Lhamo.  
 
4.1 “Asking For Money:” Monlam Chenmo Revived  
One week before the start of Monlam Chenmo in 2004, Sangwu, the 16-year 
old novice of my monk friend Tashi, came to my house one morning for a cup of 
Nestle instant coffee which he had recently discovered in my place as “much tastier 
than tea” (Tib: ja las ka fei zhi gi zhim gi). As most locals drink tea in Tibetan or 
Chinese style, instant coffee is considered a luxury. Some limited stocks in few local 
shops are priced for the occasional tourist’s need.  
Having lived in Taktsang Lhamo for a while, I was used to many kinds of 
random visits—from a passing by hello through the window in early morning to a 
group visit at mid-night. Yet it was a surprise to me that Sangwu could come out of 
the monastery at this time. The novice monks are the main duty carriers for the year 
round rituals. At this time of the year their days are usually fully occupied with 
various kinds of monastic duties—i.e., rehearsing Monlam Chenmo rituals—which 
last all day and even night for a month until the end of the New Year. 
To my surprise Sangwu told me that he was actually on a monastic mission—a 
special mission: he, along with some ten other young novice monks, had been sent by 
the monastery to “ask for money” from all the Hui and Chinese businesses located in 
where is traditionally considered Kirti subject territories. Because of the confrontation 
usually involved in this act, the monastery chooses a group of novice monks who have 
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no responsibility in the monastery to carry out this annual monastic tradition 
“unofficially.”198 That is to say, this mission is officially not a monastery-approved act. 
Neither the local government nor the monastery authority openly acknowledges there 
is something like this going on because of the apparent conflict with the official 
Chinese ethnic policy. This morning Sangwu’s group successfully collected money 
from more then ten Hui and Chinese shops. “Some of them were unwilling to give in 
the beginning,” Sangwu talked to me proudly, “but it’s impossible for them not to give 
(Tib: ma skyed ma ba gi).” After the coffee Sangwu left quickly as his friends were 
waiting for him to continue their money collection in the afternoon. 
Later I came out of my house and met my Chinese neighbor Li—a tailor shop 
owner from Sichuan who has been here for more than ten years. As usual we started 
our chat in Sichuan dialect with his favorite subject—his plan to move back to 
Sichuan after making enough money to buy a house in Chengdu (the capital city of 
Sichuan province). Talking about Sichuan made him more emotional that day because 
of what happened—he had just been “asked for money” by Sangwu’s group. Hence as 
soon as I brought up the topic, Li could not help complaining to me: 
  
They said they came to huayuan (begging for religious purpose). But 
this is not huayuan, this is robbery! And it’s every year like this. We 
have nowhere to complain about it. Even the paichusuo (local police 
office) won’t say anything. After all they are all Tibetans. 
 
The money requested from these shops is in the name of an annual contribution 
to the Monlam Chenmo. While Tibetans come to contribute voluntarily it has been a 
local tradition that non-Tibetan residents, particularly businesses, in the traditional 
                                                 
198 As Tashi explained to me later, the monastery is well aware that this tradition is not totally legitimate 
under the current Chinese regulation. By sending those novice monks to undertake this mission, the 
monastery or the monastic leaders were deliberately trying to avoid the responsibility in case of being 
questioned by the Chinese authority. They believe that the authority cannot do anything to these young 
monks who are supposedly “ignorant” and ultimately have nothing to loose.   
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monastery territory should contribute to this important annual festival as well. My Hui 
neighbor Min who is from one of the first generation Hui families in Langmusi told 
me that his family used to provide the monastery with fried bread (Ch: youxiang, a 
traditional Hui specialty food) as a contribution to the Monlam Chenmo before the 
1950s. But nowadays he expressed the same frustration as other Hui or Chinese shop 
owners when they were “asked for money.”  
 
Now is different. We are equal [as ethnic minorities]. How can they ask 
for money like this? And there is even no fixed amount. You just have 
to give whatever they asked! 
 
Later I learned from Sangwu that the amount they asked from each shop is usually 
different according to how much money the shop has made for the past year. In 
practice this means how much money this group of young monks believe they have 
made. It is because of this reason that the situation between the group of young monks 
and Hui/Chinese shop owners sometimes became very tense.  
Monlam Chenmo has been an important Tibetan ritual that embodies both the 
religious and political authority of the monastery originating in the pre-Communist 
Tibetan social and political complex. The ceremony was initially founded in 1409 by 
Tsongkhapa, the great Tibetan religious reformer and the founder of the Gelugpa sect 
of Tibetan Buddhism, as an annual religious ceremony joined by all the Gelugpa 
monasteries in Lhasa.199 With the rapid development of Gelugpa, Monlam Chenmo 
was transformed from a Lhasa-based religious ceremony to a national ceremony held 
by the Dalai Lama that gathered thousands of monks and laities from all ethnic 
Tibetan areas. In the beginning of the twentieth century, Monlam Chenmo reached its 
heyday under the leadership of the former Thirteenth Dalai Lama. Charles Bell, a 
                                                 
199 According to the biography of Tsongkhapa, the first Monlam Chenmo in 1409 was attended by eight 
thousand monks at the Jokang temple in Lhasa (Sherpa and Thurman 1982). 
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former British officer in Lhasa at that time, recorded that during the Monlam Chenmo 
in 1921, the monastery service “was attended by ten to twenty thousand monks [from 
Lhasa, plus] twenty to thirty thousand of laity and forty to fifty thousand monks [from 
outside Lhasa] crowd into the Holy City” (Bell 1931: 26). Not only was it an 
extremely crowed religious event, but it had also become a symbolic national event 
organized by the religio-political government in Lhasa with significant religious, if not 
political, influence in all the ethnic Tibetan regions.200  
As regional versions of this national ceremony, numerous Gelugpa monasteries 
throughout Tibetan regions had also formulated their own ceremonies of Monlam 
Chenmo. According to their different regional influences, these monasteries often 
have different scales of Monlam Chenmo and result in different regional centers of 
social political importance. The one in Taktsang Lhamo is one of these regional 
ceremonies, and has been performed for centuries. 
Following the Dalai Lama’s exile in 1959 and the subsequent Cultural 
Revolution, Monlam Chenmo along with other religious activities were discontinued 
all over Tibet until it was permitted again in the early 1980s.201 The first Monlam 
Chenmo revived in Taktsang Lhamo after the Cultural Revolution was held in 1980 
when the Kirti monastery was not yet rebuilt. Two hundred monks led by Alak 
Lobsang performed this ritual in a big red tent during a period of two weeks. 
                                                 
200 For a memoir of Monlam Chenmo in 1920s-1940s, see (Bell 1928; Bell 1970). There are also many 
Chinese sources on this subject. Most of them come from the Chinese mission to Lhasa (Gelek and 
Zhang 2003; Zhu 1947).  
201 The actual time and process of religious revival differ significantly in different regions in Tibet. 
According to a Chinese scholar who worked in Lhasa from 1960 to 1985, Monlam Chenmo was held in 
Lhasa altogether three times under Chinese government rule during this period (Liao 1991). For a new 
book release on Tibet during the Cultural Revolution see (Zeren and Wei 2006). The 1980s revival of 
Monlam Chenmo in Lhasa lasted only a short period of time until the imposition of Chinese martial law 
in 1989 (Wang 1995: 21-26). After 1990 Monlam Chenmo was allowed only as an individual 
monastery-based ceremony and thus terminating the former symbolism of a national unity.   
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Thousands of Tibetan farmers and nomads from nearby regions gathered to celebrate 
this ritual after nearly twenty years.202
Ritual as a rite de passage is considered as a “traditionalizing instrument” 
since it has been “constructed in such a way that even in case of a newly invented 
ritual […] it is supposed to carry the same unreflective convictions as any traditional 
repetitive ritual” (Moore and Myerhoff 1977). In Taktsang Lhamo the reinvention of 
Monlam Chenmo took place in a post-socialist Chinese context after the 1980s.203 
Indeed this process of inventing tradition seeks not just to go back to its former 
convictions, but more importantly to restore the authority that had formerly been 
carried in these convictions. Through the revival of Monlam Chenmo Tibetans in 
Taktsang Lhamo have actively seek to restore their former authority in the 
reconstructed Tibetan place. The practice of “asking for money” tradition in the 
Monlam Chenmo period is one of these efforts.  
 
4.2 Ritual Construction of Authority and Symbolic Violence of the Geke 
Since the early 1980s the natural environment around the Kirti monastery has 
been reclaimed as a sacred Tibetan site.204 This includes the sites located on the 
                                                 
202 The revival of religious practice in China since 1980s has been strictly confined to religious ritual or 
public festival in both content and form. Any political function part is strictly forbidden. According to 
Robert Ekvall’s (1952) account, Monlam Chenmo in the pre-1950s Taktsang Lhamo was much more 
than a religious festival or praying. It was as first of all an event that demonstrates the paramount 
power—both religious and political—of the monastery. At the same time it was an important trading 
occasion of the year when Tibetan nomads, farmers, and Muslim Hui traders came across the regions to 
trade at the monasteries’ trading post. At that time most big Tibetan monasteries in Amdo had their own 
trading posts and specialized monk traders, i.e. Labrang monastery (Nietupski 1999; Makley 1999). In 
addition, it was also a popular social occasion for young men and women to find their loved ones.  
203 As Hobsbawn and Ranger indicated, invented traditions not only “throw a considerable light on the 
human relation to the past,” but “they are highly relevant to that comparatively recent historical 
innovation, the ‘nation’ ” (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). In the recent decade a noticeable scholarship 
has focused on the nation-state building process in China through the historical or anthropological 
studies of how non-Han ethnic minority groups have been incorporated in the new Chinese nation-state, 
e.g. (Bulag 2002; Litzinger 2000; Schein 2000).  
204 In the early 1980s Kirti monastery was given back the monastery land as well as the sacred sites 
around it. This includes, for example, the mountain forest behind that monastery which since then has 
been protected from any kinds of destruction.  
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circumambulation path such as the Tiger’s Cave, the source of the Druchu River, as 
well as the mountains, forests, and water ponds that are located beyond the monastery 
territory and circumambulation path. Each year before the Monlam Chenmo monks 
should repaint their houses in white on the outside so that all the monk houses in 
monastery territory look brightly white.205 Outside the front door of every monk’s 
house and monastery temple a Tibetan religious pattern has to be drawn on the floor, 
with auspicious yellow colored sand.   
 As an important beginning-of-the-year ritual, the monastic preparation of the 
Monlam Chenmo starts nearly one month before the actual beginning on the fourth 
day of the Tibetan New Year. Monks in different colleges (Tib: graw tshang) practice 
different rehearsals of chanting, debating, and mask dancing (Tib: cham) according to 
their colleges and their own status.206 From the fourth day of the Tibetan New Year all 
the monks gather in the great assembly hall at three o’clock every morning. Monlam 
Chenmo formally commences on the first morning with the ritual of an annual change 
of the chief monastery disciplinary monk (Tib: tshogs chen dge skos), or the Geke as 
he is called locally. During this two-week period monks spend most of the day in the 
assembly hall praying and chanting (Tib: tshongs) except for a four to five hour sleep 
at night.  
Besides mass chanting the central monastic activity during the first week is the 
annual open exam for a Geshe, or a Tibetan monastic doctoral scholar degree. The 
exam takes form of a public debate (Tib: dam bca’ or rtsod pa) between the monk 
                                                 
205 White is the Tibetan auspicious color and has special symbolism of sacred or pure in Tibetan 
tradition, such as khata (white Tibetan ceremonial scarf). My monk friend Dungrub wrote his first poem 
saying “snow is the khata that Buddha gives the human world.”  
206 For example, novice monks in different colleges have to go through different phases in the monastic 
training during which they have to take up different duties, such as dancing cham, hanging the grand 
Tangka, or making butter flower offerings.  
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candidate(s) and a committee of monastic teachers.207 After nearly a whole week of 
debating, one or more successful candidates would be granted a Geshe degree and 
congratulated by fellow monks. A large number of pilgrims from all over the region 
start to pour into town at this time for this biggest annual ceremony. They usually 
manage to sleep in a local relative or friend’s place—even just a corner of their living 
room or in an open courtyard. It is the only time of the year when lay Tibetans, mostly 
women, are allowed to stay with their monk relatives or friends in the monastery.208 In 
exchange for the lodging, the visitors usually bring some food (i.e. yak butter, tsampa, 
meat), or offer to do some domestic work (i.e. fetching the water from river, cooking 
and keeping the fire in the stove burning constantly) in the host’s house. During this 
period everywhere in the monastery and the nearby villages is always crowded. Each 
morning when the small mountain valley of Taktsang Lhamo loomed out of the foggy, 
smoky light, another Tibetan day of celebration begins. The smoke for cooking fires—
that used to come out of the chimneys of every house only when someone is at home 
(using fire)—now comes constantly from every house because nearly every house has 
their own visitors even the monks are not in their homes most of the day.209 The 
circumambulation path—which is normally visible only during the daily 
                                                 
207 During the traditional Lhasa Monlam Chenmo this exam was hosted by the Dalai Lama and the 
monks who received their Geshe degree there were supposed to have the highest credibility in Tibet. 
With the fragmentation of Monlam Chenmo in post-1980s Tibet, the Geshe exam has also been held 
separately in individual monasteries. In order to have a broader environment of studying, Kirti 
monastery has managed to rotate the exam with another monastery in Ngawa so that each monastery 
will host the exam for both every other year. From 2002 a critical logic debate (Tib: tshad ma dam 
bca’) has been added in the Monlam Chenmo at the request of the Kirti Rinpoche in addition to the 
traditional philosophical debate (Tib: phar phyin dam bca’). 
208 The monastery regulation strictly prohibits lay people to stay over night in the monastery houses, 
especially women. Indeed they are not even supposed to entering the monastery after dark. The only 
exception is one time of the year during the Monlam Chenmo period. See (Makley 1999: ch 3 / ch5) for 
more on gender boundary construction in the Tibetan monastery.  
209 Every house in Taktsang Lhamo uses a stove for both heating and cooking purposes. Therefore one 
can easily guess from the outside if the host is in, by watching if the smoke is coming out of the 
chimney of his house.   
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circumambulation time—also gets more conspicuous and even crowded at times, 
because of the sudden influx of thousands of pilgrims in town.   
The second week of the Monlam Chenmo brings the ritual atmosphere and 
public emotion to an apex during the last three days—the annual display of a giant 
tangka (scrolled Tibetan Buddhist painting) on the thirteenth day, the ritual dancing on 
the fourteenth day, and the exhibition of the butter-made flowers and Buddhist images 
lighted by lamps on the fifteenth night.210 These grand festivities are also occasions 
for the ritual construction of Tibetan authority through public mobilization and 
performance of both ritualized emotion and symbolic violence—all engraved in the 
reconstructed Tibetan-centered place. 
On the thirteenth day of Monlam Chenmo ritual attention is moved from the 
center of the monastic temple to the mountain slope behind the outer circle of the 
monastic sacred space (Tib: gnas skor). Pilgrims and villagers have gathered at the 
center of the monastery beginning early morning. Before the sun rises, a 20m-long roll 
of a giant tangka is carried out of the main temple by some twenty young monks and 
symbolically protected by the Geke and his several disciplinary assistants (Tib: dge 
gyog). After another round of chanting by all the monks, the long awaited tangka roll 
is carried from the monastic temple all the way to the mountain slope. Despite only 
about 500m distance, it took nearly half an hour for the tangka crew to pass through 
the pilgrim crowds who had lined up on both sides of the path from the beginning 
(temple) to the end (the slope) leaving only a narrow passage. As the tangka passed by, 
                                                 
210 These three ceremonies are called gos sku (“displaying a Tibetan Buddhist scroll painting”), cham 
(“mask dancing”), and me dog mchod pa or bco lnga mchod pa (“flower offering” or “fifteenth 
offering”) in Tibetan. There is usually only one such giant size tangka in each monastery and it is 
displayed often once or twice every year. The actual size of the painting may vary from one monastery 
to another. In Taktsang Lhamo it is around 20m wide and 30m long and is displayed vertically. Because 
of this extremely big size it is usually displayed on the mountain slope. In recent years many 
monasteries have built a modern concrete display platform on the side of the hill slope. Cham used to be 
translated as “devil dance” or “mask dance” in the early Tibetan related literatures. See an interesting 
account on the changing translation of the name and meanings for cham through times (Schrempf 
1997).  
113 
turmoil arose from the crowd while everyone fought to reach the tangka for a touch or 
to throw a khata on it as a form of being blessed on this special occasion. Some old 
people who cannot compete with the crowd even lay down in front of the coming 
tangka in order to let the monks and tangka pass above their bodies. In recent years 
there has been another significant group among the Tibetan pilgrim crowd—Chinese 
journalists, artists, or tourists. Armed with all kinds of modern equipments, they are 
eager to catch every exciting moment and every expressive perspective of this exotic 
ritual without any awareness that these intrude into a ritual space.211  
With all these obstacles on the way, the Geke and his monk assistants have 
become the most visible among all the people. They waved their whips and sticks 
from one end to another shouting and scolding the crowd to maintain the public order. 
From time to time when their shout seemed to be outrun by the overwhelming crowd 
they would use the power in their hands—this time no longer the giant ritual stick used 
for the symbolic purposes, but a real one meter long leather whip or wood stick. They 
beat relentlessly on those whose actions tend to jeopardize the progression of the 
tangka crew. Meanwhile they are also responsible to watch for the young monks in the 
crew whose attention tends to be lured away from their duties. In that case the Geke 
would not hesitate to scold and beat them in front of the public. While everyone was 
still fighting to touch the tangka roll or just to get closer to it, most people would 
fearfully evade Geke’s whip or stick. Some brave hearts, often young Tibetan men, 
would show their strength and courage at this moment by jumping up over the crowd 
and crawling over everyone’s head to reach the tangka scroll. When the Geke’s stick 
                                                 
211 See chapter 7 for more discussion on tourist and tourism and their impact on the local religious 
revival and ethnic relations. Makley (1999) also shows a similar occasion when a Chinese photographer 
was punched in the face by a Tibetan monk because of his intruding into the ritual space during the 
Monlam Chenmo.  
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fell mercilessly on his back, his face turned red with both some awkwardness and 
pride. Then he would quickly disappear in the crowd.   
Most Tibetan people and monks I talked to take the Geke’s beating and 
scolding as fearful (Tib: sgrag gi) and being beaten or scolded as shameful (Tib: ngo 
tsha gi). At the same time, however, this feeling of fear and shame is obviously 
something exciting, even fun, which is an inalienable part of the whole festive 
atmosphere. Both lay Tibetans and monks have no doubt that the Geke has to behave 
like that during the ritual—cruelly beating people and furiously scolding young monks 
in front of the public—no matter how nice and gentle a person he is in his daily life. 
As Tashi explained to me, it is Geke’s duty in the monastery to maintain order with his 
power, even with violence. After all, since everyone (Tibetan) wears a very heavy and 
thick armor-like Tibetan robes in winter, Tashi claimed that even though the Geke’s 
beating is real, it is still mostly symbolic because it does not actually hurt.212 The 
purpose of the Geke’s symbolic violence in this specific occassion then is to balance 
the ritualized public emotions on the one hand, and the ritually constructed authority 
on the other. In other words, the default public emotion in this occasion is at once a 
ritualized excitement and a constantly reinforced feeling of fear which engenders an 
acute awareness of a reconstructed monastic authority.213  
 
4.3 The Crazy Drunk Tulku 
A cold afternoon in January 2004 I went to a Hui restaurant with my wife. The 
restaurant is not big but usually full of people—Tibetan monks from the local 
monasteries and nomads from pastoral areas round. Suddenly a filthy Tibetan man 
                                                 
212 From my experience of at least three years of Monlam Chenmo there I have often heard shouts from 
the crowd that sounds like real pain instead of a symbolic gesture. 
213 In another context, Makley (2003) has demonstrated similar feelings of fear, embarrassment and 
excitement from two Tibetan women pilgrims when they showed their respect and humility in the 
sacred temple of Labrang monastery. 
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attracted my attention as he was talking loudly enough to be heard even from outside. 
He looked all black from afar: curly black hair, a big black beard, a black leather 
jacket, black leather pants, and black leather boots. His cloths and boots were so dusty 
and worn out that the black had almost become grey. His big black beard covered 
nearly half of his face. I had an initial feeling that he was probably drunk or just a 
vagabond wandering around. In Tibet, religious centers are often the asylum of 
vagabonds and homeless dogs.214 Thus I was not very surprised to see a drunken 
Tibetan man with the appearance of a homeless vagabond.  
Upon spotting me and my wife entering the restaurant, he came over with a 
wind of alcohol smell and started a conversation with me in Chinese. “Hey, comrade, 
where are you from?” he asked.  “I’m from Beijing,” I answered. “Ah, me too!” he 
seemed to be excited, “I graduated from the Central Academy of Art.”215 He pointed 
to an old camera hanged on his neck, which looks like a toy camera from an antique 
shop, “I’m a journalist for Xinhua News Agency.”216 Then he turned to my wife by 
my side and asked, “Where are you from?” this time in English. “France,” my wife 
answered. “I’m from Quebec,” he seemed to be excited to have found a compatriot at 
another end of the globe, “Montreal, you know? My passport… Canada …” At this 
time a Tibetan monk came over and took him away by telling him something that I 
could not hear. 
After this brief introduction I saw him on the street from time to time always 
holding a half full bottle of baijiu, or Chinese booze made from rice or sorghum. 
                                                 
214 The begging tradition in Tibet has a history as long as that of the religious pilgrimage. In fact it is 
hard to distinguish one from the other. In most cases monastery is the place where they seek shelter and 
food. In the 1920s French Tibetologist Alexandra David-Neel made her travel to Lhasa by disguising 
herself as a pilgrim beggar (David-Neel 1927). See also (Stoddard 1986). This is also true for homeless 
animals. When Tibetan people try to accumulate their karma (merit) by saving lives (Tib: tshe thar), 
they usually free the animals around the monastery so that they can be sure the animal would survive. 
Jokang temple and around used to be one of the most populated place for pilgrimage beggars and 
homeless dogs until they were wiped out by the Chinese government in mid 1990s.  
215 A prestigious art school in Beijing which many distinguished Chinese artists graduated from. 
216 Xinhua is the top official news agency in China, organized by the CCP. 
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Many times he was scolding someone and occasionally he seemed just talking to 
himself. I tried to avoid having any direct contact with him fearing that he might in 
any moment do something that I may or may not imagine. He seemed to me like just 
another vagabond, like those I have seen in many other places. It was not until the 
Monlam Chenmo period that I got to discover some surprising stories. In fact this 
person is Alak Tayi, a well-known crazy drunkard but also a high level Tulku (or 
reincarnated lama, Tib: sbrul sku) of the Kirti monastery who is believed to possess 
some magical powers.  
The high point of the fourteenth day of Monlam Chenmo was an all-day public 
performance of the traditional mask dance (Tib: cham). Hundreds of monks in the 
monastery performed this dance for nearly a whole day on the open monastery square 
with elaborate costumes and masks. In 2004, it was a beautiful day. The sky was deep 
blue before the sun rose. At this time monks of the Kirti monastery had already passed 
a whole night chanting in the main temple. Outside the main temple people had started 
to gather around the big square where the dance would be performed. As start fo the 
dance neared, more and more people poured in the open monastic square until 
everyone could hardly move in the crowd. Still more people were trying to squeeze in. 
No one would miss this once-in-a-year chance of being blessed by this grand religious 
ritual while being entertained at the same time. Thus the line set up between the crowd 
and the reserved area for the cham performance had to be maintained constantly by the 
Geke and his several disciplinary assistants who usually carry out his duties with much 
violence.217 In Taktsang Lhamo the Geke represents the highest disciplinary position 
in the monastery.218 He maintains order at all monastic events including the everyday 
                                                 
217 The violence in a ritual situation like this carries as much symbolic meaning as its apparent function. 
See (Makley 1999) chapter 5 for a similar scene during the Monlam Chenmo in Labrang monastery. 
She argues that it is more of a performance of “heroic Tibetan masculinity.” 
218 My monk friend Tashi insisted that the Geke even has the power to watch over the Kirti Lama in 
ritual occasions like Monlam Chenmo. Unlike a reincarnated lama (Alak), Geke is a monastic position 
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routine meetings, monk study sessions, ritual events, and the night curfew in monastic 
territory. In any of situations mentioned here, the Geke represents the unchallengeable 
power of the monastery symbolized through his specially designed robe that is 
elaborately propped up from his two shoulders and through a huge ritual stick held in 
his hand.  
However this year everyone noticed the unavoidable presence of a crazy 
drunkard—the one I met in the restaurant. He was still in his filthy leather jacket and 
leather pants and the old camera hung on his neck —with apparently no film inside. 
From time to time he would point his toy-like camera at the crowd and the cham 
performance as busy and serious as a professional journalist. But I soon realized that 
his real enthusiasm was to behave as a Geke. He started by kicking and shouting at 
those who sit in the front line of the crowd forcing them to back up, which is usually 
the duty of the Geke. After he had scolded and beaten almost everyone during the 
cham performances, the crowd recognized his power by saying that even the Geke 
silently agreed with what he did. Thus wherever he passed, the crowd became like a 
flock of birds flying away from him.  
After some time, he found himself a new task—robbing hats and scarves from 
the crowd. Whenever he saw someone with a hat or scarf, he would first sneak close to 
the person and then grab it with one sudden move. While the victim had yet to 
understand what happened, he had already run around holding his plunder and 
shouting aloud to the crowd in both Tibetan and Chinese: “I am the chief of this 
monastery. Wearing a hat or scarf here is disrespectful to the monastery. I must 
maintain the order of this monastery. I’m going to burn these hats and scarves right 
                                                                                                                                            
that theoretically any monk in the community can achieve—just like any monk can study to become a 
Geshe (Tib: dge shes, the highest Tibetan scholar degree in the Gelugpa monastery system). While 
Geshe is a life-long title for one who owns it, Geke is a position based on terms—usually one or two 
years.  
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here right now.” It didn’t take long for him to gather a pile of hats and scarves in 
hand.219  
Despite his aggressive words and offensive behavior nobody seemed to be 
angry at what he did. On the contrary many people found some amusement in this 
extra scene. Moreover, after some time more and more people started to line up in 
front of him asking him to beat their arms, their backs, or wherever they have a 
disease or pain in their bodies. A young monk by my side explained that “He is 
helping these people to get rid of some pain or disease [by beating]. He is a good Alak 
and [thus] no matter how he behaves and whatever he says you should always listen 
and obey.” Alak is the Amdo equivalent of Rinpoche, an honorable address for a 
reincarnation lama or Tulku. 
This seemingly crazy drunkard is in fact one of the many reincarnated lamas of 
the Kirti monastery, known as Alak Tayi.220 He was recognized as the reincarnation of 
the current Kirti Lama’s previous teacher. His early life is a mystery since he was 
recognized as a reincarnation lama at the end of the 1950s. It was time when monks 
could not maintain their monastic lives (Tib: a kha byas mi wa gi). Even though Alak 
Tayi was recognized as a reincarnated lama, he could not resume his position in the 
Kirti monastery and had to stay in his lay home. Soon after that, the Cultural 
Revolution swept all over China during which Alak Tayi, a teenager by then, is said to 
have left for a Chinese city and allegedly joined the Chinese army and became a PLA 
soldier. Others said he actually went exile to India to meet the Dalai Lama and the 
                                                 
219 The role of maintaining order in the Great Prayer Festival—to keep everyone in a respectful 
manner—has been traditionally a position for a special group of “warrior monks” (Tib: ldad ldop) in 
pre-1950s Lhasa (Goldstein 1964). During the Great Prayer Festival in the post-1980s Labrang 
monastery this role has been held by a group of “seven laymen from the oldest villages in Labrang led 
by one specially-garbed monk” (Makley 1999). In Taktsang Lhamo it is the disciplinary monks (Tib: 
dge bskos, Geke) and the assistant disciplinary monks (Tib: dge g’yog) who usually assume this role. 
220 The life story of Alak Tayi was collected from many different people during my fieldwork. I was 
well aware of the narrative nature of different versions. My interest is the narrative itself rather than the 
authenticity of the story.  
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Kirti Lama and later came back again. But no one really knows what he did during this 
time.  
He finally showed up again in Taktsang Lhamo in the mid 1980s, when 
religious practice was permitted and the monastery was reopened. Kirti monastery was 
then being rebuilt under the leadership of Alak Lobsang. For the first time in his life 
Alak Tayi became a monk in the Kirti monastery over twenty years later from when he 
was supposed to arrive. “At that time he was no different from other monks,” my 
monk friend Tashi told me. “He was always very quiet and kept a low profile. Until 
one day he suddenly disappeared from Kirti monastery and Taktsang Lhamo.” Several 
years later when he showed up again to Taktsang Lhamo, he has been found always 
drunk and speaking crazily to everyone in Tibetan, Chinese, and English. 
 
4.4 God, Ghost and Magical Power 
I have talked to many Tibetan friends about why and how a reincarnation lama 
can become drunk and crazy. Most of them told me that it was during the Cultural 
Revolution that he became both crazy and possessed with some magical healing power. 
This evident connection between the Cultural Revolution and a present case like this 
excited my interest in how that period has been conceptualized and memorized in the 
local society. I asked my lay Tibetan friend Tserang to explain how the Chinese 
Cultural Revolution that seems to be quite far away both in time and space has 
affected this remote Tibetan village and their religion. My field diary noted Tserang’s 
answer: 
 
We have many gods and ghosts in Tibet and we Tibetans believe in 
them. For example, before the liberation (Tib: bcings ’grol, referring to 
1949), nobody would dig a well on the ground to get water since that 
would offend the god of the earth (Tib: sa bdag). If somebody did it, he 
would surely be punished [by the god of earth]. 
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During the Cultural Revolution, however, Mao Zedong became the 
king of both human being and all kinds of gods and ghosts (Tib: mi 
dang lha ’dre so so gi rgyal wo red). No one knows if he himself is a 
man, a god or a ghost. His power was so big that it suppressed that of 
any other god or ghost in Tibet. That’s why at that time people could do 
anything [i.e. dig a well for water] without being punished.  
 
But these days have you seen anyone dare to dig a well again? Of 
course not! You know why there are so many leprous people in Tewu 
area [a nearby region east of Taktsang Lhamo]? That’s because they 
offended the god of the earth by digging wells.221
 
The terror of the Cultural Revolution, in particular the deified power of Mao, is 
thus memorized as a terrible yet powerful alien force set against the divine realm of 
Tibet and particularly against the paramount power of a reincarnate lama.222 Alak 
Tayi—a reincarnate Lama, even with his crazy behavior—embodies this violent 
collision between the traditional belief of sacred power in Tibetan society and the 
terror from the memories of Chinese Cultural Revolution. 
To make things more complicated and ironic, the concept of craziness or a 
crazy person (Tib: smyon pa) has been conceived quite differently in the Tibetan 
tradition. Instead of being thought of as any kind of sickness or abnormality, it has 
often been considered as a rather saintly behavior that is simply beyond the 
understanding of any normal person. The “saintly madman” is a “well-established 
stereotype in Tibet” (Ardussi and Epstein 1978). Not only is this story found in much 
of the religious and historical literature as well as in oral traditions, but it has also 
played an active part in Tibetan society. These madmen are often recognized as a kind 
of practitioner who possesses some special kind of magical power that normal 
Buddhist practitioners could not achieve in any conventional way. Geoffrey Samuel 
                                                 
221 Fieldnotes November 18, 2003, interview with Tserang, a Tibetan cadre in his 40s.  
222 See also (Landsberger 1996-1997) for a discussion of the deification of Mao in China during the 
Cultural Revolution. Some have argued that the deification of Mao in China also had deep impact on 
minority peoples and their religions, see i.e. (Wang 1998).   
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(1993) goes further to argue that Tibetan Buddhism is indeed the reconciliation 
between orthodox Buddhism spread to Tibet from India and indigenous shamanism in 
ancient Tibet. Thus Tibetan Buddhist lamas are in fact “civilized shamans.”223 Based 
on his study on Bon religion and the Rigmed movement in Kham and Amdo, Samuel 
depicts the phenomenon of “mad yogi” in Tibetan society as “a shamanic critique of 
clericalization,” namely Gelugpa monasticism. As such, this kind of “mad yogi” has 
always existed in Tibetan society representing an alternative to the orthodox Buddhist 
practice.  
However, in Alak Tayi’s case above, “mad yogi” exists not as an antithetical 
part to the orthodox but rather an embodiment of both. Alak Tayi himself is 
recognized simultaneously as a reincarnation lama in a conventional Gelugpa 
monastery and as a drunken crazy Tulku outside of the monastery who possesses some 
magical powers that do not belong to a Buddhist lama. Moreover, unlike his 
predecessors in Tibetan history, Alak Tayi’s “saintly madness” is the result of the 
intrusion of an evil alien power—namely the deified power of Mao and the terror of 
Cultural Revolution—into the divine realm of Tibetan reincarnate lama. Despite its 
evilness, this alien power is nevertheless recognized as threateningly powerful and 
magically influential. Thus after a devastating encounter with this evil power, Alak 
Tayi has been ironically enabled with some magical powers which conventional 
practitioners would have no way to obtain otherwise. For local people he is no less a 
real Lama than any other Lamas in the monastery. At the same time he possesses some 
magical power that obviously does not go with his lama status.  
A binary understanding of Tibetan religious phenomena as orthodox (“clerical” 
as Samuel calls it, i.e. Gelugpa) versus shamanic (i.e., Bon) is thus not helpful to 
                                                 
223 See, e.g., the biography of Milarepa, the most well-known ascetic yogi in Tibetan history written by 
Gtsang-smyon Heruka, lit., “Heruka, the madman from Gtsang” (Gtsang-smyon 1962; Samuel 1993). 
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understand the complexity of religion and society in a specific context like the above 
one. It underlines one of the various possibilities (i.e., what Samuel calls “civilized 
shamans”) but underestimates or simply ignores others (i.e., what we might call 
“uncivilized or de-civilized lamas”).224 Furthermore the “civilized shaman” argument 
is also flawed with a universal assumption of the unified progress of time in a widely 
varied time and space.225
When explaining the Tibetan conception of Lama (or reincarnated bodies), 
Robert Ekvall indicates that the fundamental role of these “emanation bodies” in 
Tibetan society is not a priest hosting rituals or ceremonies. They are there “to be 
recipients of worship and the dispensers of benediction and aid to all who travel the 
long road to final liberation.” Since they represent the Budddahood in living form, 
they are at once monks who have to fulfill their monastic vows and yet they are above 
any existing law. That is to say, once he is recognized as a Lama, he will always be a 
Lama to all Tibetan people—whether he renounces the vows he took, breaks the 
monastic rules, or even he denies his reincarnation identity himself. “Nothing he can 
do will make him anything less than a Lama” (Ekvall 1979). The most well known 
case in Tibetan history is the Sixth Dalai Lama who is well known in Tibetan history 
for his iconoclastic character and is famous for his love poems popular among the 
Tibetan public. Although the Qing government denounced his Dalai Lama status 
because of his improper behavior that appeared to be against Buddhist principles, 
Tibetans have always considered him as a no-less-real Dalai Lama than any other 
Dalai Lama in Tibetan history.  
                                                 
224 In a similar way, many scholars have documented the religious coexistence of Buddhism and 
shamanism in other Himalayan societies. For example, an ethnic Tibetan community in Nepal employs 
Tibetan Lamaism and Gurung Shamanism separately for different community needs (Mumford 1989); 
there are different functions of Buddhism and shamanism in one Tamang community (Holmberg 1989).   
225 See more on this subject of time later in this chapter. 
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As Robert Ekvall argued earlier, Tibetan society denies any possibility that the 
nature of a reincarnate lama can be changed under any circumstances. In other words, 
the power of Lama is considered as the highest power in the universe. The fact that 
Alak Tayi was recognized as a reincarnate lama in the beginning makes him a real 
lama among the people as well as to himself. Thus for Tibetans in Taktsang Lhamo, 
Alak Tayi becomes a real reincarnation lama who possesses some unexplainable 
magical powers. Even though he cannot perform many routine rituals and positions in 
the monastery, the nature of his ultimate existence is still the same as a real reincarnate 
lama.  
Later the monk who told me to respect Alak Tayi reaffirmed me that “this Alak 
is very ling (effective). If you have any sickness or pain in your body, just ask him to 
beat [that part].” Note that he used the word ling—a Chinese word for the efficacy of 
magical power—here to describe the effectiveness or efficiency of a Tibetan 
reincarnate lama’s power. When explaining the concept of ling in a Chinese ritual 
context, Sangren (1987) contends that “in Chinese thought magical power is attributed 
to the mythical process” and thus ling “is at once the fetishized product of the 
reproduction of social relations and a cultural logic that gives social relations meaning 
and value.” In a similar vein, Toni Huber (1999) argues that the transcendental power 
of chinlab in Tibetan society “can also be regarded as an ideological mystification or 
misrecognition of society's own productive power.”  
In Alak Tayi’s case the product/producer model has involved another layer of 
meaning—the cross-cultural/cross-lingual interpretation. Scholars who work on the 
Sino-Tibetan borderland have shown many cases of the confusion of identities as well 
as the interchangeable use of cross-cultural/cross-lingual concepts in the local beliefs, 
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cults and myths.226 This interpretation has been closely contextualized in its social and 
political background. As the monk continued explaining to me, Alak Tayi is a good 
Tibetan lama not only because he is a powerful Alak, but also because he has done 
many good things for Tibetan people despite of his disgraceful appearance. Indeed 
some of the great deeds have been able to be accomplished only because of his drunk 
and crazy state. The year before, it is said, he had kicked out some Hui businesses 
from his hometown in Zorge by violently disturbing them. Since the 1980s there has 
been a growing resentment and jealousy from local Tibetans towards both the success 
of local Hui business and the revival of Hui religious and ethnic identity. Local 
Tibetans tend to feel that, as guests, the Hui have built their business success upon 
ripping off their host, or Tibetans. Moreover, the deep down Tibetan attachment to the 
pre-Communist ethnic hierarchy can not be simply replaced by the official Chinese 
policy of ethnic equality. However there is no simple way to express these feelings. 
Alak Tayi’s appearance as a crazy drunk vagabond and his drifter life style made him 
the perfect one to show some unspoken communal resentment that otherwise could not 
be easily expressed. Because of his known madness and drunkenness even the local 
police station could not do anything. After several incidents like that, other Hui 
businesses gradually moved out of town leaving it an “all-Tibetan” town, which is rare 
in these regions.  
After recounting all those great deeds Alak Tayi had done for Tibetan people, 
the monk said regretfully to me, “if he were not like this [crazy and drunk], he would 
surely have been a great leader in our monastery now.”227  
                                                 
226 For example, (Buffetrille 2002) discusses an identity confusion of a Tibetan territorial deity (khri ka 
yul lha) with the Chinese God of war (Guan Yu) and the Chinese God of literature (Wen Chang). 
(Schrempf 2002) presents another example of identity confusion between two local deities in Sino-
Tibetan borderland. 
227 Since the reopening of the monastery in 1980s, Alak Lobsang has been the de facto leader of the 
Kirti monastery for both religious and secular affairs. Even though he is actually not a reincarnation 
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 4.5 Bazal and the Tactics of Time: Consuming the Future through History 
One afternoon I was doing a circumambulation walk with Tashi. As it was not 
the usual circumambulation time, only some old people were on the way as occasional 
worshippers. But when we passed by the gtsan khang, or the protective deity 
temple,things changed. As a temple for a protective deity, no one is actually allowed 
to enter the gtsan khang—it is always locked except when a monk comes from time to 
time for the temple maintenance. Many people—young and old, local and from far 
away—were quite busy circling around the outer wall of the temple. Some had 
apparently done that for quite a while. They hung their mani rosaries on the wall 
counting the number of the loops they did by moving a bead each time they passed the 
same place. Others were putting more incense in the burner and throwing out piles of 
“wind horse” paper in the air as a form of prayer.228  
This small temple houses a protective deity locally referred to as Bazal (Tib: 
dpal rtsal, lit. “[someone with both] virtue and talent”). After living in Taktsang 
Lhamo for a while, it did not take me long to notice that despite its small size and 
simple appearance the gtsan khang is probably the site most frequented by both locals 
and pilgrims among all the temples in the monastery and all the sacred sites along the 
circumambulation route. It was from this point that I got interested in the story of this 
powerful local protective deity and its historical legacy in the post-socialist condition. 
Moreover this legacy that is frequently told in the local area not only reinforces local 
identity but it also does it in a specific social context through the tactics of time. 
                                                                                                                                            
lama from the Kirti monastery, he has been the only one that is considered trust-worthy by the Kirti 
Lama and politically correct by the Chinese government.   
228 “Wind horse” (Tib: rlung ta) refers to the Tibetan prayer flag, or a small square piece of paper that is 
printed with Buddhist symbols, texts or patterns. As a form of protection or praying, the prayer flag is 
often put on sacred sites or at homem, and paper “wind horses” are thrown into the air at a sacred site or 
at a sacred moment.   
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Long time ago there was a very well-known erudite Tibetan monk scholar 
from a small monastery in Thewu, several days walking distance to the Kirti 
monastery. When the old monk knew he was about to die he decided to invite the 
renowned Kirti Lama to guide his death process and to ensure the right path.229 He 
sent a young novice monk to bring the message to the Kirti monastery. The young 
monk turned out to be a lazy and irresponsible one. He was too lazy to finish the long 
walk to the Kirti monastery and turned back midway. After he came back he lied to his 
master that the Kirti Lama was too proud to show up at such a small monastery like 
his and to perform the ritual for him. He even made up some insulting words to 
reconfirm his story which eventually led to the abrupt death of the old monk.  
In Tibet when those with special spirit or high energies—i.e. reincarnation 
lamas, Tantric practioners, highly learned monks—die, it is believed that only their 
physical bodies die. Their special spirit or high energy will continue through 
reincarnation and last eternally.230 This reincarnated spirit or energy can exist in 
different physical forms—human, god, ghost, or protective deity—under different 
circumstances. Since the old monk who was renowned for his knowledge—and thus 
carried high spiritual energy—died abnormally of anger and humiliation, his soul 
turned immediately into a powerful destructive ghost that started to wander around the 
region harming innocent people and destroying many things in their lives.231 There 
                                                 
229 The concept of death in Tibetan cosmology is both a complicated and a very important one. It 
involves a long in-between process (Tib: bar dor) during which a person is neither a live nor a dead. It 
is therefore very important to have someone (i.e., a Tibetan lama) to guide the deceased through this 
process in order to be on the right path. See (Evans-Wentz 1949; Coleman 2006). 
230 The idea of reincarnation was initially originated in Tibet from the Karma Kargyu sect in 13th 
century according to the Tibetan history classic, the “Blue Annals” (Tib: deb ther sngon bo). It was later 
adopted by the Gelugpa sect and became well-known through its two biggest reincarnation systems: the 
Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. Many other Buddhist and non-Buddhist traditions in Tibet have 
also adopted this system throughout their history as their principal religious dynamic. 
231 I heard the story from different people. Although they are not completely the same, all of them 
emphasized that this ghost was very harmful on people only in terms of their materialistic lives, such as 
destroying their houses, making them sick, causing them to loose money in business, even killing 
someone, etc. Yet none of them mentioned anything that has to do with their next lives.   
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were no other deities that could control this powerful ghost until finally Kirti Lama got 
to know the whole story. He first subjugated this ghost with just his one foot. Then 
with great compassion the Kirti Lama turned this formerly harmful ghost into a local 
protective deity, known as Bazal. Since then Bazal has guarded the people and 
territory that belongs to the Kirti monastery and had its own small temple in Kirti 
monastery.232 Tamed by the Kirti Lama and worshipped as a protective deity in the 
Kirti monastery, Bazal has become a territorial deity that defines the identity of those 
who worship him. In Taktsang Lhamo the worship of Bazal separates Kirti villagers 
from, for example, Serchi villagers who worship their own protective deity of zhig dag.  
Many scholars who study the cult of territorial deities in Tibet have 
emphasized its close relation to the Tibetan ethnic identity. Fernada Pirie (2005) 
indicates that the identity reference in Amdo Tibetan societies relies much more on 
territory and territorial deities than anything else such as clan or lineage. Samten 
Karmay (1994) argues that despite of the enormous cultural, linguistic and religious 
differences that have existed in Tibetan society, there is a common consensus that has 
brought the Tibetan society together as a national whole. Activities such as the 
mountain cult or territory deity cult in Tibetan culture “therefore play a very 
significant role in the building up of [Tibetan] national identity” (Karmay 1994: 119). 
Toni Huber (1999) criticizes this “anachronism of applying the modern political 
concept and identity referent of ‘nation’ to a premodern Tibet.” He emphasizes the 
parochial nature that is involved in these mountain cults and “the unique relationship 
of each small community and territory with its own mountain deities certainly serves 
                                                 
232 This story goes perfectly with the universal structure of Tibetan protective deity stories provided in 
the Tibetan scholar H. Jigme’s study of territorial gods and protective deities in Tibet (Jigme 2002). 
According to Jigme, Bazal belongs to the more general and well-known category of zhig dag 
(protective deity). In my case I believe one reason it has been called Bazal instead of zhig dag is to 
differentiate from another protective deity, known as zhig dag, from Serchi monastery just across the 
river.  
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to generate and reinforce many local distinctions, as opposed to common pan-regional 
identities” (Huber 1999: 234). 233  
A key issue in this debate of ethnic or national identity in relation to 
mountain/territorial deity cult is thus the understanding and use of time. To better 
understand the tactics of time here, the concept of time in this particular context is 
neither a lineal path from the past to the future, nor is it a Buddhist world of endless 
life cycles. Rather it is how people endure their past to the future and particularly how 
they quantify time into some temporal chains of causality that are both the products 
and generators of current social context. Following Mueggler’s (2001) insight on this 
point, I argue that Bazal as a territorial deity has been a local medium of time through 
which the effects of social memories have been continuously engaging in the 
production of the current context. Identity as an important outcome in this process is 
thus a dynamic concept that at once subscribes to the past, as a product, and predicts 
the future, as a producer.  
Just like he was destroying the materialistic life of people when he was a ghost, 
Bazal now ensures people with this-worldly benefit after he was turned into a 
protective deity housed in Kirti monastery. His power to accomplish these goals, 
whether negative before or positive after, is believed to be equally very effective—as 
long as he is fed enough. Since Bazal used to be a ghost it is said he has a very greedy 
appetite. Those who need help from Bazal have to feed (Tib: gso ba) him a lot and 
constantly, either in public or in private.234 Furthermore, once one starts to feed him 
he cannot stop. Otherwise Bazal will not only stop helping him but even do him some 
harm. 
                                                 
233 See also (Epstein and Peng 1994) and most recently (Buffetrille and Diemberger 2002; Pirie 2005a). 
234 For example, circumambulation around the temple of Bazal, making offering or burning incense in 
front of the temple would be considered as publicly feeding Bazal; having a Tangka of Bazal at home 
and making offerings to it would be considered as privately feeding Bazal. 
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To make the story more mythical and complex, I found later in my fieldwork 
that local Tibetans firmly believe that the Hui also feed Bazal—despite the apparent 
conflict with their own religion. Tibetans said that Hui feed Bazal because Bazal is 
very effective—it also explained why Hui businesses were going so well. Of course, 
Hui do it secretly, as most Tibetans explained to me, usually at home. Moreover when 
Hui practiced these Tibetan territorial deity cults, it is said that Hui community is also 
separated into two groups: those from the Serchi Hui village who would feed zhig dag; 
and those from the Kirti Hui village who would feed Bazal. As a local Tibetan told me, 
if you are a Serchi villager—Hui or Tibetan—Bazal will not protect you.235  
As shown in the previous chapters, the local Tibetan-Hui relation in Taktsang 
Lhamo has been radically transformed from a presumed pre-Communist hierarchical 
harmony to a multi-layered complexity of contemporary ethnic rivalry. The local 
belief in Bazal’s efficacy (at least from the Tibetan perspective) is based on the former 
territorial and political hierarchy rather than the current ethnic or religious 
demarcation. Thus contrary to the lineal logic of time progression, this local belief has 
endured the past through a “practice of time.” It is this time-crossing belief, what 
Bakhtin (1981) called “chronotopes,” or a temporal causality that gives rise to one of 
the multiple discourse possibilities including ethnic or national identity.236 By 
emphasizing the materialistic nature of Bazal and his power, the local worship of 
Bazal seems to be, on the one hand, against the Buddhist ethics of next-life that has 
been the dominant ideal in Tibetan society. But on the other hand, it still reinforces the 
                                                 
235 I got this information only from the Tibetan side. I couldn’t find a way to verify or even simply pose 
such a question to the Hui communities. Despite of this, it at least reaffirms the characteristic of power 
and territoriality that Bazal embodies in the local Tibetan society. See my further discussion on the 
extension of this power in chapter 6.   
236 Stan Mumford applied Bakhtin’s dialogic theory in his ethnography of the ethnic encounter between 
Tibetan lamas and Gurung Shamans. He argues that, “Identity is multicentered. In the process of 
discourse, however, one of these possible ambivalence may become singled out and foregrounded” 
(Bakhtin 1981: 259; Mumford 1989: p15). 
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newly reconstructed Tibetan monastic authority since Bazal is the protective deity of 
Kirti monastery and territorial deity of this region under the leadership of the Kirti 
Lama.237
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
237 While all these seemed very interesting to me, my monk friend Tashi, on the contrary, did not hide 
his disapproval toward those who frequent the Bazal temple. The difference, he explains, is that to pray 
in those monastery temples only guarantees your future life (or lives) while Bazal is in charge of 
everything materialistic related to this life such as wealth or health. Therefore, he insists, those who 
frequent the Bazal temple are people who just want this-worldly benefit and thus are merely utilitarian. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
“WHITE COUNTRY” OR “BLACK COUNTRY”: SOCIAL IMAGINATION OF 
THE NATION 
 
In 2001 Monk Tashi finally finished his course of studies after being a novice 
monk in the Kirti monastery for thirteen years. A novice monk is a student in the 
monastery and a child in his monk’s household.238 As a student in the monastery it is 
mandatory for him to attend the monastery class everyday besides fulfilling all other 
monastic duties for which he is responsible. As a child in his monk’s household it is 
his duty to take care of all the domestic housework, along with other novice monks in 
the house if there are any, since they are dependent on their Akhu economically and 
socially.239 The graduation thus announces the end of his life as a novice monk and the 
beginning of his independent life as an adult monk in the monastery.  
Most young novice monks celebrate this graduation by traveling (or taking a 
pilgrimage trip) out of the local region often for the first time in their life. Religious 
travels of Tibetan monks—for pilgrimage or for study—have had a long tradition in 
Tibetan monastic history.240 Today some young Kirti monks travel for further study at 
other famous monasteries in order to obtain a more advanced scholarly degree (i.e. 
Geshe). Others just go for a pilgrimage trip before they come back and start a rather 
                                                 
238 Child monks and novice monks are often hosted by in an adult monk’s house until they formally 
graduated.  
239 Tib: a khu, is a widely used term in Amdo. It is the Amdo equivalent of sku-zhogs in Lhasa dialect to 
respectfully address a monk. In a monastery context it refers to the teacher/master monk who is in 
charge of a monk household and the finances and social relationships of his novices. When used in a 
secular context it also means uncle or a respected senior.  
240 The religious ties between central Tibet and its cultural borderlands have been maintained mainly by 
these religious travels for study and pilgrimage. Travelogue (Tib: lam yig) has been a popular genre of 
writing among both religious and secular Tibetan scholars. A recent example in modern Tibetan history 
is the Amdo monk Gendun Chospel who traveled from Amdo to Lhasa, India and Sri Lanka and wrote 
his famous “Travelogue in India” (Tib: rgya dkar lam yig). 
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conventional monk life like most adult monks in the monastery—what Melvyn 
Goldstein termed “mass monasticism” (1998)—going to the routine monastic 
gathering everyday, fulfilling the monastic duties, becoming an Akhu by taking child 
monks as their novices, and trying to reach a reasonable position in the monastery. 
The aim of this traditional Tibetan ideology of mass monasticism, as Goldstein (1998) 
argued, is to keep as many monks in the monastery as possible no matter how 
imperfect they might be. Yet as the social context has been changing rapidly in China 
and in the world today, so have the visions and concerns of many Kirti monks. When 
it comes to the religious travels, the big monasteries in Lhasa and exiled monastic 
communities in India used to be the ideal, indeed only destinations for the young Kirti 
monks. During recent years, however, local monks have become increasingly aware of 
the Chinese restrictions on Tibetans’ mobility as well as the danger of border crossing 
because of the strict Chinese border surveillance.241  
While the majority of destinations for these graduation travels are the nearby 
important monasteries in Amdo or Lhasa, there has been a growing trend among the 
young monks today to turn their eyes to China. What attracts them in China are not 
just the traditional Buddhist pilgrimage sites such as the four Buddhist seats of Mount 
Wutai, Mount Emei, Mount Putuo, and Mount Jiuhua. Today the big modern cities 
such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, or Shenzhen have also become the major 
destinations for most young Kirti monks. As I found out in my fieldwork, although 
Chinese Buddhist pilgrimage sites have been well described in the traditional Tibetan 
                                                 
241 The new Chinese regulation requires every monk to have a “monk certificate” (Ch: heshang zheng) 
which is issued by the Religious Bureau in a local government that is politically responsible for the 
monastery he is from. It gives the monk an official identity and at the same time also tightening up the 
control of individual monks by keeping those not officially registered out of the monastery. Even 
though obtaining a passport has become a very fast and simple bureaucratic process today in most part 
of China, for many Tibetans monks it is still nearly impossible to get a passport through the official 
procedure. Thus most Tibetans who went across the Himalayas to India without a passport took the risk 
of being caught by the Chinese or the Nepalese border patrol, whether they were aware of this risk or 
not. 
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literature (such as the classic pilgrimage guide books), it is the increasing knowledge 
and curiosity on modern day China that has made these Buddhist pilgrimage sites in 
China more significant in their travel decisions.242 This knowledge and curiosity have 
grown less from the traditional Tibetan literature or pilgrimage guides than from the 
increasing Chinese presence in their everyday life, such as the growing Chinese 
consumer products (i.e. mobile phones) and the Chinese tourists that they encounter 
every day.243 Furthermore these trips often have a tremendous impact on the monks’ 
later living conditions, their social status as well as their views of many local affairs 
(i.e., monk school education) in the monastery. Thus choosing the travel destination 
between a traditional choice of India (Tib: rgya dkar, “white country”) and a modern 
alternative of China (Tib: rgya nag, “black country”) has become both a new 
challenge and a new opportunity for many young monks in the Kirti monastery.244
This chapter contextualizes some varied subjects—pilgrimage, mobile phone, 
and school—against the social political backdrop of reform and opening up of 
discourse in the contemporary Chinese nation-state. I intend to show that these three 
different subjects are better interpreted from a unitary perspective of a “social 
                                                 
242 Many different kinds of classical religious history in Tibetan literature (Tib: chos ’byung, lo rgyus, 
deb der, lam yig, etc.) have described Buddhist development in Tibet, India, China, and other adjacent 
regions. The important Buddhist sites mentioned in this literature have later become the popular 
pilgrimage sites recorded in the pilgrimage guidebook. 
243 See chapter 6 for more on discussion of mobile phone and Chinese tourists in Langmusi. 
244 The linguistic distinction between the descripiton of Tibet and China has been changed according to 
different context. An American friend who has been teaching English in China told me an incident in 
her class when they came across a topic related to Tibet. As she said naturally in English a Tibetan 
monk “coming to China from Lhasa”, her students were very quick to correct her. “But Tibet is part of 
China!” In a daily Tibetan conversation, the concept of China (rgya nag) can be easily conveyed as a 
separate spatial and cultural concept from either Tibet (bod) or India (rgya dkar). Once the conversation 
changes into Chinese, Tibetans use the word handi (lit. “Chinese land”) as an equivalent to rgya nag 
instead of the formal term zhongguo. However during the recently years with more Chinese tourists and 
media influences the common Chinese word neidi (lit. “inner land”) has replaced handi in many 
Tibetan conversations particularly in the young generation. While handi is a Tibetan linguistic 
invention as an antithesis of the Tibetan land, neidi is a Chinese linguistic invention which is used as an 
antithesis to all borderland areas in the nation. Therefore it self-evidently assumes a belonging—spatial 
and political—of both borderland (including Tibet) and neidi, though isolated, under the administration 
of one Chinese nation state. I will come back to the linguistic impact of the Chinese loan words like this 
later in this chapter.  
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imaginary”—a social imagination of the Chinese nation-state that has been projected 
through the changing politics of inclusion and exclusion and yet appears as if it were 
materialistically located. As Castoriadis (1987) explained, a “social imaginary” 
provides answers to those fundamental social questions which neither “reality” nor 
“rationality” can provide.245 In his thought-provoking ethnography Mueggler (2001: 5) 
further extended this concept as “the tangible ‘illusions’ of this magical state.” He 
argued that to approach the state in this “imaginary” way is to envision a state that “is 
not external to the fundamental concerns of daily life” but a “constitutive force at the 
heart of the social world.” Extending this insight, I treat these illusions and 
imaginaries as both art and technology. Here I particularly intend to highlight both 
aspects of this social imaginary through the material sites of pilgrimage journeys, 
mobile phones, monastic schools, public schools that have made those imaginations 
and illusions tangible. Moreover in the post-socialist Chinese context there is an 
intrinsic conflict between this social imaginary and its material sites. Thus to explore 
them and their conflicts is to navigate the reconstructed nationscape through a bottom 
up perspective that is at once imaginary and concrete.  
Besides being the materialistic sites of a social imaginary these different 
subjects also provide a unitary key to the understanding of the complex cultural and 
ethnic situation (including Tibetan, Hui, and others) in contemporary Chinese society. 
Arguing for the important role that lay Tibetan intellectuals have played in the 
formation of contemporary Tibetan identity in China, Janet Upton (1996: 121) 
reminded us that the polemic nature of an “authentic” Tibetan subject—both popular 
and academic—in the twentieth century has largely reduced the complex Tibetan 
situation into a simple opposition between “the Chinese government” and “the Tibetan 
                                                 
245 Cited in (Muggler 2001: 4). Every society has to answer those fundamental questions such as “who 
are we as a collectivity? What are we for one anther? Where and in what are we? What do we want; 
what do we desire; what are we lacking?” in order to defines its “identity”(Castoriadis 1987).   
135 
people.” This reduction of complexity ignores the real people and their everyday life 
that involves various mediation and negotiation in the contemporary Tibetan society in 
China. While my field research fully supports this argument it also shows that these 
mediating roles go well beyond the circle of Tibetan intellectuals. In this chapter I try 
to use a more personalized perspective, instead of a collective perspective of “Tibetan 
people” or “Tibetan intellectuals”, to show how these seemingly different subjects—
pilgrimage journeys, mobile phones, and schools—can be treated as the same kind of 
material site upon which, many different actors have played a mediating role by 
constructing and imagining a Chinese nation-state that is at once far away and tangible.  
I first tell the stories of a young monk’s pilgrimage experience in China, his 
decision to go to China and his recounting of that experience to his monk fellows 
afterwards. These stories illuminate the key point that modern Tibetan identity 
negotiation within a new context of post-reform China has a wide range of participants 
and ways of participation. In my case this negotiation has crossed multiple cultural 
and political boundaries in the name of universal Buddhism and modernity. I propose 
to understand the cultural and ethnic complexity in China through the changing 
politics of inclusion and exclusion and in the perspective of “unit of common 
participation” with a dynamic view of their borders or boundaries (Fortes 1938; 
Vasantkumar 2006).  
In a similar fashion the mobile phones—widely known with its Chinese name 
shouji—have greatly changed the way locals imagine the nation. Since its arrival in 
Taktsang Lhamo, shouji has become the new fashion and a symbol of modernity 
desired by many locals particularly Tibetan monks. At the same time the fast spread 
and wide acceptance of shouji in the monk community as both a universal symbol of 
modernity and a window to see the outside world have greatly changed the way these 
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monks imagine the Chinese state and Chinese people as well as a reflexive image of 
themselves.  
Lastly, I present two cases of education to show: 1) a Hui family’s 
determination to send their children to a Chinese school in the regional capital; and 2) 
Tibetan monastery head lama Alak Lobsang’s struggle to establish the Kirti monastery 
school. I argue that in these cases local actors have acted as political mediators and 
cultural brokers between Chinese authority and the local community. Historically 
these “cultural brokers” appeared variously as religious pilgrims, military warlords, 
nomad herders, and trading middlemen in the diverse ethnic groups living in 
northwestern China (Aris 1992; Nietupski 1999). Today these people, mostly rendered 
under the Chinese official category of ethnic minorities, have become more and more 
aware of their own “otherness” in an increasingly imaginable and seemingly tangible 
Chinese state. Furthermore they start to participate, willingly or not, in the 
construction of their own otherness in a Chinese nation-state. It is this reconstruction 
of difference that, paradoxically, has placed the newly constructed Tibetan identity—
and by the same token Hui or Han identity—as part of the new Chinese nation-
building context.  
 
5.1 Mapping a Buddhist World in the Nation 
Many monks in Kirti monastery told me that a student monk (Tib: dbe cha ba, 
lit. “The book one”) from the Philosophical College (Tib: mtshan nyid grwa tshang, or 
thos gsang gling, lit. “The hall of listening and thinking”) has more chance to find a 
teacher to follow nowadays since their knowledge is based mostly on books, at least 
before they enter the most advanced levels. But a student monk from the Tantric 
College (Tib: rgyud pa grwa tshang) or Kalachakra College (Tib: dus ’kor grwa 
tshang) has comparatively few choices since they passed on knowledge primarily 
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through oral tradition of their masters who have mostly passed away or are in exile. 
Therefore I was not surprised when Tashi, a novice monk from the Tantric College, 
expressed to me his desire to go to India. However I was very shocked by way that 
these ideas for extremely hard and dangerous journeys came out of the monks’ mouth 
as something rather exciting and doable—and, just by the way, you should avoid the 
Chinese army! Having been practiced for centuries in Tibet, these trans-Himalayan 
trips—without a Chinese passport and a visa—today involve the risk of life crossing 
the highest plateau in the world and also the severe punishment if caught by the 
Chinese border patrol. Even if they get out, if they want to come back afterwards, 
which many of them do today, they will also face intense investigation and a heavy 
fine, if not a more serious punishment, from the local police station at home.  
When talking about these exile trips with monks I found, to my surprise, that 
what comes up first and concerns them the most was not the presumable danger and 
hardship of crossing the Himalayas and an international border, but instead it was a 
general worry or fear of the “turn-back monk” (Tib: grwa log, or monk who 
renounced his monkhood) that has cast a shadow on this centuries-old Tibetan 
monastic practice today. Monk Darji said to me, “I don’t know why it is like this but 
once they [monks] go to India they tend to renounce monkhood very easily. Maybe 
it’s because India is too open.”246 It is a general belief among the monks that if a monk 
is exposed too much to an alien and presumably “open” world he tends to renounce his 
monkhood easily. Renouncing the monkhood has been considered the number one 
threat to the monastic community. As the foundation of the Gelugpa monastic system, 
the “mass monasticism” is based primarily on the life-long commitment of monkhood 
from the moment when the families send their children to the monastery. Goldstein is 
                                                 
246 Here he used the Chinese word kaifang for “open.” Many Tibetans in Taktsang Lhamo use Chinese 
loan words nowadays not only to be convenient but to express some new concepts that have been 
generated in a particular (Chinese) socio-political context.  
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right to argue that the traditional Tibetan ideology of mass monasticism has made 
quantity rather than quality of the monks the priority of the Gelugpa monastic system 
(Goldstein 1998: 15-17). Both the Tibetan monastic community and the lay society in 
general have been actively reinforcing this ideology by leaving little or no space for 
those who do not conform to this norm. As monk Dzoba explained, “We [monks] are 
different from you [lay people] because we have vows on our bodies. Only the bodies 
that have taken those vows can wear this monk robe (Tib: gzan). If a monk takes off 
his robe [renounces those vows] he becomes nothing, not even a layman. Because all 
that he has achieved so far in his life—his knowledge, his belief, his practice, and his 
body—becomes meaningless once he starts to do things only for ‘life’ (Tib: ’tsho ba, 
or material needs).” At that moment he mentioned a grwa log who has been running a 
teahouse in town since he came back from India and seemed to be doing quite well. 
But Dzoba was very quick to indicate: “he [grwa log] thought he is more clever than 
us because he has seen the big world (Ch: jianguo da shimian). But actually he is 
nothing: not a monk, not a layman, and not even a family member! You see, that’s 
why he can only stay here but can not go back to his hometown.” Indeed to be called 
grwa log is not only derogatory to the person himself, but it is also very awkward and 
shameful for his family among their fellow villagers. Tashi told me of similar incident 
that happened years ago in his own family. When his brother who was also a monk in 
his home monastery tried to flee to India, his family became very nervous and 
followed him all the way up to Lhasa. Finally they brought him back before he could 
arrange his escape.247  
While going to China is a comparatively less passionate subject for many 
young monk novices, there has also been a general consensus among the Kirti monks 
                                                 
247 More recently it was reported that in addition to the Chinese border patrol, Tibetan villagers along 
the Himalayan border have been preventing other Tibetans from crossing the border because they 
would be held responsible for that illegal border-crossing by the local government (Vasantkumar 2006). 
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that going to China is less threatening than going to India in terms of the risk of 
renouncing monkhood afterwards. The main reason offered was that China is 
allegedly less “open” and also less “alien” than India. When Tashi discussed his 
thoughts with me before his graduation, he said the most difficult thing he (and most 
other monks) could foresee in China was that he didn’t speak Chinese (Tib: skad mi 
shis ni nges nges dka’ ki). Although India is a foreign country, its large Tibetan exile 
communities in many places, particularly in those Buddhist pilgrimage sites that most 
Tibetans would go, have greatly reduced the cultural and linguistic barrier—at least 
the feeling of that barriers—for the newly arrived Tibetans. Nevertheless, in the eyes 
of many Kirti monks India is still unquestionably more alien than China.248 After his 
brother’s unsuccessful escape to India, Tashi’s family constantly called him back to 
his home monastery—a village that is less accessible than Taktsang Lhamo—fearing 
that he would be contaminated by the increasingly open environment of Taktsang 
Lhamo. Besides pressure from his family, Tashi confessed to me that his final decision 
to go to China had to do with his feeling that China is “not so far away” (Tib: thag mi 
ring gi). “After all,” he said, “India is a foreign country which we don’t know much 
about.” Comparing India with China he said jokingly “at least we know the money 
here.” Tashi also confessed that he had made the first Chinese friend in his life—me, 
and this had encouraged him to go to China. He insisted that it was the feeling of 
having a Chinese friend and the talks we had about China that made China sound a lot 
closer than before. 
                                                 
248 In a similar way Tibetans in exile would feel closer to their “unit of common participation,” which is 
India. After an old Tibetan monk in exile gave a talk (in Tibetan with a personal translator) in our 
anthropology class at Cornell he immediately spotted an Indian student in class and came up holding his 
hand even though they don’t have a language of communication. Later that Indian student described 
this encounter to me as “unbelievable, although we didn’t say anything I could definitely feel that it was 
like meeting someone close in a foreign country.” 
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Kirti monks like Tashi imagine China to be closer through their everyday 
contact with Chinese people, Chinese products, and other Chinese influences. This 
belief of the Kirti monks illuminates the analytical importance of what Meyer Fortes 
(1938) termed “unit of common participation.”249 Borrowing this concept in the study 
of diverse realities in colonial Africa, Christopher Vasantkumar (2006: 53) elaborated 
on this classic anthropological concept and suggested that one constructive way to 
address the cultural complexity of China is to focus on this unit of common 
participation rather than a presumptively shared culture. In support of this perspective, 
I further argue that in order to fully facilitate this analytical tool it has to be 
supplemented with two things: a contextualization of the multiple production process 
of those seemingly conflicting practices and desires, and a close look at the constant 
re-making and re-imagining of the boundary itself. Without a dynamic view of this 
“unit of common participation” this promising framework could still be a niche of 
essentialism with a critical appearance.  
In the groundbreaking volume of collected works on the religious revival in 
contemporary Tibet, Goldstein and Kapstein (1998: ix) have pioneered this field by 
attempting to explore and explain contemporary Tibet in China as a “unity of 
opposites.” Goldstein has described this Tibetan monastic revival in the 1980s as “a 
delicate, and not entirely conscious, process of adaptation” to the post-Cultural 
Revolution China. Because of a lack of a close focus on the production process of 
those conflicting unitary practices, however, this exploration of “unity of opposites”—
which Goldstein calls a “social matrix,” stays on a dualistic level of “sociopolitically 
compatible with the current socialist society yet culturally authentic.” Kapstein termed 
                                                 
249 Cited in (Vasantkumar 2006: 53), Meyer Fortes writes, “to study culture contact as a dynamic 
process, the anthropologist must work with communities rather than customs. His unit of observation 
must be a unit of life and not of custom—a village, a town, a settlement, a unit of common participation 
in the everyday political, economic and social life” (Fortes 1938). 
141 
this dualistic unity “a dimorphism of values” in which the Tibetan sentiment is 
reduced to a public (or fake) appearance adjusting to the official guideline while 
masking an authentic heart of Tibetanness inside (Kapstein 1998: 143-144). The 
uncritical assumption of culture and the thereby searching for the authenticity based 
on this assumption presuppose the analytical dichotomies by drawing an unreflexive 
boundary between “the Chinese government” and “the Tibetan people”, between the 
ritual context and rational sociopolitical context, between the “pre-modern” Tibet and 
the post-1950s Tibet.250  
In his critique of the Bourdieuian notion of practice-oriented analysis, Sangren 
(2000) suggested that human motives and desires are not to be reduced to “interests” 
in any direct fashion. The complexities of desires necessarily complicate practice 
theory by encompassing “the production of resistances internal to the social 
production and reproduction.” For example, contrary to the conventional 
understanding of Chinese patriliny which often excludes role of women from the 
production of a patrilineal society, Sangren (2000: 7) argues that “women are the most 
important producers of family institutions in ways that it would be difficult to construe 
in terms of any ‘interest’ they might possess in reproducing ‘the system’ as a whole.” 
By the same token, much scholarship on contemporary Chinese ethnic minorities 
argues that, despite their marginalized position, ethnic minorities have nevertheless 
played an important role in the modern Chinese nation-state building process.251  
Monk Tashi’s final decision of traveling to China was the result of many 
conflicting motives that have come from his family, the monastic community as well 
                                                 
250 For a critical analysis on culture and its application in Chinese/Tibetan context, see the introduction 
of (Kolås and Thowsen 2005).  
251 See for example Gray Tuttle (2005) on the important yet often invisible contribution from Tibetan 
Buddhism and the Tibetan Buddhist practitioners in the process of the making of modern China; or Dru 
Gladney (1991) on Hui ethno-religious revival that has integrated Hui as one ethnic minority group in 
the Chinese nation state.  
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as from the sociopolitical environment of contemporary China. More importantly it 
has come from a complex desire of his own that is closely related to these conflicting 
social motives. I treat Tashi’s decision to go to China as the result of a social 
production process through the “unit of common participation” of which he himself is 
a part. The young monks’ selection process of choosing between India and China as 
pilgrimage destination is also a matching—and by the same token, mismatching—
process between a Buddhist cosmology of the world and a social imaginary of the 
nation. It is a Tibetan monk’s mapping of a Buddhist world in the contemporary 
Chinese nation. During this process many geographical and ideological boundaries 
(i.e., Tibet, China, India, or Buddhist vs. non-Buddhist, close vs. far) have been 
reconstructed, negotiated, and ultimately integrated in such seemingly static yet 
dynamic notions as China, Chinese, Tibet, and Tibetan.  
 
5.2 All Hui Under the Sky Are One Family 
Compared to Tibetans, the official ethnic category of Hui is more fluid in 
nature. When the CCP leaders launched the ethnic identification (Ch: minzu shibie) 
campaign in the 1950s, Hui was probably one of the most problematic minzu because 
it contradicted Stalin’s four characteristics of nationalities—common language, 
territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture. 
The CCP used these criteria as the principal guidelines to identify the complex ethnic 
groups in China. Many scholars have pointed out the productive nature of the official 
creation of the Hui by the state government as one of the 56 ethnic categories in 
China.252 The name itself has since taken on a life of its own as a social label. 
However, despite the common sense that Hui is essentially different from Han Chinese 
                                                 
252 See, for example, (Gladney 1991; Kaup 2000; Tapp 2002), also “China Information” July 2004 
vol.XVIII No. 2, Special issue on ethnic classification. 
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only in their Islamic belief, it is still impossible, as Jonathan Lipman (2004) argues, to 
see Hui as members of “any other Muslim ‘culture’ in which Islam is a ‘natural’ 
component of identity.” In other words, Hui in China is not a religious-based identity 
even though Islam is certainly an integral part of Hui identity. When studying a 
contemporary Hui community in northwest China, Gladney (1991) used the term 
“ethnoreligious resurgence” to depict Hui as an ethnic category that has been 
revitalized with an inseparable reference to Islam since the 1980s. He concluded that 
this ethnoreligious identity of Hui is a result of constant dialogue or negotiation 
between the local/self desire of Hui and the Chinese state policy (Gladney 2004).  
Today most Hui in China take pride in being a member of this government-
constructed ethnic category in spite of the enormous diversities—geographical region, 
life style, language, even religious affiliations—under the universal category of Huizu 
(or Hui nationality). Many Hui I have talked to particularly like to emphasize the 
fraternal relationship within a nationally imagined Hui community based on shared 
Islamic belief—typically phrased as tianxia huihui shi yijia, or “all Hui under the sky 
are one family.” The Chinese term tianxia, or “under the sky”, depicts a vaguely 
bounded concept of empire in the classical Chinese world.253 The change from the 
Chinese empire to the modern Chinese nation state altered the context of tianxia. For 
many people, including Hui in this case, the subject of tianxia was simply changed 
from the Chinese empire to the modern Chinese nation. While the very notion of Hui 
is undoubtedly situated in the Chinese context, the Hui-Hui relation has often been 
depicted as an “internal” or family relationship—in contrast to the Hui and non-Hui 
(i.e. Han or Tibetan) relation as an “external” one. Zhang, a Hui business owner in 
Langmusi, recounted how his family had passed the hard time during the Cultural 
Revolution.   
                                                 
253 I thank Magnus Fiskesjo for pointing this out to me. 
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My family has been doing business (Ch: zuo shengyi) for many 
generations in Langmusi. During the Cultural Revolution doing business 
was forbidden. We had no other source of subsistence. So my family 
decided to move to Henan [in central China] where we had some 
acquaintances (Ch: shuren) in a local Hui community. They were not even 
our relatives. But once we say Seliam254 everyone [Hui] there helped us 
just like family. If it were not because of this help we could never survive 
those years. We moved back to Langmusi until the [government] policy 
changed. It is really true that tianxia huihui shi yijia [all Hui under the sky 
are one family]. 
 
This kind of common narrative from Hui has often created a general atmosphere—for 
both the listeners and narrators themselves as well—that Hui are separable, or at least 
detachable, from the rest of the Han Chinese society. As Zhang continued, not only 
did this Hui membership help his family survive hard times in the Cultural Revolution, 
it also remains a vital identity to access the revived Hui social and business network 
today that has spread all over the nation. Many local businesses in Langmusi, he 
explained, such as collecting raw materials (i.e., wool, meat) from Tibetan nomads 
then transporting them to the main Chinese market, or bringing industrial goods from 
the Chinese market targeting mostly Tibetan customers, have long been dominated by 
the local Hui businessmen.255  
 
It very difficult for outsiders [non-Hui people] to jump into these 
businesses because we have had a long relationship with Tibetans. [It is 
said that] Tibetans recognize only one tent. That means it takes some time 
to gain trust from those nomad Tibetans. But once they trust you they will 
go to no one else except you, from father to son and to grandson. Now we 
have a market economy. If Tibetans want to sell their goods to us or buy 
things from us, even the government can not say anything. We have our 
                                                 
254 Short for Seliamaiti, (Ar: lit. “peace be to you”), a common Muslim greeting. (Gladney 1991: 412) 
255 James Millward researched the Hui wool traders in Northwestern China during the late Qing and 
early Chinese Republican period. The wool typically came from Tibetan nomads on the Sino-Tibetan 
borderland regions and went to the big cities in China (Millward n.d.). 
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Hui [social/business] network everywhere in the country (Ch: quanguo 
daochu douyou women huizu). No one can compete with us here.   
 
5.3 Tibetan Monks’ Pilgrimage to China  
When talking about their pilgrimage experience in China, Tashi’s favorite 
subject is always the hardship and the awkward moments they experienced during 
their three-month adventure. The initial idea of going to China made them both 
excited and afraid since it was the first time for Tashi and his two novice monk 
fellows, Chosphel and Senge, to go to China, and only Tashi spoke a little Chinese at 
that time. “We had very little money with us on that trip,” Tashi recalled, “so we 
bought the cheapest hard seat (Ch: yingzuo) ticket in the train. We even brought 
tsampa and butter with us to save money on the way.” Still, the three young monks 
went with the ambition of visiting four most famous Buddhist Mountains in China—
Wutai, Putuo, Jiuhua, Emei—which constitutes a trip around China with a total 
distance of more than seven thousand kilometers. Having a limited time and budget, 
the three monks chose the most affordable and most popular transportation in China—
the train.  
Once out of the familiar Tibetan atmosphere the first thing they noticed was 
that wherever they went their appearance always drew a lot of attention. Sometimes 
this attention was simply curiosity as everyone was looking at them and saying to each 
other, “Look! lamas from Tibet (Ch: kan, xizang lai de lama).” But sometimes it made 
the three young monks feel rather surprised, or even embarrassed. The first 
embarrassment Tashi said was on the train they took to Mount Wutai. 
 
We had prepared to stay up on the train during the two-day trip since we 
only bought hard seat ticket. Once we were in the train people in that 
wagon started to complain the yak butter smell from our body [clothes]. 
We felt very embarrassed but we could do nothing. At the time for eating 
Chospel opened the bag of tsampa and butter. Suddenly everyone around 
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us ran away to the other side of the wagon—they couldn’t stand the smell! 
So we ended up having the whole bench that we could even sleep on. 
 
After the three monks arrived in a Chinese city they found that their embarrassment in 
the train was still with them. “Every time we registered at the cheap hostel (Ch: 
zhaodaisuo) they always put us separately from the rest of the [Chinese] customers—
separate room, separate floor, even separate hot-water thermos” Tashi said, “because 
they felt we are smelly and dirty as we are Tibetans.” Much to their chagrin and 
embarrassment the three Tibetan monks simultaneously felt somewhat satisfied even 
proud in the painful awareness and recognition of their otherness.256  
It was not long after that Tashi and his friends found out that their otherness 
was not all negative. Indeed they sometimes found themselves in a surprisingly 
empowered position once they were in the booming Buddhist atmosphere such as at 
Mount Wutai. Many Chinese Buddhists called them shifu or dashi (master or great 
master). They respected the Tibetan monks like reincarnation lamas even though they 
scarely knew who these monks were or what Tibetan Buddhism was.257  
 
Wutai Shan [Mount Wutai] is a great place. We stayed in the Tibetan 
monasteries there and didn’t have to deal with the hostels. There were so 
many [Chinese] Buddhists believers. [When they saw us] they also said, 
‘Look! lamas from Tibet.’ But they respected us because we are monks. It 
was just they can’t tell the difference between a lama and a monk. 
 
                                                 
256 After this trip to China Tashi has started to change his diet—cutting back on meat and butter while 
increasing vegetables—in order to avoid the strong body smell that embarrassed him. See chapter 7 for 
further discussion on the subject of food and ethnicity.  
257 Chinese Buddhists following the Tibetan Buddhist tradition is not at all a new phenomenon. For a 
historical study on this subject in the Chinese Republican era (1911-1949), see (Tuttle 2005). Oversea 
Chinese following Tibetan Buddhist teachers including Taiwanese followers of Tibetan Buddhism, a 
new trend after the Communist Party came to power in the mainland and particularly after the exile of 
the Dalai Lama in 1959 (Zablocki 2005). With the reform and opening-up in China since the 1980s 
Tibetan Buddhist revival has also attracted large number of Chinese Buddhist followers (Germano 
1998). 
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Being a simple monk in a Tibetan monastery, Tashi initially felt very uneasy 
with the way those Chinese Buddhists respected them. After some time he felt 
somehow relieved, as he gradually discovered the transcendental power of a universal 
Buddhism. “We [Tibetan and Chinese Buddhists] all believe in Buddhism,” Tashi 
explained, “That’s the most important. Before I always thought of them as Han 
Chinese [first and then Buddhist]. But now I see them first as Buddhists. They become 
not too much different from us.” Tashi’s first encounter with Cheng—a young Chinese 
Buddhist about his age who has later become his disciple and lay patron—is a good 
example of this Buddhist transcendence. They met the day after Tashi arrived at 
Mount Wutai when they were both doing circumambulation. Tashi noticed this 
Chinese young man because he was performing the traditional Tibetan practice. A 
dedicated Buddhist believer, Cheng works in a government office in Xi’an, a large city 
in northwest China, and comes to Mount Wutai once or twice a year for religious 
activities. He offers incense (Ch: jinxiang) to the numerous Buddhist temples and 
monasteries, both Chinese and Tibetan. They quickly got on very well though they had 
to manage to communicate through Tashi’s very limited Chinese vocabulary.  
Even after several years I was still curious how Cheng could get on with Tashi, 
even became his disciple, without a functional communicating language. He was 
rather surprised by my curiosity and answered “but we are all Buddhists.” For Cheng 
it goes without saying that given his life-long belief in Buddhism and particularly his 
fascination with Tibetan Buddhism, the language barrier between them could nearly 
be ignored in their Buddhism-based relationship. “The most important thing [as a lay 
Buddhist] is you find a real master and obey him completely,” Cheng explained to me 
when I visited him once in Xi’an. “Most people in China today feel lost in front of 
money, power, and a fast changing society. I have felt my foot on the ground (Ch: 
tashi) since I found master Tashi.” From the beginning Cheng showed his 
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determination to follow Tashi as his lay disciple and patron. He called Tashi master 
(Ch: shifu) and insisted on prostrating (Ch: ketou or Tib: phyag ’tshal) himself before 
Tashi, in order to show the highest level of respect.  
Coming out of the monastery for the first time at the end of a novice monk life 
was already quite new for Tashi. The idea of taking on a disciple himself, particularly 
a Chinese one, was somewhat challenging. “Taking on a [Chinese] disciple is different 
from having a [Chinese] friend,” Tashi said, “They bow to me and want to ask me a 
lot of questions. But my Chinese is too poor to explain those questions [in Chinese].” 
Although Tashi felt embarrassed with his poor Chinese in front of his Chinese 
disciples, he soon realized that his Chinese students did not take the actual answer too 
seriously. In fact it was more important that he was there to “receive” rather than to 
“give.” Even though he could not actually answer those questions as he wanted, the 
fact that he tried to explain with his limited Chinese, and maybe merely his being there, 
had already satisfied his Chinese disciples.  
After Mount Wutai, Tashi and his two friends visited Mount Putuo and Mount 
Jiuhua in eastern China as pilgrims and finally arrived at Mount Emei in Sichuan, the 
last stop of their journey. After nearly three months of travel three young monks were 
both physically and economically exhausted at the end of their trip. As they ran out of 
money Tashi and his friends tried to stay in the Buddhist temple in Mount Emei. But 
the temple authority refused since they didn’t have the state issued monk certificate 
(Ch: heshang zheng). Most Chinese monks are very familiar with this certificate that 
usually allows them to be welcomed and accommodated for free in most Buddhist 
monasteries or temples nationwide (Ch: guadan). However for many Tibetan monks 
the idea that a monk needs a state issued ID to prove his monk identity is still quite 
strange. For several days, Tashi said, they ate only once a day and slept outside at 
night and would not give up their desire to visit the last destination of Mount Emei. 
149 
The plight of three maroon-robed Tibetan monks soon attracted attention from some 
Chinese Buddhist pilgrims at this popular pilgrimage site. Many of them were 
sympathetic with their situation and tried to help them by giving them some food, or a 
little money. Finally a pilgrim group of middle-aged Chinese women from Sichuan 
decided to take care of all the expanses of the three monks since they were on the 
same pilgrim route to the top of Mount Emei. The Chinese pilgrim group got on so 
well with the three Tibetan monks that later they even invited them to their hometown 
Mianzhu in Sichuan. Once again the three young monks were treated as well-respected 
lamas there. Unlike Cheng, these women were not looking to find a teacher to ask 
questions. “They were just very devoted Buddhist layperson (Ch: jushi),” Tashi said, 
“and wanted to be patrons to us (Ch: gei women bushi).” At the end of their stay, Dr 
Wang, a member of this pilgrim group and a major patron, asked Tashi if he could do 
something for her son who failed the national college entrance exam (Ch: gaokao) the 
year before. She asked Tashi to help him as he was trying to take it again this year. 
With some unwillingness, Tashi told her the magical power of Bazal and said if you 
feed him enough he can do everything. Dr Wang was very happy and gave Tashi 1000 
yuan to offer Bazal on her behalf when they went back to Taktsang Lhamo. 
Although Bazal is a widely respected powerful deity in the Kirti monastery, 
many Kirti monks, including Tashi, still believe that those who pray there are just 
looking for material—thus lower—needs.258 Until he came back from China with Dr 
Wang’s entrustment and money, Tashi had never felt obliged to feed Bazal. When I 
returned to Taktsang Lhamo in 2003, Tashi told me secretly that his offer to Bazal 
actually worked. Dr. Wang called Tashi and told him the good news that his son 
eventually passed the exam after praying to Bazal. Although it was not at all a surprise 
to Tashi he did not seem to be all happy with it either. As Dr. Wang was so happy to 
                                                 
258 See more on Bazal in the previous chapter 5. 
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find a new source of magical power, through the medium of Tashi, she quickly spread 
the word to everyone around her. Since then Tashi received so many requests to pray 
to Bazal that he felt very burdened.  
 
5.4 Universal Buddhism and Social Imagination of the Nation 
Although Buddhism in theory originated as a universal truth that applies to all 
human societies, in practice it has been transformed into many varieties as it spread 
over many parts of Asia over centuries. To talk about Buddhism on the practical level 
is to look at a particular genre of Buddhism in its particular social political context. 
The birth of modern nation state in Asia has added more complexity on the various 
localized Buddhist traditions and societies with a universal ideal in origin. Thus the 
modern practice of Buddhism is a delicate balance between a Buddhist ideal that 
transcends race, ethnicity, and nation on the one hand, and growing nation-building 
influence that put a national vision on the local landscape—a nationscape—on the 
other. Tibetan Buddhism in this sense is no exception.  
After the trip to China Tashi has learned to talk about Buddhism in a universal 
context often associated with the concept of modernity. It is especially notable that 
Buddhism in this way has been not only detached from such specific contexts as 
nation and ethnicity but it was also privileged over them. To talk about a universal 
Buddhism like this reconstructs an alternative landscape to the nationscape. It 
navigates across the ethnic boundaries set up by the state as well as the religious 
boundaries that traditionally separate the different sects under the unified name of 
Buddhism. This is in fact not new in the modern Chinese and Tibetan history. Gray 
Tuttle (2005: 68) has indicated that the development of Buddhism as a Pan-Asian 
religion began its influence in modern China at the beginning of the 20th century. 
Some Chinese and Tibetan Buddhist monks at that time adopted the idea of a universal 
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Buddhism which was an important force to incorporate Tibet in the modern Chinese 
nation building process. Tuttle argued that Buddhism in this case in fact laid the 
crucial ideological foundation for Chinese—both Republican and later Communist—
political imagination of Tibet against the backdrop of the modern emergence of 
Chinese nation state and Chinese nationalism.  
The revival of Tibetan religious practice since the 1980s has also brought back 
the idea of universal Buddhism. While adapting to the new post-socialist context, this 
universal ideal of Buddhism has constructed an alternative landscape with its 
transcendental power that surpasses the ethnic, linguistic, even national boundaries. At 
the same time it does not necessarily challenge the authority of nationscape, which the 
nation-state has actively constructed and imposed on its national territory. 
While some Tibetan monks have embraced a universal Buddhism that 
transcends ethnic and national boundaries, Hui clearly emphasize their nationally 
bounded ethnicity which is still based on a transnational notion of Islam. The adoption 
of the government-constructed category of Hui serves as an immediate reference to a 
collective social imaginary of the Chinese nation. This national imaginary based on a 
transnational belief reinforces both the insider and the outsider status of Hui in the 
Chinese nation.  
In both cases, a unified Hui community based on a transnational Islamic belief 
inside the Chinese national boundary and the Tibetan empowerment of universal 
Buddhism, the local imagination of the nation is closely related to the post-reform 
Chinese social political context. Moreover this localization of the social imaginary 
complicates the whole scenario of the nation by constructing new material sites that 
hold the social imaginary of nation as if it were materialistically located. To imagine a 
nation like this, borrowing Erik Mueggler’s word, is “to find it to be at once remote 
and intimate, at once alien and familiar.” The materialization of the local imagination 
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of the nation is examplified through the introduction of mobile phone (or shouji) in 
Taktsang Lhamo. 
 
5.5 Shouji Fever, Shouji Scam and the Imagination of the Nation 
Modern infrastructure such as electricity, landline phones, and more recently 
mobile phones—or shouji, as it is referred to locally—have been a recent yet rapidly 
growing phenomenon in Taktsang Lhamo. With the introduction of regular electricity 
in 2001 locals have finally retired the hydropower station which had for decades 
provided the town and monastery four-hour low-voltage power every night. Landline 
phones arrived almost at the same time with the electricity. However there was not 
even enough time for the landline phonse to appear in the homes of local families 
before China Mobile—the biggest mobile phone company in China—had already 
covered this region as part of its national network and later set up a mobile phone shop 
in town. Since then, the mobile phone has reached an unprecedented popularity in 
Langmusi, particularly among the monks.259 This shouji fever among the monks 
comes first from the possibility of owning a shouji. Traditionally the monastic 
authority depends on two things to prevent the monks from accessing what they 
should not possess. One is the monastic discipline and the other is the access that the 
monks have to outside resources. Since the 1980s new things arrived in monks’ 
everyday lives at an accelerating pace. But monastic authority has been slow to react 
to all of them leaving many ambivalent areas in the monastic discipline.260 Moreover, 
                                                 
259 The mobile phone explosion in Langmusi is part of the booming phenomenon in China since the 
beginning of the 1990s. According to the official Chinese data (www.mii.gov.cn) the number of mobile 
phone users in China grew from 20,000 in 1990 to 3.4 million after five years and 350 million in 2005 
(Latham, et al. 2006). 
260 For example, TV is clearly forbidden in the monk houses by the monastic authority. But some 
monks who can afford more expensive portable DVD player or game player still watch movies or play 
games at home since the monastery did not explicitly forbid those things since they were not affordable 
for most monks. More recently computers have entered some monks’ houses as the monastery has not 
set up any rule on that either. 
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the new social-political context in post-1980s China also created more possibilities 
beyond the traditional Tibetan monk-patron relationship.  
Dinner time, when monks gather, is the most popular time to share the latest 
news. In this context, the shouji became the most popular discussion topic and object 
to pass around to everyone with the owner proudly showing each fancy function. If a 
call came in just when the shouji was in circulation, the owner would start to talk right 
in front everyone who would then listen quietly as if this was part of the show. Many 
times on these occasions I noticed that the most common question asked was if this 
shouji was the same as those sold in big Chinese cities. As more and more Chinese 
consumer products have been brought from Chinese production centers to the remote 
borderland, like Taktsang Lhamo, most of these products are cheap and of low quality. 
With rapid development in the coastal and urban areas in China, a developmental 
hierarchy—between urban and remote areas, between east coast and west hinterland—
has been created through both a Chinese official government discourse (i.e. GDOW) 
and a hierarchy of consumption.261 It is widely assumed that Chinese products sold in 
the remote hinterland are usually of low quality or counterfeits that do not sell well, if 
at all, in the more developed urban areas. By constructing this consumer hierarchy, it 
produces a social desire from both ways. On the one hand, it actively encourages those 
“undeveloped” areas and “backward” people to catch up with their more progressive 
compatriots through the material standard of consumption. It also creates an 
opportunity for those who are on the apex of this consumer hierarchy, i.e. Han and 
Urban Chinese, to taste their progressiveness through their unfortunate neighbors.262 
The production of this social desire ultimately promotes the integration of this remote 
borderland into the national market, and hence the nation.  
                                                 
261 See next chapter 7 for more on consumption. 
262 The most prominent example is the official “Helping Tibet” (Ch: yuanzang) project.  
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Desire, as Sangren (2000: 7) argued, is not only individually but also socially 
produced. This socially produced desire is often more complicated, even contradictory, 
than it seems to be as it reflects the “the production of resistances internal to the 
processes of social production and reproduction.” Furthermore, the result of the social 
production of desire is not the end of it. The monks’ desire for a high-end consumer 
product, such as shouji, along with their anxiety about its quality, results in a constant 
imagination and re-imagination of the state by both conforming with and confronting 
the consuming hierarchy that the national market has brought in. For a certain time 
Tashi had been very keen on comparing his shouji with those of incoming Chinese 
tourists—until finally he was content to find that his shouji was in fact as good as or 
even better than theirs.  
This social imagination of the Chinese nation through the spread of mobile 
phones is both concrete and imaginary. It has also been reworked and integrated into 
the local Tibetan hierarchy. For most monks these days, having a mobile phone is not 
only to flash a symbol of the modern, but it is also a new form of social status and 
social grouping aside from the traditional ranks and monk households. Since Tashi got 
a shouji he spent considerably less time in his house. His novice monk Sangwu told 
me that “he no longer needs to be home (Tib: yul la stod mi dgos)” since people can 
reach him everywhere and anytime. In the Amdo monastic tradition monks live in the 
monastery in individual households in which the young novice monks (Tib: grwa ba) 
take care of all the domestic housework (mostly cooking, cleaning, taking care of his 
Akhu’s life) whereas their Akhu (or master) is responsible for the house financially. 
Since Tashi had his shouji Sangwu had visited my place more often than before. He 
had much more free time because of Tashi’s usual absence at home. One day Sangwu 
started to tell me how frustrated he was because many of his friends (young novice 
monks) already had a mobile phone and he did not have one yet.  
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More and more friends of mine have a shouji or xiaolingtong (cheap local 
mobile phone, hereafter XLT).263 Of course they can still call me at home 
[through a landline] or just come and find me. Langmusi is so small. But 
now everyone wants to play with his shouji or XLT. So they just call first 
whoever has shouji or XLT. If I don’t have one they will contact me less. I 
also feel embarrassed [for not having one].  
 
He finally concluded that “nowadays it is impossible not to have a mobile phone (Tib: 
da shouji med na mi ba gi)!”  
There was a time when “Chinese lovers” (Tib: rgya dga’ ma) had been a 
popular term among the monks to tease those who could speak Chinese or who were 
good at dealing with the Chinese authorities. With the booming popularity of the 
shouji in the monastery more and more monks in the monastery started to carry a 
shouji in their daily life. The primary use of SMS (text message through mobile phone) 
and many other fancy functions, which are all in Chinese, have made the lack of 
Chinese language ability more salient for the Tibetan users. Suddenly those “Chinese 
lovers” have become the new stars in the monastic community. The use of the term 
itself has also silently diminished in daily conversation because of its derogatory 
implication. This change of relations in the monk community has a tremendous impact 
on both the traditional hierarchical monastic authorities as well as the collective 
imagination of the Chinese nation state. Later a real incident from a cell phone 
message really triggered the monastery-wide debate on Chinese and China.  
It started when many monks began to receive SMS messages on their shouji, 
many of which are advertisements of lottery winners or other similar kinds of fraud. 
                                                 
263 Not long after the initiation of mobile phone in Taktsang Lhamo China Mobile introduced a cheaper 
alternative to the relatively expensive mobile phone, with local reach and limited functions. Locals 
make the distinction between the two mobile phones through their Chinese names: shouji, the more 
expensive nationwide mobile phone versus xiaolingtong (XLT), the cheap alternative local mobile 
phone. 
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For a time I received as many as three groups of monk everyday in my place who all 
came to ask about those winning messages. Tashi told me he had also been 
approached by many monks with these messages because of his Chinese experience. 
But no matter how he explained those messages are not real, many monks were still 
not totally convinced. One morning Chosphel and several friends came to me with his 
shouji and a message of winning the third prize of a sweepstake worth of 50,000 yuan. 
I soon understood that they had already got the messages translated before they came 
to me. When I told them they were false (Tib: rdzu ma) all of them seemed to be 
confused. “(If they are false) why did they send this to me?” Chosphel asked. I tried to 
explain that everyone receives this kind of fishing message. This is just a common 
scam to cheat people for money—something that many people in China are already 
used to. When you respond to this message you will be asked to deposit a certain 
amount of money into their account in order to receive your award. If you do it they 
will immediately disappear with your money. The monks listened to my story with 
amazement but still were not convinced until they made me swear in the name of the 
monastery (Tib: dgong ba).264
The monks’ confusion about this shouji scam didn’t last for long since many 
started to realize they were receiving exactly the same winning message. Nevertheless 
it created a long lasting topic at the monks’ dinner table and during their leisure 
gathering times. The various discussions around the shouji scam, along with more 
SMS information coming into the monastic community everyday, have subjectively 
recreated an imaginary Chinese state and Han Chinese as an alien other that they 
nevertheless have to live in or live with. 
 
                                                 
264 The local Amdo dialect of swearing on monastery (Tib: dgon ba), especially popular among the 
monks, is the highest level of colloquial swearing, something equivalent to the Lhasa dialect of 
swearing in the name of the Three Treasures (Tib: dkon mchog gsum). 
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Conversation A: 
 
Monks: “Do they [the scammers] also send these [same] messages to Han 
Chinese?” 
 
Me: “Yes, of course.” 
 
Monks: “So everyone receives these false messages (Ch/Tib: xinxi rdzu 
ma) on their shouji everyday?” 
 
Me: “Yes, it is kind of like that everywhere in China.” 
 
Monks: “Are there a lot of Han Chinese doing this [cheating]?” 
 
Me: “If you count absolute numbers, yes. But in term of percentage, they 
are still a minority.” 
 
Monks: “Doesn’t the state government do something [about it]?” 
 
Me: “They don’t have the man-power and money to control everything.” 
 
Monks: “But they have the man power and money to control the 
monastery [referring to the police station set up outside the monastery]. 
They don’t care if these Han Chinese cheaters [are cheating on Tibetans] 
but if we [Tibetan] say a word [that is not politically correct] they will 
arrest us.” 
 
Conversation B: 
 
Monk A: “Many Han people are Buddhists, aren’t they? I have seen so 
many [Han Chinese] pilgrims in the Buddhist mountain seats [in China].” 
 
Monk B: “Those [Han Chinese] from the city only care about money. 
That’s why they have so many material worries that they have to believe 
in Buddhism [to relieve those worries].” 
 
Monk C: “If they believe in Buddhism and do those [cheating] things at 
the same time, what’s use of believing in Buddhism in the first place?” 
 
Monk D: “But Chinese are different from us. Many things [Chinese] are 
very strange. Like the jushi (Chinese lay Buddhist home practitioners), 
they are neither lay people [because they take vows] nor monks [because 
they still lead a normal lay people’s life]. Why? Those Nyingmawa [Red 
Sect Tibetan Buddhist] are still monks even if they have wives and 
children.” 
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Monk A: “I received an advertisement on SMS that sells electronic 
prayers. They said you would save your praying time by letting this 
electronic prayers doing it automatically for you. That was very strange.” 
 
Monk C: “You pay for the electricity of the prayer so maybe that can still 
be counted [as you praying].”     
 
Social imagination is not only poetic but also has a material dimension—a site 
on which people both create and are created. The imaginary Chinese state and Chinese 
people through the spread of shouji has both created a collective Tibetan ethnicity 
opposing the Chinese other while paradoxically incorporating their marginalized 
position into the Chinese state. The creation of ethnic difference and ultimate 
incorporation into the Chinese nation building—namely the national economic 
integration of the minority areas—have been actively advanced with the coming of 
Chinese tourism in this ethnic borderland.265 Moreover there is an intrinsic conflict 
between the social imagination and its materialistic sites. On the one hand, having a 
shouji has put Tibetan monks on the same imaginary line of the modernity as everyone 
else in China—thus subsuming everyone into the same unified discourse of the state. 
On the other hand, having a shouji also increasingly makes them aware of their 
otherness and their marginalized position in a Chinese nation. In this way these 
materialistic sites not only hold the social imaginaries but they also serve to constantly 
create and recreate them.  
 
5.6 A State Run Monastic School, Monks without Robes, and Identity Negotiation 
Studies on Tibetan education, both in China and in the West, have long been 
rooted in the textual and historical orientation mostly related to monastic education.266 
                                                 
265 See chapter 6. 
266 For Chinese language sources see (Li 1989; Li and Yu 2002); for Tibetan language publications see 
(Dun-dkar-blo-bzang-'phrin-las 1981); for English see (Dreyfus 2003); 
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Secular Tibetan education in PRC has rarely been studied ethnographically—with 
some notable recent exceptions such as (Upton 1999) and (Goldstein 1998). Even less 
attention has been paid to the secular or social political influence on the Tibetan 
monastic education revival in the post-reform PRC as well as the Tibetan negotiation 
with it. Not only have these secular or socio-political influences largely confined and 
altered the traditional Tibetan monastic educational ideal, but local Tibetans have 
played different roles of negotiation in this revival process by actively imagining and 
confronting the Chinese state in different ways. As an important part of the Tibetan 
monastic revival in Taktsang Lhamo, the revival of the monastic education system was 
initiated by the construction of Kirti monastic school in 1993. The development of the 
Kirti monastic school is a good example of the revival of monastic education within 
the current social political system. Indeed it has created a frontline site of negotiation 
between monastic revival and the Chinese government effort to incorporate it into the 
new nation-state system. I shall show in this case that, in addition to the Tibetan elite 
(i.e., intellectuals), participants in the building of the monastic school, including the 
school founder Alak Longzang, the monk teachers, and more than 400 students, have 
all played the role of negotiators through their everyday practice while adjusting 
themselves and their school to a Chinese system that is both imaginary and real.  
When Alak Longzang founded the monastic primary school as part of the Kirti 
monastery system in 1993 he had to rely mostly on voluntary labor and contributions 
from the Tibetan public.267 The school was established in the traditional Tibetan way 
to educate exclusively boys aged from four to fourteen who were recruited or sent 
voluntarily by their parents as child monks to the monastery. The teachers were all 
Kirti monks, assigned by the Alak Lobsang, to teach Tibetan language and elementary 
Buddhist texts as full-time studies. These boys graduate after four to five years of 
                                                 
267 This school was officially closed by the government as a result of the 2008 riots in Tibetan regions.  
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study, and at that time they are ready to enter different colleges of the monastery. The 
school has been tuition-free to all from the beginning. Monk teachers received 75 yuan 
($11) salary from the monastery. As most boys were sent as child monks to the Kirti 
monastery they either had a monk relative to live with or their family would arrange 
for them to live in different monk households. In either case the parents only need to 
bring some material goods (i.e. butter, tsampa, etc.) to the monk house as the 
compensation for their child’s living expenses.  
After more than three years of construction, the Kirti monastic school had 
simple classroom buildings that housed students and teachers when the Chinese 
government started to launch a patriotic education campaign particularly targeting the 
Tibetan monastic community (Goldstein 1998). Schools in the monastery often 
attracted enthusiastic surveillance from the government. Alak Lobsang expressed his 
discontent in the officially sanctioned way: “I established this school all by myself 
without any help from the government. But after that the government told me that 
monastery-founded schools were not allowed. They had to be either private or public.” 
Indeed it is not just monastery-founded schools that are sensitive subjects but, more 
precisely, it is the Tibetan monastic tradition of child monks that goes directly against 
the Chinese state law.268  
The school system in China is an important element of state control. Both 
public and private schools have to get official state authorization before they can be 
formally founded. This authorization includes not only the building of the school but 
also the authorization for the teachers working in the schools as well as the teaching 
materials used in the schools. After nearly two years of negotiation between Alak 
Lobsang and the local government, Kirti monastery school survived as a hybrid 
                                                 
268 Chinese law of youth protection, Ch: wei chengnian ren baohu fa, indicates the illegality of child 
monk practice.  
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combination—a monastic-run public school. The school officially became a public 
school in 1998 under the administration of the Ruoergai County government and its 
name changed to Taktsang Lhamo Primary School.269 Yet at the same time it is still 
headed by Alak Lobsang and staffed by Kirti monks—with only one new Han Chinese 
teacher assigned by the local government to teach the only Chinese language course. 
Students are still exclusively boys, many of whom would eventually enter the Kirti 
monastery as monks. 
The negotiation between monastery and local government was neither as 
simple as this nor does it end there. Instead it was a dynamic process, with the Chinese 
government’s continuing efforts—as well as the limits of these efforts—to incorporate 
religion and ethnicity into the nation-state system by secularizing the school education 
on the one hand, and the Tibetan monastery struggle to revive their education system 
in the traditional religious context within the confinement of the current social 
political system on the other. One of the most prominent examples of this negotiation 
is the fact that all the monk teachers and the students are not allowed to wear monastic 
robes in school. According to the Chinese official regulations public school education 
cannot show any religious preferences including any explicit religious symbols such as 
robes or religious texts unless they are used as a counter-examples and critiqued by 
Marxist materialist theory. For monks, monastic robes are one of the few most 
symbolically charged materials in their lives. Only those disreputable “turn-back 
monks” (Tib: grwa log)—renegade monks who renounce their monkhood—would 
take off their robes. However the government regulation on public schools has left the 
monk teachers in the Kirti monastic school with no choice but to wear lay Tibetan 
                                                 
269 Tib: rtag tsang lha mo slob gra chong ba, Ch: langmusi xiaoxue. Interestingly although the 
government clearly aimed to create a secular flavor to the school by taking out monastery from the 
original school name, the Chinese name of the school still points explicitly to the monastic nature of the 
school, if not purposefully. 
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robe or Chinese style clothing. Not only do teachers have to wear lay clothes, students 
also have to wear lay clothing when they are at school. Nevertheless they are still 
considered by the Tibetan public as child monks in the traditional Tibetan sense. 
Similar negotiation can be seen in the use of texts in the monastic school. Monastic 
schools use Buddhist texts as the main preparation for students to start their monastic 
lives. But as a public school it is also under the pressure of switching to secular texts. 
The negotiation on the text and teaching is thus part of the everyday school practice.  
 
5.7 A Day in Taktsang Lhamo Primary School 
One early morning in November 2003 I went to Taktsang Lhamo Primary 
School to see a friend, Kalsang, who had been one of the monk teachers there since 
the beginning of the school. Located within the southern bounds of the 
circumambulation route around the monastery, the school is an enclosed courtyard 
building with a basketball court size square inside. The building is a fairly simple and 
has a plain one-story classroom. Only the school gate is decorated in traditional 
Tibetan fashion with a statue of a snow lion on each side, and a Chinese national flag 
flying high above. When I arrived there it was just the time for the daily school ritual 
of raising the Chinese national flag. As a state run public school all the students and 
teachers have to gather together every morning in the school square to watch the 
raising of the Chinese national flag with the loudspeaker playing the Chinese national 
anthem.  
I met Kalsang afterwards in a big room shared by all the teachers as their office. 
Because the school had virtually no source of income, procurement of supplies 
including office supplies and heating for office and classroom in winter had been a 
problem for both teachers and students. The result had been to leave the rooms with no 
heat at all or to let some teachers or students bring their private stock from home—
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usually dried yak dung or firewood as the cheap local alternative to coal or gas. Now 
that the school has turned public, the government has started to provide basic office 
supplies as well as coal for heating in winter, which was considered a local luxury. 
Thus the teacher’s office was heated with a coal stove that also provided hot water for 
drinking. Kalsang brought a cup of hot tea to me and started to talk about the change 
in the school since I was here the last time in 1999 and 2001. As every teacher in room 
was wearing Chinese style clothes or Tibetan lay robes, Kalsang started the topic with 
the changing of the monk robe. 
 
At first we [the monk teachers] did not realize it was serious [that we 
could not wear monk robes]. Many of us only changed to Chinese clothing 
when there was someone from the government coming to check. We still 
wore monk robes in our daily lives until we got more and more pressure. 
First it was Alak Lungzang who went to the county government meeting 
very often and received critique from the county leaders. Then there were 
some journalists and tourists who came and took photos in school. You 
know those people. They only like those who wear monk robes. After 
[they went back] they published photos in Chinese newspapers and 
magazines. Then the government knew we still wore monastic robes. We 
had no choice [but to change].   
 
Despite the verbal complaints that every monk teacher would tell me, there was 
obviously a mixed feeling towards the monastic school becoming state run. Both the 
teachers and students were happy with the improvement of the school due to the 
material support of the government. At the same time, the government policy clearly 
aims to separate religion from education—or more precisely, to secularize school 
education—and has put monk teachers and monastic schools in an uncomfortable 
situation.  
 The school has a lunch break at 11:30 when teachers and students go back to 
their monk households to have lunch. I went back with Kalsang to his house. His 
house is a large complex cohabited by Kalsang and six novices including his younger 
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brother. Kalsang was the master monk (Akhu) and the youngest novice was about five 
years old. When we arrived at his house the six young boys had just come back from 
school and had already started to cook some thugpa for lunch. As the master and the 
guest, Kalsang and I kept talking while waiting for the lunch to be served. When the 
young boys came with lunch we turned to discuss them.  
Students in school—or future monks in the monastery—have been sensitive 
topic both in the government and in the monastery. There is certainly no simple 
answer as to whether these boys are child monks in the Tibetan monastic tradition, or 
are lay students in a Chinese public school like everywhere else in China. The conflict 
lies between the traditional Tibetan practice of accepting child monks from as early as 
four to five years old who are often sent by their devoted parents, and the modern 
Chinese state law on religious regulation and secular school education which aims to 
clearly separate religion from school education. While Chinese law officially allows 
any adult to practice religion (i.e., become monk or nun at his or her own will), it has 
been ambivalent on those under the legal adult age of eighteen.270 The result of such 
conflict often has more nuances and sometime contradictions at a practical level.  
Except during special monastic occasions such as Monlam Chenmo when they 
still wear their monastic robes, the young boys in Taktsang Lhamo Primary School 
wear lay Chinese or Tibetan clothing all year long—some even wear the hong ling 
jin.271 At the same time these boys still carry out all the duties of child monks in their 
monk household, such as taking care of domestic work in the house and 
serving/working at monastic rituals during the Monlam Chenmo period. As another 
part of the compliance with the Chinese school regulation the school began in 2002 to 
                                                 
270 The official rhetoric is that state religious regulations “forbid any forced religious education for 
those under 18” (ZYZJ 1995). But it has been reportedly flexible in practice, particularly in cases that 
deal with ethnic minorities who have child religious education tradition. 
271 This is a piece of red cloth tied up around the neck symbolizing the membership of the Young 
Pioneer—the official subgroup for the Chinese Communist Party for children aged around 5-13. 
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replace the monastic textbooks used in classes with the national standard edition of 
Tibetan language textbook that was compiled by the state educational bureau.272 
Although many monk teachers were against this change they were also aware that they 
were fighting a lost battle.  
 
First we have to take off our monk robes. Then we cannot teach our own 
texts. We are really becoming like any other schools in neidi (China). We 
[all the monk teachers] were so uncomfortable [worried] that we went to 
see Alak Lobsang [for a solution]. He assured us that we are still monks 
even though we can not wear our robes. The most important thing he said 
is to continue teaching in school. Now there is a lot of gossip [about us] 
but Alak Lobsang said we should ignore that and just do our job.  
 
In reality, however, despite the change of official textbooks, the monastery and 
monks teachers still managed to insert their own teaching in the school schedule. I was 
told that the end of the afternoon is the official “off school activity time” (Ch: kewai 
huodong shijian). Unlike other Chinese schools, students in this school had an extra 
class at this time taught by the monks using their own monastic textbooks. Once, 
Kalsang accompanied me as we walked to different classrooms. There were seven to 
eight classrooms with more than 50 students in each. The classroom had typical 
Chinese school layouts: two blackboards on two end walls one for the teachers’ use 
and the other for Mao’s slogan haohao xuexi tiantian xiangshang (study hard and 
improve everyday) that appears in every Chinese school; three lines of wooden 
benches and desks in the classroom with three to four boys sharing one bench and one 
desk. The monks were teaching Buddhist texts in their lay clothing. One class at an 
advanced level was actually taught by a monk that day, in his monastic robe. “Is it no 
problem like this?” I asked Kalsang meaning both the robe and teaching itself. “You 
                                                 
272 Janet Upton (1999) provided an in-depth study on these state compiled Tibetan textbooks used 
nationally in all Tibetan language classes.  
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know those government things (Ch: zhengfu de shiqing),” Kalsang changed to Chinese 
making his explanation easier, “[when dealing with them] for some things we don’t 
have a choice and for other things they can’t do anything either (Ch: youxie shiqing 
women mei banfa, youxie shiqing tamen ye mei banfa).”  
While the monk teachers and students have been struggling hard to maintain 
their monk identity in school, their own community has been changing their views 
about this special group of monks. I later heard some gossip from other monks about 
the change in credibility of their fellow monk teachers in school. As the monastic 
school turned public, all the monk teachers in the school officially became “state 
cadres” (Ch: guojia ganbu). These monk teachers are now government employees and 
even receive a salary every month from the government. In 2003 the rumor was that a 
monk teacher’s salary was 1000 yuan a month, which was not only an unheard number 
for most monks but was even higher than many supposedly privileged local cadres.273 
The visual change of taking off their robes and receiving the salary from the 
government have immediately separated the monk teachers in school from the rest of 
the monk community. “At first they went to teach in school because they were asked 
by Alak Lobsang to contribute to the monastic school,” one monk said. Stereotypical 
beliefs among the monks often privilege academic study towards the highest Buddhist 
degree whereas teaching child monks is often the alternative choice for those who 
obviously cannot achieve that goal. If those monks chosen to be teachers in school 
were not fully respected by the monk community in the beginning, now they were 
even looked down upon by their monk fellows who called them na gongzi de ren 
(salary receivers) sarcastically behind their back.  “Who knows if they are contributing 
to the monastery or the monastery is contributing to them.” As such, the gossip among 
                                                 
273 Salary difference in different regions reflects one of the many hierarchical differences in China. It 
often parallels with the regional administrative hierarchies. Thus one could logically imagine a city 
salary higher than a county one and in turn higher than a village one.  
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the monks often focused on whether those monk teachers were actually forced to take 
off their robes by the government or if they were more willing to trade them for a high 
salary, given that they could not follow the ideal monk path. 
 
5.8 Suzhi and Hui Politics of Exclusion: A Voluntary Minority? 
Besides the Tibetan monastic school there are two public primary schools in 
Taktsang Lhamo, one in each of the provinces of Sichuan and Gansu. A local Hui 
teacher in the Sichuan side school told me proudly that as a Chinese school they 
follow the national standard curriculum here, just like every school in neidi, with 
everything taught in Chinese. A fluent Tibetan speaker himself, the young Hui teacher 
immediately linked the Chinese language with the idea of modernization (Ch: 
xiandaihua).  
 
We Hui speak Tibetan because of our old tradition of doing business [with 
Tibetans]. Nowadays China is modernizing and we minority people also 
have to catch up [with this modernization]. Everyone thus must learn 
Chinese today. Without good Chinese you can do nothing! 
 
Chinese education policy allows schools in ethnic minority regions to be either 
a “Chinese school” (Ch: hanxiao) where Chinese is the main teaching medium or a 
“minority school” (Ch: minxiao) where an officially sanctioned ethnic minority 
language is primarily used in teaching. Langmusi Hui Village Primary School (Ch: 
langmusi huimincun xiaoxue), the school on the Sichuan side, is one of those “Chinese 
schools.” It is staffed by Hui and Han Chinese teachers and enrolled primarily local 
Hui and Tibetan children. Hui in Taktsang Lhamo speak a dialect quite different from 
the standard Mandarin Chinese (putonghua).274 In all religious contexts, Arabic is the 
                                                 
274 Hui in northwest China speak a dialect of Chinese that is generally categorized as “northwest 
dialect” (Ch: xibei hua, or xibei fangyan). Researches on the Hui dialect show that there are many 
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main medium. However, as an official ethnic minority in China Hui do not officially 
have their own “minority language.” In their everyday life Hui use their own dialect 
among the Hui community members but switch to Tibetan or Mandarin Chinese with 
outsiders. Nevertheless Hui are in agreement on the importance of mastering 
Mandarin Chinese as both a practical tool to participate in the booming Chinese 
market and also a symbol of modernity, which parallels the Chinese state discourse of 
“backwardness” including the incapability of using Chinese that characterizes most 
ethnic minorities. 
A conversation with my Hui neighbor Min makes it clearer that, being aware 
of their double minority position in both the nation and region, Hui people in 
Langmusi have openly accepted the state-propagated ideology of modernity. They 
have further tried to manipulate this ideology for their own cause while actively 
participating in the Chinese nation-building process. It was through this inclusion and 
exclusion process that Hui have given the new interpretation of such concepts as 
modernization, religious freedom and ethnic equality, in accordance with the new 
social political context.  
Min family relies on a small grocery shop and a Qingzhen bakery as their 
source of income. His two boys were both in school, one in the Ruoergai County and 
the other in Langmusi, while the youngest girl dropped out after finishing primary 
school. Min first explained the difference between boys and girls in a family.  
 
Girls will marry out eventually and become members of other families (Ch: 
renjia de ren). But boys are different. If they learn more knowledge now they 
will be able to help the family out later on. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Arabic and Persian loan words mixed up in their daily conversational language which makes it nearly 
unintelligible for most Chinese speakers, even local Han Chinese (Yang 1996).   
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From here Min brought up the topic of education quality in different schools and 
people’s quality based on different education. 
 
Tibetans value (Ch: zhongshi) [only] their religion. But we Hui pay lots of 
attention to education. My elder son is in Ruoergai county school. Of course 
that’s better than the school here but it also costs much more money [to send 
him there]. I can’t afford to send my younger son to go there at the same time. 
So he is just going to this school in Langmusi [Langmusi Hui village primary 
school]. 
 
[…] 
 
The school here is a low quality one because the teachers here are low quality 
(Ch: suzhi di). None of them are college graduates. Their [spoken] Chinese 
level is not even better than mine. Students who go to this school can not 
really learn anything here and they will come out with a low quality too.  
 
[…] 
 
The different quality of schools makes for a different quality of students (Ch: 
xuexiao suzhi buyiyang xuesheng suzhi ye buyiyang). If I had enough money I 
would have sent my children even to schools in Beijing. [Because] that’s 
where there are the highest quality schools. Now that the policy is good [for 
doing business] I just have to work harder to make more money.  
 
Min’s conception of human quality comes directly from the official Chinese discourse 
of suzhi (quality). As many studies on this phenomenon have indicated (Yan 2003), 
this discourse of suzhi has imposed both an official abstract value in order to shape a 
new human subjectivity and a new form of governmentality. It also reproduces the 
existing social hierarchy yet disguises itself in a form of economic development. 
Schools and education are the fields where the suzhi discourse is heavily propagated 
by the state. Research on this subject, however, has mostly focused on the suzhi 
discourse as a state technology of inclusion (Kipnis 2007; Anagnost 2004). What 
follows then, is a natural division between those who resist this inclusion and those 
who are more cooperative with the state. Gerard Postiglione (2004: 5) proposed a 
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concept of “voluntary minority” in his research on the contemporary ethnic minority 
education in China. Using the ethnographic data from state schools in rural Tibet, he 
argued that if the “indigenous minorities view the education system as a way to strip 
them of their own culture and identity without giving them an equal opportunity in the 
wider society, [… they] will respond with resistance. If, however, they hold the view 
that they can use this education to achieve success, they will often surmount the 
obstacles posed by cultural divergences.” In the later case those minorities become 
what he calls “voluntary minority.”  
 What is missing in this analysis are the actual people in this process who are 
the agents of both inclusion and exclusion. I suggest that this absence can be 
compensated for by adding the dimension of the social imagination of the nation to it. 
In this case the Hui embracement of the state ideology of suzhi should be understood 
first of all as part of their politics of exclusion. Hui in Taktsang Lhamo have been 
caught in a borderland that is both part of the Han Chinese majority state and an ethnic 
Tibetan majority region. This situation of a minority in an ethnic minority region has 
made the Hui expression in this region different from the Hui in most other Hui 
majority regions in the northwest (Gillette 2000; Gladney 1991). On the one hand, Hui 
in Taktsang Lhamo explicitly and eagerly differentiate themselves from the local 
Tibetans in the sense that Hui are supposedly not exotic and have higher suzhi than the 
Tibetans. For this end Hui do not hesitate to employ various kinds of state discourse 
(such as suzhi in this case) to depict themselves as modern and progressive, as 
opposed to the local Tibetans who are backward and exotic and who are still trapped 
in their traditions—symbolized and reaffirmed by the tourist gaze. 
On the other hand, the Hui alliance with the Chinese state is a delicate one. 
While Hui value Islam no less than Tibetans value Buddhism, Min’s emphasis on the 
Hui-Tibetan difference through a different ethnic emphasis on religion and education 
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is indeed a reflection of the politics of exclusion. It parallels the state discourse of 
modernization through a secularized education. At the same time it also sets up the 
undertones of a different context for Islam that naturally escapes the official state trap 
of supposedly backward tradition. Therefore it is not uncommon to hear a Hui 
commenting on their ethnic emphasis on education in ways that appear completely 
separate from the officially Chinese sanctioned domain of religion. This Hui politics 
of exclusion not only reflects their understanding of the new ethnic relations with both 
Tibetans and the Chinese, but more importantly it also reflects a social imagination of 
the nation. Just like the Tibetans who imagine their position in a Chinese nation 
through their travel and the use of mobile phone, Hui express their ethnic situation as a 
minority in an ethnic minority region by positioning themselves at once on the border 
and in the center of an imaginary nation.  
Both Tibetans and Hui in Taktsang Lhamo have been actively imagining 
themselves as part of the new Chinese economic development and nation-state 
building. Both see the state education system as a means to bring certain social 
benefits or positions within their reach. In this sense they are both “voluntary 
minorities” in Postiglione’s term. To define ethnic motivation only on the basis of 
material benefit, however, is ultimately a reductive approach to its ethnic and religious 
complexity. As Sangren (2000) argued, desire is socially produced in a complex 
situation. It is often a result of many conflicts and negotiations that go well beyond the 
immediate interest measured solely through material benefit. In this case the 
traditional Tibetan monastic practice of pilgrimage has been renewed with the monks’ 
rediscovery of Chinese Buddhists and Chinese pilgrim sites. The mixed feeling of the 
Tibetan monks towards the Chinese shows both the “voluntary” side and its reluctance, 
even resistance. By the same token, Hui acceptance of the Chinese state has often been 
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amplified when they are juxtaposed with the Tibetans as a “minority minorities” in 
their own homeland.  
As official ethnic minorities in a Chinese state, Tibetans and Hui are both at 
the marginalized periphery of a nation and at the center of their national imagination. 
By adding another dimension of this social imagination of the nation we can go 
beyond an arbitrary division of the voluntary and resistance. Instead of understanding 
their practices through labels of “model minority” or “problem minority” we look 
directly into the multi-faceted practices unfolding in their particular context of the 
nation—both in a political economic sense and in an imaginary perspective from a 
particular ethnic group. Only through a close look into the complex and dynamic 
nature of these seemingly conflicting motivations and desires can we overcome those 
analytical dichotomies by focusing on their multiple production process.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
“HELLO, TICKET!” 
 
In the summer of 2001 I returned to Taktsang Lhamo to do my pre-dissertation 
fieldwork. After a bumpy, dusty and delayed two-day journey, I finally got off the bus 
on the main street of Taktsang Lhamo. The dirt street before in the town center had 
been recently paved, which made it look like a small Chinese town. As there was still 
no running water or sewer system, people habitually poured the dirty water out on the 
street. Unlike the dirt street before that absorbed water, the new concrete paved road 
became like a running river. This river ended shortly on the Gansu side where the 
paved road ended. A familiar dirt path started again, as I walked up to my friend 
Tashi’s house in the Kirti monastery.  
Just as I approached the monastery, I suddenly heard some knocking and 
shouting from a small house on the side of the road. I looked there and to my surprise I 
found someone calling to me. The noise came behind the small window of this simple 
one-room house. As I walked towards the house, a small window opened and an old 
monk’s face came out speaking to me in broken Chinese: “Hey! You! Buy ticket!” No 
matter how I explained that I was not a tourist and that I was just visiting an old friend 
who is a monk here, he would not let me pass until I finally gave him fifteen yuan for 
the ticket.  
Later I got to know from Tashi that this small house was the newly established 
ticket office of the Kirti monastery. That old monk was assigned by the Siguanhui to 
work there as a ticket collector for the monastery. After I left Taktsang Lhamo that 
year I heard from Tashi that he was going to replace the old monk as the Kirti 
monastery ticket collector. The job was not easy. Since there is no actual gate or any 
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other visible border of the monastery, it is the duty of the monk (ticket collector) to 
call on the coming visitors to buy tickets. Most monks in the monastery hardly speak 
any Chinese, let alone English, to explain the official reason of buying tickets. 
Tourists, mostly Chinese, often refuse to buy tickets. The confrontations between the 
monk ticket collector and tourists sometimes can be very tense. The previous old 
monk was said to have fought with too many tourists that the Siguanhui had to find 
someone else who is more apt at dealing with tourists. This position of ticket collector 
became a hot potato in the monastery.  
Finally the Siguanhui decided to appoint a group of three young monks—
instead of one—who were reputed to know more about the outside world and speak 
more Chinese. One of them is my friend Tashi. In order to be polite this time, Tashi 
asked me seriously to teach him the correct way to address tourists both in Chinese 
and in English. After a short conversation he decided the Chinese standard form of 
address would be Nihao, qing maipiao (Hello, please buy a ticket). He found the 
English equivalent a little too complicated for him to say, “Hello please buy a ticket.” 
He shortened it to just two words: “hello” to be polite and “ticket” as the content. Thus 
in 2003 when I returned to Taktsang Lhamo, I was greeted by Tashi at his ticket office 
in English—“Hello ticket!” 
In this chapter I explore the influence of modernization and consumption, 
particularly tourism, as an important new factor in the local religious revival and 
ethnic reconstructions. The changing social and political context in China also changes 
the “organizational features” (Barth 1969) which govern the construction of ethnic 
religious identity and the inter-ethnic encounters in Taktsang Lhamo. I start with the 
construction of a local highway with its historical legacy in the 1950s that connects 
this once remote ethnic borderland to the new Chinese nation state. While the 
construction of Lan-Lang Road in the 1950s was explicitly carried out under an 
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ideology of socialist development in the early days of the PRC, the rebuilding of this 
road in 2003 was contextualized in a more complex situation in which the traditional 
ethnic and religious relations have been both revived and contested in the new national 
ideology of market economy. What has come with the new Lan-Lang Road is not only 
the invasion of market goods and the tourist gaze but also a new social arena created 
by the ideology of modernity and consumerism. It is within this newly created social 
arena that religious revival and ethnic reconstruction in Taktsang Lhamo have become 
multi-vocal and have taken a more diversified direction than a simple reproduction of 
the collectively memorized past.  
Studies on tourism and their impact on the local societies can be characterized 
by two trends. One has focused on the deleterious effects of tourists and tourism on 
local cultures and traditions (Smith 1989). These authors have talked about tourists 
and tourism in terms of cultural consumption, cultural imperialism and the 
commoditization of local society in the face of global modernity. In the case of 
tourism in Tibet, Cingcade (1998) argued that Western tourists have come to search 
for authenticity and uniqueness with strongly pre-conceived desires, which has in turn 
produced the Tibetan desire to fulfill them in order to gain success in the new modern 
dominant discourse. She also criticized the tourists to Tibet as Orientalists who, 
through their consuming activities, have transformed the original Tibetan religious 
tradition into a secular business “performance” for tourists.275  
The other trend has been critical. Some even question “tourist” as an analytical 
category.276  Admitting the unavoidable consequences of tourist encounters, these 
authors have tried to resume local agency in the face of the tourists and the power of 
modernity. Talking about tourist impact on the High Himalaya, Charles Ramble (1993) 
                                                 
275 (Cingcade 1998), see also (Adams 1996). Greenwood made the similar critique of the 
commoditization and secularization of Basque ritual in Spain (Greenwood 1989). 
276 (Urry 1990), See also (Kolås 2004) for a case study of tourism through a native point of view.  
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took an optimistic view of the local people and the preservation of their tradition. “By 
and large,” he said, “the host societies of the Himalaya take a benevolent view of 
tourists. They like the things they [tourists] bring. But nobody seriously wants to be 
like the tourists” (Ramble 1993: 24). John Urry (1990) made a more nuanced 
argument, aruging that the tourist gaze “in any historical period is constructed in 
relationship to its opposite, to non-tourist forms of social experience and 
consciousness.” The concept of tourist is thus context-specific and relational to other 
non-tourist categories. 
Following these lines I analyze tourism and consuming practices in Taktsang 
Lhamo primarily as an important and integral part of the general phenomenon of local 
religious revival and ethnic reconstruction. In particular I place these practices against 
different time scales on a complex social economic context rather than an individual 
phenomenon in an isolated time and space. In relation to the “practice of time” from 
chapter 5, I depict various consuming practices including tourism through different 
time references that have been envisioned by different parties in different contexts. 
Both Tibetans and Hui have felt the impact and changes in their lives brought by 
increasing numbers of Chinese and Western tourists. Yet through different native 
eyes—Tibetan and Hui—and in different contexts, I shall show a more inter-
subjective encounter in a complex social political context that has led to various kinds 
of subject formations and various destinies envisioned by different parties.     
 
6.1 Road Construction: Making Taktsang Lhamo Legible in the Nation 
The reform and open-up policy after the 1980s has not only made China a 
giant factory for the world but also a great construction site itself. Among all the 
development projects, road construction has been seen both as the top priority for 
policy makers and the golden path to get rich for the people. A popular saying during 
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the 1990s went “If you want to get rich, build the road first” (Ch: yao xiang fu, xian 
xiu lu). As these construction projects have expanded from urban Chinese cities to the 
remote hinterland, particularly to the ethnic minority areas, their mission has gone 
well beyond the materialistic project of getting rich. It has become a modern nation 
state project to transform those ethnic minorities from backward, primitive, 
uncivilized to progressive, modern, and civilized—what Stevan Harrell (1995a) terms 
a “civilizing project.”  
Although Taktsang Lhamo is located between two provinces of Sichuan and 
Gansu, the geographical remoteness and the lack of infrastructure in this region break 
apart the 213 National Road (Ch: guodao) that connects the two provincial capitals of 
Lanzhou and Chengdu. Buses that pass by this region only stop at the bridge that 
leaves another 5 km zigzag mountain path meandering into the valley of Taktsang 
Lhamo. Until 2003 only three buses operated privately by local Hui families went in 
Taktsang Lhamo. Some locals ran their tricycle motor tractor to make one yuan profit 
each by picking up occasional tourists from the bridge. The Hui families started to run 
these buses with the increasing transportation demand from the local Hui who 
commute frequently to Linxia and Lintan for both business and family needs. The 200 
km between Linxia and Taktsang Lhamo often takes a whole day to cover, because of 
both the bad road condition and the old age of the bus. Yet the Hui bus families were 
all unwilling to invest in a better bus. If the road condition is that bad, it does not 
worth investing more on buses.  
 
6.1.1 A Road to Nation 
In the beginning of the 21st century China officially launched a long-term 
comprehensive national project: the Great Development of the West (GDOW) (Sines 
2002). The project aims to invest in the local infrastructure in China’s poor, vast 
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Western regions in order to better exploit the rich natural and human resources there. 
As many scholars have indicated, it also constitutes a modern nation-state strategy to 
map the former uncharted territory into part of its territorial legibility (Scott 1998). 
The strategic use of the “West” is certainly not merely a geographical direction. It 
symbolically represents all places where local rhythm does not go with the national 
one and therefore local practices are “illegible” to the state. This national ideology has 
generated dyadic concepts of a backward place with an inferior people and uncivilized 
culture waiting to be modernized (and civilized) by a “regime of representation” with 
the unquestionable good of development and modernization (Escobar 1995). As 
narrated in an official memoir about the first construction of Lan-Lang (Lanzhou to 
Langmusi) Road (Ch: Lan-Lang gonglu) in the early 1950s:  
 
The Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture is located in the 
Southwest of Gansu province and on the northeast rim of the Tibetan plateau. 
Here the immense pasture and rivers have nurtured dense forests and rich 
natural resources.  
However, before Liberation, there were only two simple roads [in this 
region] with no maintenance and no bridges. The roads were often blocked 
and transportation relied exclusively on draught animals, manpower, and 
wood wheeled carts. The rich natural resources could not be developed and 
exploited [because of the road condition]. Local products could not go out and 
industrial products [from urban Chinese cities] could not go in. Because of 
this [isolated] situation malicious merchants exploited the people with high 
priced products and Republican bandits hid themselves there. Local people of 
all nationalities suffered from the harassment of those bandits and lived in 
long-term poverty.277   
 
During a three-year period (1952-54) this road was built by the PLA (People’s 
Liberation Army). The primary goal of building this road then was to “liberate” local 
people of all nationalities from the repressive “old society” (Ch: jiu shehui)—the 
harassment of Republican bandits and the economic exploitation of malicious 
                                                 
277 Yu Yongquan: “Lan-Lang gonglu de chuqi xiujian”, in (GNZX 1989). The translation is mine. 
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merchants. For nearly half a decade this road was maintained as a political symbol to 
salvage a backward and desperate borderland by connecting it to a civilized socialist 
nation. 
For most people in China the change from Mao’s China to Deng’s China 
meant a shift from a life centered on political and ideological rhetoric to an economic 
and materialistic one. The rebuilding of the Lan-Lang Road after four decades reflects 
the shift of this meaning. In 2003 a new Lan-Lang Road project was launched as one 
of the many development projects to open up China’s backward but resource-rich west. 
This new road cuts across the adjacent regions of Hui autonomous prefecture of Linxia 
and Tibetan autonomous prefecture of Gannan connecting these regions ever closer to 
the provincial capital and national centers in China. The last stop on this road is 
Langmusi, before it goes further to Sichuan province. One of the main observable 
differences between the new road and the old one in 1950s is the amount of 
investment. Both projects were exclusively paid for by the state government. The old 
project used 2.75 million yuan to build the whole road as well as bridges from 
Lanzhou to Langmusi over a three-year period (GNZX 1989: 161). In 2004 just the 
first stage of investment for the last section of Lan-Lang Road, about 161 km, reached 
6.2 billion yuan.278 If the socialist construction during the 1950’s had initiated the 
nation-building effort by bringing political attention to every corner of its imagined 
territory, the GDOW project in 2000 has again reinforced this effort by spreading the 
new market wave from the national and province centers to the far remote borderlands 
like Langmusi.     
 
                                                 
278 Data comes from Gannan Daily, the official newspaper of the Gannan prefecture government, 
November 29, 2004. This is only for a second class freeway cost. According to a Linxia official report, 
the Lanzhou-Linxia part of the Lan-Lang Road will be constructed as a first class highway, which costs 
about 22 billion yuan for this 50km long express way. 
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6.1.2 A Road to Taktsang Lhamo 
It was a cold day in October 2003 when I returned to Taktsang Lhamo on the 
Hui family bus from Hezuo. The bus had to stop very frequently because of the road 
construction along the way. Thus although we started early in the morning it was 
nearly dark when we finally finished this 160 km distance arriving at the bridge near 
Taktsang Lhamo. Even worse was the news that the bus could not go further because 
the road construction team was preparing for an explosion in front. While the road 
construction in 1950s mainly followed the curve of the mountains and rivers the new 
construction today simply cut them though, which required the blasting of many hills 
including the one between the bridge and the valley of Taktsang Lhamo. Many 
passengers chose to walk through this 5 km mountain path as it was unsure whether or 
when the bus could pass. 
While most people tried to get away from the center of the construction as they 
passed the working zone, I was curious to see what was going on there. After another 
explosion, one man with a helmet ran over to me shouting with an accent from 
northeastern China: “What are you doing here?!” I explained that I was doing a field 
research on the development of this area. My Beijing accent self-evidently proved that 
I am a closer compatriot (Ch: laoxiang) to him. “Isn’t that so hard (Ch: jianku) to work 
in this poor and backward area?” He replied and seemed to have found someone who 
comes from a modern civilization (like him) and thus can share his jianku experience 
in this uncivilized wildness. His name was Li, a construction team leader from 
northeastern China—in fact the whole team was from the northeast. We started to chat 
right in front of the construction site. I was curious why a construction team that far 
was hired while many young locals, especially minorities, could not find a job. “This 
place is too backward. Minority peoples,” Li said, “if you let them sing and dance they 
are good at it. But if you let them work they are just stupid and lazy (Ch: you lan you 
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ben).”279 Li believed that the government is clever to hire them for the road 
construction because the locals (minority people) would never get the road done. “We 
have no time to waste here. Our next project has already been contracted.” Li openly 
acknowledged that he and his team members hate to work in a poor and backward 
place like here because of the very bad working and living conditions. Nevertheless he 
also admitted that these days he got more contracts in western China, mostly backward 
and remote minority regions, because of the GDOW project.  
As we were talking, Li proudly showed me around his working site. He 
explained that the hardest part of this construction was first of all to blow off the top of 
the mountain through which the former 5 km path to Taktsang Lhamo passed. After 
the road is done the distance will be shortened to 3 km. When I asked about a small 
group of Tibetan workers among his team, Li said he hired some local workers when 
they are short of hands. But “they can only do some ‘heavy manual works’ (Ch: 
cuhuo),” he said, “such as clearing the rock pieces after explosion.” Just as I was about 
to leave, I told him that I would like to take some photos of the construction site. 
Understanding that I was doing minzu (minority) research, Li immediately ordered his 
men to back off from the site. Many of his workers didn’t understand this order 
immediately until he shouted aloud: “you don’t have any minzu characteristics, do you 
(Ch: nimen you meiyou shenme minzu tese)?” This time they understood that their 
leader was telling them to stay away from a presumed search of minzu characterized 
images as none of them are ethnic minorities. With Li’s team workers quickly stepped 
aside, they seemed to be relieved from performing in front of my camera to audiences 
                                                 
279 In fact I heard similar words even from a Tibetan monk who was in charge of building the monastery 
hostel. He claimed that he would rather hire (Han) Sichuan workers from far away than local (Tibetan) 
labors. As he explained, workers from Sichuan are hardworking in nature and cheap to hire while locals 
are often lazy and hard to deal with.  
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off the stage. At the same time, the small group of Tibetan workers left on this stage 
appeared both puzzled and awkward in front of one camera with a laughing audience. 
 
6.2 Ticket, Time and Tension 
The road brings both tourists and consumer goods to Taktsang Lhamo. It also 
brings new concepts of time to this tradition engraved borderland. Until now much 
research on China, particularly on ethnic minorities in China, has documented an 
explicit exploitation of the concept of road and time by the Chinese state to create a 
spatial and temporal metaphor of backwardness of ethnic minorities versus 
progressiveness of the majority Han.280 Since the Communist party came to power in 
China the Marxist model of a unilateral social progression—from primitive society 
through slave society to capitalist society then socialist society and ultimately 
communist society—has been applied as a universal truth to all human societies at all 
times. On this universalized social scale ethnic minority societies have been treated as 
“our living past.” As a result one of the self-entitled missions of the Chinese 
government was to help those backward people to catch up with the progressive 
Chinese.281 In recent years further research on this and related subjects have 
complicated the issue by showing that ethnic minority peoples in China have not 
merely been the passive receivers and innocent victims of a state power and its 
ideology. Considerable research has demonstrated both the resistance and negotiation 
through reversion and internalization of this state ideology by the ethnic minorities.282  
                                                 
280 See, i.e., (Harrell 1995c; Schein 2000; Litzinger 2000; Mueggler 2001).  
281 In the 1950s the Chinese government announced as a first great achievement that one ethnic 
minority, the Erlunchun, in China had been successfully transformed from primitive society directly 
into part of the new socialist Chinese society—compare to the same progression of the Chinese society 
that has taken thousands of years. 
282 For example, Jing (1996) has documented a reinvention of religious tradition through the 
manipulation of local memories. Mueggler (2001) argued that rituals and oral traditions have functioned 
as an “opposite practices of time” which countered an imagined magical state and tried to heal the 
trauma in the collective memories.   
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In Taktsang Lhamo the conflicting concepts of time used in the monastery, in 
the Hui community, and by tourists have given rise to new spaces and subjectivities 
through a multi-faceted inter-subjective encounter. Along this line, I shall also show 
how different practices have been labeled and associated with different times, which I 
have called the “time of practice.” I start with the new phenomenon of the ticket since 
I see it as a hub of most of the new events, practices, and tensions.  
  
6.2.1 The Debate on the Ticket at Kirti Monastery 
For most monks in Kirti monastery, being simultaneously a monk chanting and 
gathering in the monastery and a ticket collector sitting in a tourist office seems too 
bizarrely different to contemplate. Therefore ever since Kirti monastery set up its own 
ticket office in 2000, that small house, along with the monk ticket collector and events 
that revolved around it everyday, has never stopped being a subject of conversation, 
sometimes even a hot debate, in the monk community. In 2001 the new ticket office 
and the old monk who stopped me for a ticket quickly became the favorite subject of 
jokes during the monks’ dinner time. Whenever there were any tourists during the day 
the story would be circulated among the monks later at dinner: how the old monk 
argued with the tourists (in Chinese), or how he hunted down those who tried to 
escape the ticket in the monastery alleys. By laughing at the old monk’s behavior, a 
bizarre and ridiculous atmosphere has been created around this position of monk ticket 
collector and the very existence of the ticket office itself has been questioned. 
The establishment of the ticket office in Kirti monastery started in the year 
2000 with impetus from the government to embrace the market as well as an 
increasing financial need in the monastery. The Chinese government openly 
propagates that culture and tradition show their value only when they help to develop 
the local economy to reinforce the dominant place of the new rising market in the 
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nationwide economic reform.283 The monastery is no exception. While Tibetan 
monasteries have been deprived of their previous political and economic privilege 
since the 1950s, it was not until more recently that the monastery self-sufficiency 
campaign (Ch: yisi yangsi) actively got the monasteries involved in the new Chinese 
market. Since the early 1980s the Chinese government has encouraged Tibetan 
monasteries to develop new sources of economic revenue despite the fact that many 
monasteries received ample volunteer donations from local Tibetan communities 
immediately after the government sanction of religious practice.284 An official 
government report on religious policy concludes: 
 
Based entirely on volunteer actions and with ample consideration, religious 
institutions should gradually and steadily reform any outdated customs and 
bad habits that go against the socialist construction of material civilization and 
spiritual civilization. At the same time they [the religious institutions] should, 
according to their own situations, start some productive or service enterprises 
that benefit the society.285
 
From the 1990s, tourism emerged as a big potential market especially for those 
remote backward minority regions that are affluent in natural and cultural resources 
but otherwise lack other economic advantages. Collecting entrance fees from tourists 
as part of the monastery income became both a challenge and a new way to expand the 
traditional monastery independence. The debate in the monastery started over the issue 
of whether they wanted to be controlled by another government branch, namely the 
Tourist Bureau in the Zorge government, besides the official leadership of the 
Religious Bureau in the Zorge government that had already been imposed on the 
                                                 
283 The original Chinese slogan goes wenhua datai jingji changxi, literally, “culture provides the scene, 
where the economy acts.”  
284 In 1980s the Serchi monastery received a government loan to buy a truck in order to join the rising 
market of transportation (Guan and Li 2000; Niu 2000). 
285 An investigation report on the implementation of religious policy by the central government office 
investigation committee released on December 29 1985 (ZYZJ 1995: 138-139). 
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monastery. If the monastery wants to collect tourist tickets it then has to accept all the 
administrative regulations as a tourist site and thus has to be regulated by the Tourist 
Bureau—such as obtaining a “certificate for collecting tickets at a tourist site” (Ch: 
luyou jingdian shoufei zheng) from the local Tourist Bureau, and paying certain taxes 
from the annual tourist income. It also has to assign specific persons—in this case 
monks from the monastery—to carry out this full-time job. This is far from a monk’s 
duty, if not conflicting with it. 
Meanwhile the opposing opinions argued that if they did not collect tickets 
from the tourists, the monastery would just let the money pass by us and we would 
just watch everyone else collect it. Although nobody has raised it for public debate, it 
is the common consensus that nowadays it is becoming more and more difficult to get 
enough money from either volunteer donation or any other source of revenue to fulfill 
all the monastery needs. Making business is no easy task for them either. From the 
experiences of their Hui neighbors many Tibetan monks believed that collecting 
entrance fees from tourists is probably the least demanding business that the 
monastery can engage in to make money. They also used examples of famous Tibetan 
monasteries in Lhasa and Amdo—Jokang temple, Potala, Kumbum monastery, 
Labrang monastery—that had already collected entrance fees from tourists for a long 
time.   
The final decision of the Siguanhui to set up a ticket office and place an old 
monk as the first ticket collector did not end the debate. It simply changed it from the 
public forum in the Siguanhui meeting room to various private occasions such as tea-
house chats, dinner gatherings or the intermissions of monastery classes. After the old 
monk became an object of jokes in the monk community, the Siguanhui finally 
reassigned three young monks as the new ticket collectors in 2002. As time went by 
the debate on the ticket office seemed to wane, especially after this ticket office started 
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to yield more than 80,000 yuan every year to the monastery. But the ticket office itself 
continues to be a hot topic and the discussion around it has continues to be a favorite 
everyday topic among the monks.  
Just as I thought the debate had ended when I came back to Taktsang Lhamo in 
2003, I found that many young monks started to challenge this issue through reference 
to their own experiences, particularly those who have been to China. As more and 
more monks in the monastery (mostly young monks like my friend Tashi) started to 
travel to Buddhist pilgrim sites, temples, and monasteries in China, they seemed to see 
the future of their monastery in the light of their Chinese counterparts. Many Tibetan 
monks were surprised by the economic stability in the Buddhist temples and 
monasteries all over China. However most of them do not think that is the way 
monasteries or monks should be—even far from what they hope for their own future. 
Dungrub, after coming back from his trip to China in 2003, directly criticized the 
shortsightedness of the Siguanhui authority: 
 
The Siguanhui is just satisfied with the 80,000 yuan every year. But if we go 
on like this our monastery will become like those in China. Monks do nothing 
but selling tickets, running souvenir shops, and becoming tourist guides. [If 
they are like that] then what is the difference between a monk and a [lay] 
person with a job? What is the difference between a monastery and a tourist 
site? I am very afraid of this [happening to our monastery].  
 
This complaint from Dungrub was quite representative among the young monks who 
consider themselves more modern and experienced with the outside world—as 
opposed to the old monks who have never left the monastery, like those in the 
Siguanhui. In addition to their worries about the monastery’s future there was also a 
deep-down uneasiness with this job that conflicts with fundamental Buddhist ideology 
of avoiding any kind of personal confrontation. In fact Dungrub has even proposed an 
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alternative plan to the current ticket system based on his first year of working 
experience as one of the three ticket collectors.  
 
Tourists come from such distant places to visit our monastery. We should be 
happy to give them good explanations of our monastery and our history. But 
now we have to stop them and if they don’t buy tickets we have to prevent 
them from coming in. As a monk in the monastery, I feel very uncomfortable 
with this.  
 
I have explained this to Siguanhui many times. Tourists coming here everyday 
are very different people. Some of them are rich and can afford the ticket. 
Some are poor and can not afford the ticket. Some believe in Buddhism and 
come here [to pray or for pilgrimage] just like Tibetans.286 Some do not 
believe in Buddhism and come here just for a visit. Therefore it is not fair to 
charge them with the same ticket price. If the Siguanhui could take my 
suggestion we should let everyone come in for free. Not only that, we should 
also provide them with a good guide to explain everything in the monastery 
and give them some small souvenirs like a srung mdud (protective amulet) 
before they leave. If they were satisfied [with what we provided] and had the 
ability [to donate] they would possibly donate even more [than a ticket]. If 
they were poor and could not afford the ticket then they don’t have to pay. [At 
the end the revenue in general is similar. And] we won’t have to have 
conflicts [with tourists] every day. Sometimes I felt very uncomfortable all 
night if I had tension with someone during the day. 
 
Dungrub’s proposal seemed to be too avant-garde even for many monks of his 
own generation. The Siguanhui committee listened to him with much suspicion. 
Giving free entrance and even souvenirs to tourists simply made no sense to them. 
They did not give a second thought to this idea. Some even said there was something 
wrong with Dungrub’s head.  
                                                 
286As a general rule, Chinese and Westerners coming to the monastery are treated as tourists and have to 
buy a ticket to enter the monastery. Tibetans are treated as pilgrims and people who come to pray and 
are thus free. This is the case in all monasteries and religious/tourist sites in Tibet. However on the 
practical level the way to determine whether one is Tibetan or not differs widely from one place to 
another.  
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The debate over tickets did not end in the monastery and the monastic 
community. Instead it created a new arena where Tibetan monks, Chinese tourists, and 
Hui villagers have to refigure their own role in this unfolding historical moment. 
 
6.2.2 Tourist Time and Monastic Time 
The creation of the ticket office has introduced a new concept of time—which 
I call tourist time, because for most monks this time comes with the tourists—to the 
monastic community, which conflicts with the monastic time with which the monks 
are more familiar. To compare these two ways of timing I look at two technologies—
calendars and daily schedules—used by a specific group in a particular space. In most 
Amdo Tibetan regions including Taktsang Lhamo the Tibetan calendar has been 
widely used both for local Tibetans’ everyday life and for rituals and festivals in the 
Tibetan monasteries. In practice, this Tibetan calendar is same as the Chinese lunar 
calendar and thus different from the Tibetan calendar used in central Tibet which is 
often considered as the Tibetan calendar. For this reason monastic rituals or festival 
events, such as the Monlam Chenmo, could fall on a different date in an Amdo 
monastery and in a Lhasa monastery.  
On the Muslim side of the village the Hui villagers also use the Chinese lunar 
calendar for their daily lives, except when they deal with tourists. Unlike the Tibetan 
rituals and festivals which are counted after the Tibetan/Chinese lunar calendar (Tib: 
bod zla, Ch: nongli), Muslim religious rituals and festivals have been based solely on 
the Islamic calendar (Ch: yili). The western calendar is associated with everything 
related to the government and more recently with the tourists. In the case of the Hui 
villagers their time has been marked by the five prayer times everyday and the weekly 
grand prayer every Friday (Ch: zhuma). For monks in the monastery it is the monastic 
call and the Geke that set up the main rhythms of their day. Although clocks and 
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watches were nothing new to locals including monks, their lives were not timed to and 
tied up by those little machines.  
When Tashi took the ticket collector job with two other monks in 2002, he was 
not very happy about it but had no choice since it was a decision from the Siguanhui. 
After awhile he complained to me that many of his monk fellows considered him and 
the others who did this job as lazy because as monks they no longer complied with the 
monastic rountine. Instead they use the time of the watch to measure their day—a 
characteristic that is often attributed to tourists or to those who work for the 
government (Tib: las phyed pa). As ticket collectors they start their day by opening the 
ticket office at eight o’clock every morning, and finish their day by closing it at six in 
the evening. They have nothing to do afterwards.  
Monks in the Kirti monastery follow the monastic rhythm set up by the call of 
a huge Tibetan trumpet (Tib: dung) and by the monastery Geke. They start their day at 
five to six o’clock with their morning session in the monastery assembly hall (Tib: 
tshogs chen lha kang). Since there is usually no breakfast time, many monks bring 
tsampa with them and take it during the session break with some hot tea that is served 
in the assembly. The morning session ends at eleven to twelve o’clock at noon when 
monks go back to their dormitory for lunch. The afternoon session often takes place in 
each college (Tib: grwa tshang) with different subjects.287 The evening is the official 
time for group recitation outside. Everyday after dinner young monk students come 
out of their dormitory to join their study group under the strict surveillance of the 
Geke. They follow the traditional Tibetan way of reciting or reading aloud to review 
what they have learned. During the time of monastic rituals or ceremonies, they often 
have extra gatherings and chanting sessions throughout the night.  
                                                 
287 As a typical Gelugpa monastery Kirti monastery consists of four colleges: the Philosophical College 
(Tib: mtshan nyid grwa tshang), the Tantric College (Tib: rgyud pa grwa tshang), the Kalachakra 
College (Tib: dus ’kor grwa tshang), and the Medical College (Tib: sman pa grwa tshang). 
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Teachers and lamas lead these daily activities and routine monastic rituals, 
while the Geke observes the monks and punishes those who do not commands. 
Although most monks now use a clock or a watch, the call of the trumpet on the top of 
assembly hall is still the standard time scale for everyday monastic events as well as 
the progression of these events. In each gathering session or event, the Geke is the sole 
person who controls time. Those who are late for their sessions or gatherings will be 
scolded and beaten in front of all of the monks. Every day after dark Geke embarked 
on one of his most important duties—patrolling the monastery border to keep the 
monks from going out of the monastery after dark and to keep outsiders, especially 
women, from entering monastery territory. Many tourists do not understand this rule 
and often end up quarrelling with the Geke when they are refused entry with their 
tickets. In this case Tashi was approached several times by such dissatisfied tourists. 
He had no other explanation except that the monastery opens during the day and 
closes after dark—though there is not actually a door, or even a fence, to close on 
itself. He later told me that it was very unpleasant to compare his monastery with a 
tourist site in China.  
 
6.2.3 Tensions between Tibetans and Hui 
This issue of tickets and the ticket office has not only created tensions between 
the monks and tourists and between the young and old monks in the monastery, it has 
also brought on some new tensions between Tibetan monks and local Hui Muslims. 
As the major hotel and restaurant owners in town, Hui villagers have benefited from 
the growing numbers of tourists attracted by the local Tibetans, their culture and 
mostly their monasteries. From the Tibetan side, especially among monks in the 
monastery, there has been a growing feeling of both cultural pride and economic 
jealousy over the Hui people. However on the Hui side they completely do not accept 
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this view. Most Hui business owners attribute their economic success mainly to their 
ethnically marked talent of doing business and the Chinese government policy which 
has created a good environment for doing business.  
Although the tension exists in many aspects of local life it has been expressed 
only in some subtle ways. As the tourist business increases year by year, some local 
Hui businesses started to believe that tourists could become a more reliable source of 
their income than those locals who have been their customers for centuries. A 
successful Hui restaurant owner told me that if they are lucky the money they make 
from the tourists during the month of Monlam Chenmo can be more than their total 
annual income from their local business. Many Hui restaurants have started to prepare 
two different menus during the tourist season—one for locals and one for tourists. 
From 2003 some newly opened Hui restaurants targeted tourists. These restaurants 
only open several months a year during the short tourist season and stay closed most 
of the time. They are known to the locals as serving only expensive dishes and no 
local food (such as the cheap Hui style beef noodle soup).  
In Taktsang Lhamo, some of the old Hui family houses and lands were initially 
granted by the Kirti monastery and have since been inherited for many generations. 
They are often on the outer circle of the monastery. Ali’s house is one of these. It is 
right next to the monastery ticket office. From 2004 he opened one of the new tourist 
restaurants in his house and made good income during the Monlam Chenmo. After the 
tourist peak of the May 1st national holiday, I went to his restaurant for a casual talk. 
Ali and his wife looked both tired and happy from a busy but exciting week of tourists. 
The previous week had been the so-called “golden week” of May—one week of 
national holiday during which more and more urban Chinese leave the big cities to 
escape the increasing working pressures and city pollution. “If you had come any time 
last week,” Ali said, “I would not have even one minute to talk to you.” He admitted 
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that he had only gone once to the zhuma prayer on Friday and had no time to do the 
five time daily prayers for the past week. “We were not able to close [the restaurant 
door] before midnight for one week,” he said. Since I live across the street from Ali’s 
house I could hear the tourist noise in his restaurant late at night. Many other Hui 
family shops also extend their business hours during the tourist season. Nine to ten 
o’clock is no longer the bedtime for many locals. This, according to Ali, is the result 
of more competition from other restaurants in town. “If you want to attract more 
tourists you must satisfy their needs,” Ali explained to me proudly. 
But satisfying the tourists’ needs has also created certain tensions between 
some Hui businesses and Tibetan monastic community. Coming out of Ali’s restaurant 
I went directly to the ticket office to visit my friends there. I immediately felt that the 
monks in the ticket office seemed to be unhappy knowing that I had emerged from 
Ali’s restaurant. After a short reluctance Tashi told me not to go to Ali’s restaurant 
any more because the Hui had made more trouble for the monastery ticket sales. I had 
seen the monks’ difficulties of selling tickets everyday. Among all the tourists, 
foreigners have the best reputation for being honest ticket buyers—with the only 
exception of those from Islamic countries. “They [Muslim tourists] all said they are 
going to the Mosque [thus don’t want to buy a ticket],” monk Dongrub said, “but who 
knows where they go once they enter from here!” Chinese tourists are often the most 
trouble. “Some of them said they are Buddhists [thus don’t want to buy tickets]. Some 
saw that we are monks and wanted to negotiate the price. Some just refused to pay!” 
Dongrub said, “I have too much headache (Tib: nga zhi gi sgo kho’i) [with the 
Chinese tourists].” This time I learned that recently Kirti monks have caught some 
Chinese tourists who entered the monastery without buying tickets. Eventually they 
got to know that it was the Hui restaurants that gave these tourists the “back door” 
access in order to attract more business. Since there was not any kind of gate or border 
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to keep the monastery separate from the rest of the village, Hui restaurant owners, who 
are familiar with local roads, often show Chinese tourists in their restaurants the 
alternative ways to get around the ticket office. As a conclusion, Dongrub said 
“Islamic people are not good people” (Tib: yisilan myi ma hra gi).288  
In addition to this conflict over tickets, Tibetan monks have also discovered 
that more and more tourists have learned local history—mostly the history of Tibetan 
monastery and lama lineage—from the local Hui restaurant owners. Although many 
monks in the monastery are very erudite about their own history and some of them are 
also willing to share their knowledge with outsiders, most monks do not speak enough 
Chinese to communicate with the Chinese tourists. The Hui restaurant owners not only 
have the linguistic convenience to communicate with the tourist. But they are also the 
main service providers in town and are very apt at dealing with various kinds of 
people due to their extensive business experience. They quickly convinces most 
Chinese tourists that their version of local history and stories—though all about this 
Tibetan land, Tibetan people, and Tibetan monastery—are as authentic and detailed as 
those from the Tibetan themselves. Whenever I talked to the monks about this, they 
were all very angry and eager to point out that whatever the Hui said is not trustworthy.  
 
6.3 The Political Economy of Tea 
Over the past several decades, the emphasis on human agency in practice 
theory has become central in much anthropological work. Following the theoretical 
framework provided by Bourdieu (1977), Sherry Ortner defined practice theory as “a 
theory of relationship between the structures of society and culture on the one hand, 
                                                 
288 Today Tibetans borrow the Chinese word yisilan to indicate Islam as a religion as well as Hui for the 
name of ethnic group. Traditionally in this region there was seldom a specific word for Islam in local 
Tibetan and the Tibetan term for the Hui is hehe. I have noticed many monks still using hehe as a 
general name for all Muslims, so the Muslims from outside China are called shijie hehe (lit. “foreign 
Muslim”).  
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and the nature of human action on the other.” As a promising approach to emphasize 
human action and agency, the theory of practice posits a way to connect individuals to 
society by transcending the traditional dualism of subjectivism and objectivism. Here I 
intend to connect everyday practice of individuals to their specific social political 
context. In other words, to illuminate the human agency and cultural logics of human 
practice, it is important to place the everyday practices into a context that is sensitive 
to political and economic concerns. 
In the following paragraphs I analyze one of the most important everyday 
practices in the Tibetan monastery—patron relations and patronage. I shall show that 
the cultural politics in the people’s everyday actions are indeed closely connected to 
the changing political-economic context. I first demonstrate the changing context of 
the political economy in the Tibetan monastic system in China. Through focusing on 
the practice of patronage I emphasize a scenario of conflict: On the one hand, new 
Chinese government regulations have sanctioned the practice of Tibetan religion but 
cut off its former political and economic function and thus forced the Tibetan 
monastery to completely change its way of survival; on the other hand, since the 1980s 
many Tibetan monks and reincarnate lamas have gradually discovered the new 
possibility of patronage from Chinese Buddhist believers as well as some new urban 
capitalists in China who are eagerly looking for cultural exotics both to reinforce their 
own political and economic status and to relieve the feeling of cultural loss left by the 
accelerating economic development. This new Chinese influence has further stratified 
the monastic community in the post-1980s era and made the religious revival on this 
ethnic borderland more complex. 
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6.3.1 Changing Contexts of the Monastic Patronage System  
One of the crucial issues in the Tibetan monastic system, both before and after 
the Communist takeover, is to secure patronage. Patronage enables the monastery to 
carry out all rituals and ceremonies and provides daily sustenance for the monks. 
Meanwhile it also carries a heavy symbolic value for the monastery and for the 
reincarnate lama—those who receive more patronage are those who have a higher 
reputation and more prestige, and vice versa. This giving and receiving relation is an 
important mode of interaction between the lay and monastic communities of Tibetan 
society.  
In Taktsang Lhamo the formal Tibetan term sbyin bdag—patron or sponsor—
is often replaced by a more popular expression in the monastery called “tea” (Tib: 
mang ja, lit. “lots of tea” or “tea for the mass”). Specifically this tea refers to 
anything—tea, butter, meal, cash—that is donated by one or more patrons for certain 
monastic ritual or ceremony and distributed to the monks in the name of the hosting 
lama. Thus to be a sponsor or patron is widely known as “to make a lot of tea” (Tib: 
mang ja skol). 
Unlike their Chinese counterparts, Tibetan monks (particularly in Gelugpa 
tradition) are exempt from any physical work involved in agricultural or pastoral 
production. In the pre-1950s age, the Kirti monastery had regular income taxes from 
subject villages, tax that constituted the major source of monastic revenue in addition 
to other donations. A special monk crew headed by a close relative of the Kirti Lama 
was assigned separately from the monastic community to ensure the annual tax 
income and to manage the monastery funding as their life-long profession.289 The 
incorporation of Tibet into the new Chinese nation state system strictly subdued any 
                                                 
289 According to the Chinese government survey of the Kirti monastery in 1955, the total monastery 
assets included silver cash (300,000 yuan), cattle (329,000 yuan), real estate (800,000 yuan) and land 
(ABLD 1985). See figure 5.  
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former political and economic power for the Tibetan monastic system—a system that 
had supported Tibetan monasteries for centuries. With the relaxation of the Chinese 
state policy on religious practices since the 1980s, much scholarship has concentrated 
on the ethnic and religious revival in China including ethnic Tibetan regions.290 Yet 
few have given emphasis to the nature and the change of monastery patronage as well 
as its stake in the post-reform era—what I call the “political economy of tea.”  
After the termination of the tax-based patronage in the 1950s, especially under 
the post-1980s Chinese regulation of monastery self-sufficiency (Ch: yisi yangsi), 
there has been a significant diversification of patrons and patronage in the Kirti 
monastic revival.291 While the government has prohibited the previous mandatory 
patronage to the monastery through legal regulation, the boom of the Chinese market 
gradually transformed context of the monastery patronage. Monastery income is 
uncertain and the monastery leaders have to deal with many new situations that they 
have never imagined before. This diversification of patrons and patronage also affects 
various changes in religious revival. It has deeply affected the reconstruction of newly 
revived monastic lives as well as local ethnic relations.   
 
6.3.2 The Political and Economic Bases of Religious Revival 
When religious practice was initially permitted again in the late 1970s, Alak 
Lobsang with his several young novices spent much of their time traveling around the 
nearby pastureland and agricultural villages. He announced the news from the 
government and tried to revive public faith in the monastery and monkhood that had 
been brutally suppressed during the Cultural Revolution. At the same time he prepared 
                                                 
290 On the religious revival in China after the 1980s, see, i.e., (Gladney 1991; Jing 1996), on Tibetan 
regions see (Goldstein and Kapstein 1998; Makley 1999). 
291 For research on the similar subject of the patron and patronage among the exile Tibetan 
communities, see (Zablocki 2005). 
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the reconstruction of the Kirti monastery by recruiting young monks and collecting 
donations. Most people were very excited by this news but suspicious of its veracity. 
As they learned it to be true people started to resume their religious practices and their 
patronage. Villages once the subjects of Kirti monastery now formed a volunteer 
league to support the Kirti monastery through their patronage on a rotating basis—
each village supporting one ritual of the year. For an elaborate ritual like Monlam 
Chenmo the cost can be huge. Even with the support from all villages Monlam 
Chenmo in the 1980s was held in a tent that functioned as a great assembly hall. There 
was no formal costume to wear in the cham. Patronage was mostly in the form of 
various kinds of necessities for the monastery and for the monks such as food, drinks, 
and labor services contributed to rebuild the monastery or to facilitate the monastic 
rituals.  
Many monks who entered the monastery during the 1980s remember that 
period as having more patrons and patronage but fewer monks in the monastery 
compared to today. “People then were poor but they were more devoted,” a monk said. 
Therefore although patronage was not significant in its amount many monks still 
believe that they had a better life back then. After all there were very few occasions 
that they actually needed money and everything then was still much cheaper. Back in 
the early 1980s there was only one Hui restaurant in town and it was considered a 
luxury by the monks to have a beef noodle soup for half yuan in the restaurant.  
Only ten years later, when I was in Taktsang Lhamo in 1999, a major topic in 
the town during the Monlam Chenmo was about patronage. It was the largest amount 
of money that the Kirti monastery had received so far—the total amount was said to be 
100,000 yuan, a huge sum of money considering the monthly wage of a local 
government employee’s was less than 500 yuan. This money had solved the problem 
of the costume making and final decoration of the grand assembly hall as well as the 
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living expenses for all the monks during the fifteen-day ceremony. More 
conspicuously this huge amount of money came from one local Tibetan family who 
ran a series of local businesses in Taktsang Lhamo and got rich in the new market 
economy. While in the beginning everyone in town (mostly monks) had great respect 
for this family because of this patronage, it was not until later that people began to talk 
about the utilitarian end of this patronage. Because of this patronage this family 
business got the privilege of building the only hotel located on the monastery property. 
After it was built in 2001 this Tibetan hotel immediately took away a large part of 
customers from many Hui hotels in town because of its monastery location and 
because it was seen as authentically Tibetan by tourists. Since then the family 
businesses have greatly benefited from the economic privilege they got from the 
monastery.292  
In normal years, donations to the monastery were not extraordinary. Alak 
Lobsang used all his salary, besides the donation he received, to make “tea” in the 
regular monastic ceremonies. With the change of the Chinese government policy and 
the redress offered (Ch: luoshi zhengce) after the Cultural Revolution, many head 
lamas in these monasteries (including Alak Lobsang) have been assigned a position in 
the local government.293 To many local Tibetans, the concept of salary has been 
introduced with the advent of Chinese government. Yet it had always been associated 
with Chinese and with someone who works for the government (Tib: las phyed pa). 
                                                 
292 Several years later, many monks including some Siguanhui members in the Kirti monastery started 
to regret their decision to give those privileges in return for the patronage. They believed that this 
family business—including a hotel, a restaurant, a tea house and a shop, all by the side of Kirti 
monastery—has been benefitted more by the tourist trade than they have contributed to the monastery. 
This eventually led to the decision of the Kirti monastery Siguanhui to build their own hotel, a much 
bigger one, right next to this family hotel. 
293 These positions were often rendered under the Political Consultative Conference (Ch: zhengxie) or 
National United Front (Ch: tongzhanbu), which are the principal government entities for 
communicating between the ethnic religious community and the local government. The rank of the 
position given to each lama often depends on the scale of the monastery and the reputation of the lama 
himself. The highest rank of this kind was that of the former Panchen Lama who held a senior position 
in the National People’s Congress.  
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When Alak Lobsang started his job in the local government, he felt that holding a 
position in the government distracted him from his responsibilities in the regular 
monastic affairs since he constantly had to attend government meetings in different 
places. Yet he also admitted that these frequent travels are essential to maintain his 
position both in the Chinese government and more importantly in the new system of 
monastic organization (see figure 6). With the political and economic function 
eliminated from the former monastic system Alak Lobsang as the leader in the new 
monastic system had no choice but to deal with the local Chinese government for the 
various political and economic factors related to the monastery. He told me that the 
first cash patronage he distributed in the monastery was the money he received from 
the government. Although his salary was not very high it gave him more freedom to 
choose many things he needed in the growing market and which the donations he 
usually received—yak butter, meat, tsampa—could not offer.  
Compared to Alak Lobsang, many other reincarnate lamas in the Kirti 
monastery do not have the same access to political and economic resources. Moreover, 
with the new Chinese religious regulations, some reincarnate lamas could not even 
resume their status in the monastery. According to these regulations on religious 
organization and religious personnel, all monasteries and monks have to register with 
the religious bureau in the local government and obey the specific rules on religious 
practice. Every reincarnate lama in the monastery has to be approved by the religious 
bureau and issued a “certificate of reincarnate lama” (Ch: huofo zheng) before he can 
publicly hold any religious positions in the monastery.294 This is meant to filter out the 
external influence from the Tibet independence movement, particularly from the exile 
                                                 
294 In September 2007 the highest Chinese government administrative unit, National Religious Bureau, 
officially issued the “Regulations on the Reincarnation Lama in Tibetan Buddhism.” 
http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2007-08/02/content_704414.htm. However, the political control of the 
reincarnation lamas in Tibetan monastery has been applied well before this official issuance. See for 
example the controversy over the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama in 1995 (Zablocki 2005). 
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Tibetan religious community which has been connected in one way or another with the 
Tibetan monasteries in China. Reincarnate lamas found and recognized by the exile 
community are thus not recognized from the Chinese side. Without a position in the 
monastery a reincarnate lama would lose the official title to host any ritual in the 
monastery and to receive patronage during those ceremonies. It would in turn hurt his 
reputation in the monastic community because of his inability to generate patronage 
even if he was initially accepted through the recognition of the exile community. His 
public influence among the people would diminish unless he could improvise his own 
way to reinstall himself and his status in the new monastic system. 
The stories of generous Western patrons have been widespread among the 
monks in the Kirti monastery. Most of these stories come from those who have 
traveled to India. After the Chinese open-door policy in the 1980s, Taktsang Lhamo 
started to see Western tourists from time to time. During my fieldwork in Taktsang 
Lhamo I was approached several times by the monks to write letters in English to 
Europe or America. All of them requested donations. Yet I have not heard of any 
successes during my stay or after. A monk friend who asked me once to write such a 
donation letter talked to me in a disappointed tone that he heard many big monasteries 
in Lhasa and Dharamsala received generous patronage from shijie (foreigners), yet no 
one seemed to be interested in Taktsang Lhamo.295 In recent years, while many 
reincarnate lamas still tried hard to find their way out of the dilemma in the new 
monastic system, some lamas and monks have found improvised solutions from the 
newly discovered Chinese patrons and patronage. Many of these Chinese patrons have 
been found among the Chinese tourists. 
 
                                                 
295 Shijie is Amdo dialect (Tib: phyi rgyal), the equivelent of yinji (foreigner) in Lhasa dialect.  
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6.4 Buddhism, Tourism and the Chinese Patrons: The Stories of a Lama and a 
Monk 
“Chinese Buddhism” and “Tibetan Buddhism,” despite their same family name, 
did not share the same religious concept of “Buddhism” until the early 20th century. 
According to Gray Tuttle (2005), the increasing interaction between Tibetan and 
Chinese Buddhists since then has occupied a unique place in the creation of the 
modern Chinese state. The exile of the Dalai Lama and his Tibetan government in 
1959 has brought Tibetan Buddhism from the remote Himalayas to the front stage of 
the modern world. Since then Tibetan Buddhism gained great popularity both in 
Western countries and in the Chinese world outside the mainland (Schell 2000; 
Zablocki 2005). The religious revival in Tibet following the change of Chinese policy 
in 1980s has further complicated this situation. It has not only brought many Tibetans 
in China back to their long-defunct religion but it has also regenerated the Chinese 
popular interest in Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism. David Germano (1998) has 
documented a charismatic Amdo Tibetan lama, Khenpo Jigme Phuntsog, during the 
Tibetan Buddhist revival in the 1990s. Among all his followers, Chinese Buddhists 
including monks, nuns, and lay people have constituted a significant part of the 
student body in the Buddhist institute that Khenpo established.  
While Western backpackers initially introduced the idea of tourism to local 
people in 1980s, it was the Chinese tourists later—individual travelers such as students, 
amateur artists, and later the new generation of urban capitalists—who have quickly 
become the main tourist body on the street of Langmusi and in alleys of the 
monastery.296 Among these Chinese tourists, quite a few claimed to be Buddhist 
                                                 
296 Taktsang Lhamo was listed in many western language guidebooks, such as “Lonely Planet”, as early 
as in the 1990s. Since the late 1990s more and more Chinese tourists have come to know Taktsang 
Lhamo through the Chinese media and guidebooks. However the tourist boom after the construction of 
the Lan-Lang Road in 2004 is still dominated by individual tourists and few commercial tourist groups 
have arrived in this borderland. Those commercially organized tourist groups that actually pass by this 
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practitioners at home (Ch: jushi) or Buddhist believers (Ch: xinfo). They came as both 
tourists and pilgrims. Other tourists range from those trying to escape the urban 
pressure to amateur artists looking for inspiration from exotic minorities. Despite the 
different interests, all these tourists, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, have been 
attracted to the Tibetan monastery, Tibetan monks, and Tibetan Buddhist practices.  
 
6.4.1 Alak Jigme 
The new Chinese tourist gaze on the monastery and monks has gradually 
influenced the newly re-constituted monastic relations. It has created a new 
opportunity for those who are willing—and first of all who are able—to deal with 
these Chinese tourists. The change in Alak Jigme’s status in the Kirti monastery 
represents a new agent in the Tibetan monastic revival and the new monastery system, 
namely Chinese patronage.  
Alak Jigme was a young reincarnate lama in his 20s. Since the Dalai Lama 
recognized him as a reincarnate lama in the Kirti monastery when he was fifteen years 
old, Alak Jigme has become one of the “uncertified reincarnate lamas” under the new 
Chinese rule. His official position (as an abbot of one of the four colleges) in the Kirti 
monastery could not be confirmed for that reason. An immediate consequence 
following the lack of resolution of his position was the uncertain patronage from the 
Tibetan patrons as well as the low reputation of the monastery that in turn worsened 
the future prospect of patronage. When I first met him in my friend Tashi’s house in 
1999, he was doing nothing but “sitting” (Tib: ’dug, a local Tibetan colloquial 
expression meaning “staying or wandering idly”) in the monastery. 
                                                                                                                                            
region often pass by Taktsang Lhamo without staying. A tour guide told me that it is mostly because of 
the low quality and capacity of local tourist infrastructure. He said, “people want to feel the wildness of 
nature. But after one day of wildness they still need to stay in a modern hotel and restaurant with 
everything they are familiar with.” Interview in Langmusi, May 2004. 
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In the Kirti monastery two positions are needed to make “tea”—patronage to 
the whole monastic community—on a regular basis through the year: one is the abbot 
of the monastery or college (Tib: mkhan po) that is often held by a reincarnate lama of 
the monastery; the other is the Geke of the monastery or college that can be held by 
any monk in the monastery recommended by the reincarnate lamas or the Siguanhui. 
Lamas or monks who are going to hold these two positions usually have to prepare for 
the patronage well before they actually take the position. Although there are no written 
rules for the actual amount of each patronage, there are definitely certain expectations 
from the monk public and these expectations have been growing quickly in recent 
years. If the patronage does not meet the public expectation, people would “talk a 
lot.”297 The lama or Geke who was responsible for the patronage would feel 
embarrassed and then have more difficulties in maintaining his reputation in his 
position. On the contrary, if the patronage exceeds public expectation, people would 
also talk about it afterwards. In this case those who gave the patronage would gain 
more respect both in their positions and in the monastery. This ideal connection 
between the wealthy patronage and the highly renowned lama or Geke position in the 
monastery has been based on the pre-1950s political and economic context.  
Shortly after Tashi started to work at the ticket office in 2002 he met a group 
of Chinese tourists from Shanghai. They claimed to be Buddhist practitioners or 
Buddhist believers and came to Taktsang Lhamo for religious purpose more than 
tourism. After a short congenial talk with Tashi they were immediately attracted to the 
reincarnate lama he mentioned because he has been recognized by the Dalai Lama. 
Tashi then brought them to meet Alak Jigme in his house, to receive his blessing—a 
white khada (ceremonial scarf) and a colorful silk tie for protection (Tib: srung mdud). 
                                                 
297 Tib: kha mang gi, literarily means “many mouths,” it is a local Tibetan colloquial expression, 
meaning to gossip or talk badly about someone or something in a private circle.   
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This meeting proved to have a magical affect on both the Chinese group and Alak 
Jigme. Although the Chinese group relied totally on Tashi’s rough translation to 
understand the few words Alak Jigme said, they apparently left with complete 
satisfaction. After some time one of the Chinese in this group—a wealthy auto dealer 
in Shanghai—contacted Tashi again through the new shouji (mobile phone) he got. 
The Chinese businessman wanted to invite Alak Jigme for a blessing trip to Shanghai 
with all their expenses covered. Having no responsibility in the monastery at that time, 
Alak Jigme gladly accepted the invitation and asked Tashi to be his translator.  
The trip was a fruitful one. Not only did Alak Jigme and Tashi experience an 
airplane for the first time in their lives, but it was also the first time that they gave 
blessing to a group of Chinese businessmen in a five-star hotel. The Chinese group, all 
of whom were wealthy clients of the auto dealer, was fascinated by the blessing of a 
young Tibetan lama who was recognized by the Dalai Lama.298 At the end of their 
stay the Chinese host learned that such a young, promising lama was still taking a bus 
to go to the countryside for blessing or teaching. Thus they suggested a donation of a 
four-wheel drive Toyota. When Tashi recalled that moment to me, he made a shocked 
expression with his face. But in the end they decided not to accept this hugh donation. 
Tashi explained to me that in the Kirti monastery only Alak Lobsang had a four-wheel 
drive at that time, which was given to him because of his position in the government. 
It would be very awkward for Alak Jigme to have the same car as someone with a 
lower status. For practical reasons, it was more urgent for Alak Jigme at that time to 
“make a lot of tea” for the monk public than to ride in a luxury four-wheel drive 
vehicle. Finally the Chinese patrons agreed instead to pay for the “tea” expenses 
(patronage) in all ceremonies that he would host during one year.   
                                                 
298 Tashi told me that the fact Alak Jigme could not have any position in the Kirti monastery indirectly 
proved his connection with the Dalai Lama.  
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When I came back to Taktsang Lhamo in 2003 I was surprised to hear that 
Alak Jigme unofficially held the abbot position of the Kalachakra College in the Kirti 
monastery. Monks were talking about the generous patronage he gave during the 
rituals he hosted. A young monk told me it was the biggest amount he received in one 
monastic gathering—five kilos of yak butter and twenty yuan cash. Although the 
Chinese source of his patronage was no secret to the monk community, Alak Jigme 
still got the reputation of being good at dealing with new things and thus won a lot of 
public support, especially from the majority of young monks. Some even suggested 
that the Siguanhui should confront the government’s disapproval on this issue and put 
Alak Jigme in his appropriate position in the Kirti monastery. The young monks’ 
support to Alak Jigme is not just a latent critique towards the older generation of 
authorities who are slow to direct their monastery in the new social economic 
situations. In the new monastic administrative system the Siguanhui leaders and its 
committee members are officially elected through a monastery-wide open vote every 
four to five years—though the final result still has to be approved by the Religious 
Bureau. Although there is usually no suspense regarding who will be elected, some old 
monks elected confessed in private that they are now under more public pressure than 
before when they have to make any monastic decision.  
Alak Jigme’s success in the Kirti monastery seemed to also have inspired 
others in a similar position. The most visible case is the changing attitude of the Geke 
towards the Chinese tourists when they maintained public orders. In previous years 
only a government authorized badge issued to some state employed journalists or 
government officials could guarantee privileged access to the ritual grounds during the 
monastic ceremony (Makley 1999). During the recent years the number of tourists and 
amateur artists to this region, particularly during the festivals like Monlam Chenmo, 
has been skyrocketing. Armed with the latest fancy gear from AV equipment to four-
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wheel drive vehicles, these tourists come explicitly to hunt for everything exotic. It is 
thus no wonder that the high-sitting leading lama and the well dressed and equipped 
Geke during the ceremony have become the most observed subjects. While the 
traditional symbolic power of the Geke requires a more violent treatment towards the 
public, regardless of whether they are Chinese tourists or the Tibetan pilgrims, today 
this responsibility has been confronted with Geke’s pragmatic need to “make a lot of 
tea” during his tenure. During the last two years of Monlam Chenmo that I have 
attended, I observed that the Geke has visibly treated the Chinese tourists in mild 
manner, even though they have obviously been intruding during the monastic 
rituals.299 In contrast to Geke’s gentle treatment to the Chinese tourists, the young 
monks in the monastic community, particularly the child monks, were very hostile 
towards the intruding Chinese photographers. Many Chinese photographers who 
passed the Geke’s control into the ritual center finally had to give up in order to 
protect themselves and their expensive equipment from the constant small stones 
coming from the crowds of young monk.  
 
6.4.2 Monk Dzoba 
Just before I left Taktsang Lhamo in 2005 monk Dzoba became a popular 
subject of talking in the monastic community. The former abbot of the Medical 
College had resigned from his position for certain reasons—and one of them was said 
to be his inability to generate necessary patronage. Before the Siguanhui assigned a 
new abbot, monk Dzoba bravely suggested that he could be the new abbot of the 
Medical College. This act shocked everyone in the monastery since it was probably 
                                                 
299 During the Monlam Chenmo 2004 when a Geke saw I was taking photos and videos he even called 
on me to enter the ritual ground to take photos right in front of the Tibetan public. 
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the first time in the Kirti monastery history that a monk volunteered to become an 
abbot of a college.  
Dzoba is no more than a normal monk in the Kirti monastery. Since he first 
arrived in the Kirti monastery in the early 1980s he was known among his fellow 
monks as a Gyagarma (Chinese lover). As he comes from mixed region with Tibetan, 
Hui, and Chinese, Dzoba naturally speaks good Chinese and has many “Chinese 
habits,” such as drinking green tea (instead of Tibetan tea), eating Chinese style food 
(instead of tsampa), sitting in a chair (rather than on the floor), or sleeping with a quilt 
(rather than in a Tibetan style robe). While these were initially talked about and 
laughed at by many of his fellow monks, nowadays he has become prouder of these 
Chinese habits as well as his Chinese language ability. 
Through his meeting with many Chinese tourists to Taktsang Lhamo as well as 
his own trips to China, not only has Dzoba made many Chinese connections, but his 
knowledge about the outside world has made him like a rising celebrity in the 
monastery. Many monks like to come to his house for dinner because they would 
enjoy hearing about all the interesting things from outside: how Tibetan monks can 
stay for free in Chinese temples during their pilgrimage, what is it like to stay in a 
high-class hotel, and how some rich Chinese Buddhists can be more generous than 
Tibetan patrons. He often attracts many young monks who are curious about 
everything outside the monastery. He also has some fancy gear brought from the 
outside that many monks like to inspect. He was one of the first in Taktsang Lhamo 
who owned a mobile phone and almost every time he came back from the outside he 
would change to a new model with some new fancy functions. 
His monk friends believe that Dzoba’s confidence to go against the monastic 
mainstream comes from his knowledge about the outside as well as his alleged 
business success. Monks in Kirti monastery are not strictly forbidden to be involved in 
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any kind of commercial business. However, it is widely considered as a shame or 
dishonor to do so for monks who have taken all the vows. Dzoba insisted that he had 
no business relation with his Chinese friends. But everyone else in the monastery 
seemed sure that Dzoba has commercially benefited from his Chinese liaison. They 
started to tease him by calling him akhu laoban (“monk boss” or “monk 
businessman”)—a combination of a Tibetan word for “monk” and a Chinese word for 
“boss” or “businessman” implying his business relations with the Chinese.  
The fact that Dzoba as an ordinary monk nominated himself publicly for a high 
monastery position showed his confidence in both his celebrity status and his financial 
abilities, which many in the monastery would not openly announce but nevertheless 
admit as an important factor in the monastery position today. Although the Siguanhui 
did not grant this position to Dzoba in the end, the influence of this event has 
reconfirmed in the minds of many monks and reincarnate lamas that to be a monk or a 
lama in the monastery today no longer means the same thing as it did before. Monks 
who are quick to understand and adapt themselves well to the new context (such as 
Alak Jigme and monk Dzoba) find it an time with more opportunities. However few 
have thought of the stakes that are involved in these new opportunities.   
 
6.5 Food, Mobile Phones and Stomach-ache: Modernization and Consumption in 
the Ethnic Borderland 
The building of the Lan-Lang Road has made this ethnic borderland more 
accessible to the Chinese nation, both geographically and economically. Meanwhile it 
has also greatly increased the mobility of the locals for participating in the fast 
growing nation-wide market that has developed since the 1980s (Davis 2000). 
Compared to my previous stays I felt immediately, when I arrived in 2003, that there 
were significantly increased choices of commercial products, particularly industrial 
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food, imported from outside. Many local Hui residents have opened new shops with 
more consumer goods. The new Lan-Lang Road has made it possible to transport 
more products from elsewhere in China with much lower cost than before. Three 
vegetable shops—two run by the Chinese vendors from Sichuan and one by a local 
Hui family—have supplied the increasing restaurant demand for fresh vegetables. One 
Hui family opened the first commercial public shower to meet the increasing 
demand.300 On the top of the hill of Taktsang Lhamo valley, China Mobile has set up a 
transmission tower and put the mobile phone coverage of this region into its national 
network. Tourists can now get connected through their mobile phone in Taktsang 
Lhamo. Even some advanced locals started to carry a mobile phone bought from 
outside. Although most of these facilities were a direct response to the growing need 
of tourists, the explosive choices for consumption suddenly poured into this ethnic 
borderland and tourists have become live models of consumption practice deeply 
influencing the everyday practices in the local Tibetan and Hui.  
While consumption used to be a sub-category of production, it has attracted 
much scholarly attention in recent decades. Many have linked the concrete everyday 
practices of consumption to other constitutive parts of culture and society such as 
religion, ethnicity, nationalism, globalization, political economy, etc. (Anagnost 1997; 
Appadurai 1996; Certeau 1984; Davis 2000; Gladney 1998b). Borrowing from 
theorists like Michel de Certeau (1994), this scholarship highlights the individual 
creativity and ability to control consumption practice and tries to restore the human 
agency that could otherwise be buried in the grand discourse. In the case of China the 
rise of consumerism with the reform and opening up policy since the 1980s has been 
generally positioned as a new challenge to the political hegemony of the Chinese 
                                                 
300 Before this public shower, the only place we could take a shower was in one of the local hotels, 
which often did not have enough supply of water or electricity.  
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government (Davis 2000), an alternative voice in the taken-for-granted concept of the 
“Chinese culture” (Latham, et al. 2006), or an emergence of public sphere as a result 
of the retreat of government intervention (Gillette 2000). The consumption of food, for 
example, is the one of the most explicit cases in which the everyday practices can be at 
the heart of such ideological domain as the reconstruction of ethnic identity or the 
resurgence of nationalism (Cesaro 2000; Rudelson 1997). In her ethnography of urban 
Hui in Xi’an, Gillette (2000) documented a contemporary Chinese Muslim community 
in China that has openly embraced the Islamic tradition as an alternative index to 
achieve what they envision as modern or modernization. However, as she contended, 
despite the resistance to the Chinese state imposed ideology “[m]ost ordinary Chinese 
citizens [including urban Hui residents in Xi’an] shared the government leaders’ 
material standard of modernization.”301 Indeed it is this hybridity that characterizes 
many parts of the Chinese as well as the ethnic minority society in contemporary 
China.302
My own research in Taktsang Lhamo shows a similarly nuanced scenario of 
the everyday practices of consumption. It supports the view that increased choices of 
individual consumption practice have provided a new arena for the religious revival 
and ethnic identity reconstruction in the ethnic borderland of post-reform China. Both 
religious revival and ethnic identity have been expressed through various daily 
practices of consumption which were made possible by a simultaneous political 
relaxation and market expansion in China. Even sickness, as I shall show, can be 
incurred, diagnosed and cured through the ethnically marked practices of consumption. 
While this new consuming expression of ethnicity and religion does pose a new 
                                                 
301 See (Gillette 2000: 15). Also (Upton 1996; Davis 2000). 
302 Johnathan Lipman has suggested a “hyphenated identity” in which Hui could be comfortably be 
situated as both Chinese and Muslim without reducing each into the other (Lipman 1996). Dru Gladney 
also used a similar concept when he criticized Huntington’s “clash of civilization” (Gladney 1998b; 
Huntington 1996). 
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challenge to the Chinese state hegemony, it has nevertheless been conditioned by the 
political and economic context of Chinese modernization—some have labeled it “a 
new form of governmentality” (Ngai 2003).303
 
6.5.1 Meat, Tsampa, Tea, and Vegetables  
As a traditional nomadic region local food structure in Taktsang Lhamo has 
been rather simple. Meat and milk products from sheep and yaks are the main local 
produce. Tibetan peasants from the neighboring agricultural regions provide ample 
supply of tsampa—the Tibetan staple food. Together they constitute the principle 
content in the local Tibetan diet. Symbolically meat represents an expensive or luxury 
food served in celebrative occasions while tsampa is often viewed as a cheap default 
food in everyday life.  
Local Tibetans including monks love to eat meat.304 A typical local treat to 
welcome honored guests, close friends and family members, or to celebrate a festival 
season are some gigantic pieces of freshly cut and boiled meat accompanied with 
steamed Tibetan Momo (locally referred to as zangbao) stuffed with meat, or 
preferably fat. For many local Tibetans, having meat mixed with vegetables is 
considered the “Chinese way.” To eat purely vegetables is nearly unthinkable. When I 
lived in my friend Tashi’s house, he always had a whole leg of pork or sheep (Tib: 
skam sha), dry and raw, hung on the wall of his living room. Besides using it for 
                                                 
303 By criticizing the “myth of democratizing through equal access to consumption”, Ngai (2003) 
pointed out that behind this seemingly democratized practice of consumption it is usually the social, 
political, and economic context that determines the individual access to various social and economic 
resources. Therefore in the post-reform era of Chinese state consumption has also become “a new form 
of governmentality.” 
304 Compared to Chinese Buddhist monks, Tibetan monks have not been restricted on their diet, mainly 
meat. My monk friends explained this with the severe climate condition on the Tibetan plateau that 
requires more energy—thus meat—from food and that also makes growing vegetable nearly impossible. 
In recent years, with the increasing global influence on Tibetan communities, particularly through the 
exile Tibetan communities in India, meat eating has become a new concern in the monastic community 
in Taktsang Lhamo.  
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cooking, Tashi’s favorite joy every time he finished chanting was to jump up from the 
floor, take a knife from the side table, slice a big piece of meat with fat from the 
hanging leg, and then fill up his mouth with a look of complete satisfaction.  
In contrast to the luxury and festive nature of meat, tsampa serves mostly as 
cheap breakfast and lunch for monks who have to go through the long morning 
sessions, for lay families who have to be out of home for the whole day herding their 
cattle, or for those who simply can not afford anything else. As a daily staple food in 
Tibetan life tsampa is a unique Tibetan food adaptation to the high altitude 
environment. Moreover it has also become a Tibetan cultural symbol that has 
transcended the geographical, linguistic or other cultural barriers across the Tibetan 
plateau. Therefore it carries as much material importance to the Tibetan daily life as 
the symbolic one.305  
In many Amdo Tibetan regions where Hui immigrants have settled for 
centuries Hui food has changed the local Tibetan taste and become an important part 
of the Tibetan diet. Not only have local Tibetans adapted well to Hui style food, but 
the Hui influence is found in local Tibetan food as well.306 One of the most popular 
local Tibetan dishes in Taktsang Lhamo, the thugpa—a Tibetan style noodle soup 
mixed with meat—can be the Tibetan version of the popular Hui restaurant dish the 
mianpian, or Hui noodle soup with meat.  
Another significant adaptation in the Tibetan diet is the adoption of Chinese 
and Hui style tea. Because of the general lack of vegetables in Tibetan diet, tea has 
                                                 
305 Indeed tsampa has even become ethnic marker to differentiate Tibetan from non-Tibetans. During 
the Tibetan uprising in 1959, Tibetans identified themselves as “tsampa eaters” in contrast to Chinese 
as the “rice eaters.” See (Shakya 1993) for more on tsampa and Tibetan ethnic identity. 
306 In a borderland region where everything is by nature hybrid, it is hard, if possible at all, to describe 
one particular food in the modern ethnic terms that have been recently created in a nation-state context. 
It is not my interest to look for the origin of one particular food. But rather I mean to convey the idea of 
a mutual influence on each cultural tradition through everyday life interaction. See also the later part of 
this chapter. 
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always been an important complement in Tibetan everyday life. Unlike in central 
Tibet where the yak butter tea (Tib: ja sal ma) is served all the time along with or 
outside meals, Tibetan tea in Taktsang Lhamo is often served without butter and salt. 
After the 1980s Chinese tea has gradually appeared in local Tibetan life. Monk Dzoba 
remembered vividly that he was often laughed at by other monks at that time for 
drinking Chinese green tea while everyone else was drinking Tibetan tea. Twenty 
years later, Tibetans in Taktsang Lhamo including monks are drinking primarily the 
Chinese green tea (Ch: lucha), locally referred to as xicha (fine tea or small tea). Only 
in some occasions people still drink the Tibetan tea (Tib: bod ja), locally referred to as 
dacha (coarse tea or big tea), which is now considered cheap. It is now considered 
awkward, or “face warm” (Tib: ngo tsha), to treat a guest with Tibetan tea. In addition 
to the Chinese green tea, the Hui style Muslim tea (Ch: babao cha), locally referred to 
as wanzi (cup), has also become a popular drink in Taktsang Lhamo. Muslim tea is a 
Hui invention through the history of Chinese interaction. This tea is typically served in 
a traditional Chinese style cup filled with a mix of Chinese green tea leaves, some 
cube sugar and several kinds of dry fruit. While Muslim tea used to be consumed only 
in the Hui community, nowadays it has become popular in Tibetan families and 
among the Tibetan monks as well.  
Vegetables do not grow easily at this altitude and virtually did not exist in the 
local Tibetan diet. Tibetans borrow the Chinese word cai (Tib: tshal) for vegetable 
since the Tibetan word rtsa means mostly grass which serves only as food for 
animals.307 “People here don’t eat any vegetables!” This was a local Chinese 
restaurant owner from Sichuan told me when I went to his restaurant the first time. 
Since most Chinese dishes in his restaurant come with a mix of meat and vegetables 
                                                 
307 Robert Ekvall has some detailed ethnographic account on the everyday life in Taktsang Lhamo 
during the 1920s-1940s, in which he has described how nomad Tibetans laughed at those Chinese who 
eat grass and have no strength.    
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Tibetan customers typically finished their dishes by picking out the meat and leaving 
everything else.  
The appearance of the three vegetable grocery shops in town was in the 
beginning because of tourist demand. The Hui vegetable shop serves the special Hui 
community need since Hui would not buy their vegetables from a non-Hui Chinese 
shop for religious reasons.308 However after I arrived at Taktsang Lhamo in 2003 I 
have noticed that eating vegetables has somehow become a trendy thing among the 
monk community. Although big pieces of meat still play the dominant role in the 
important days of festivals, many monks started to buy vegetables for their regular 
meals. At first I related this to the fact that vegetables are a lot cheaper than meat and 
thus more affordable for poor monks who have little connection to the herding 
families who have meat.309 It turned out that many monks have much more to say on 
this subject than simply a price difference. In fact it surprised me that they hardly even 
mentioned the price factor. Instead they often related eating vegetables to being 
civilized and modern. As one monk told me after his trip to China:  
 
Before I went to China I only liked to eat meat and butter but never ate any 
vegetables. During my travel in China because it was hot everywhere I have 
always had so much grease and a bad odor coming out of my body. Wherever 
I went [Chinese] people would avoid me. I felt so ashamed of this! (Tib: nga 
zhig gi ngo tsha phyi gi) This is a bit uncivilized (Ch: bu wenming), isn’t it? 
Then I realized it was because I ate too much meat and butter. Now I eat 
vegetables everyday and I find vegetables are also tasty (Tib: zhim gi). 
 
                                                 
308 I have noticed sometimes that some Hui restaurant owners did buy vegetable from the Chinese shop 
when they served Chinese tourists. It was probably because of the Chinese tourist demand for certain 
vegetable that was not available from the Hui shop. 
309 The meat monks consumed has mostly come from Tibetan nomad or herding families as gift or 
contributions rather than commercial exchange. For those monks who have little connection to these 
families (i.e. a monk from agricultural region) they often have less meat at home or they have to 
exchange what they have (i.e. tsampa) with other monks who have meat. 
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For monks and local Tibetans who have not been to China eating vegetables also 
became a new fashion which relates to the conception of modern brought by the 
tourists or their monk friends who have been to the outside world.310 Consumption is 
no longer a simple matter of taste or habit. Rather it is more and more intertwined with 
such new ideological concepts as modernity, ethnicity, or the state.  
Stevan Harrell (1995a) traced the genealogy of the civilizing project that has 
been constructed between a civilizing center and those to-be-civilized peripheries 
inhabited by the uncivilized peoples. While this civilizing project served mostly the 
imperial imagination of their subjects on the fringe of the empire, it has become much 
more concrete in the nation state era. Since the founding of the People’s Republic the 
Communist Chinese government has propagated a socialist modernization project that 
promised to bring all nationalities equally to the golden path of socialism. However to 
articulate the enormous cultural, ethnic, and economic differences in a multi-ethnic 
nation state within a unified state model of Communist modernization has worked to 
both incorporate and marginalize those people in a nation building project. After the 
1980s this state model of modernization has shifted to a complex mix of materialist 
pragmatism, a consumer oriented market, and socialist state control. In Taktsang 
Lhamo the changing consumption practices—from meat, tsampa and Tibetan tea to 
vegetable and Chinese or Muslim tea—show the local participation of the materialistic 
modernization that Chinese government has advocated. What is at stake, however, is 
the mutual influence between the materialistic modernization and the ethnic and 
religious revival. While the local ethnic and religious revival aimed to recuperate the 
cultural identity and tradition, their change of consumption practices shows a 
                                                 
310 I have myself been an agent of modernity in this case as well. Since I came there whenever someone 
invited me for food they always prepared vegetables. In the beginning it was more curiosity and slowly 
many of my friends started to relate vegetables with me and with an idea of modernity that I have 
embodied.  
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transformed meaning of their tradition which have been paradoxically represented 
through a Chinese version of modernity (i.e., bu wenming, uncivilized). 
 
6.5.2 “My Mobile Phone Eats More Than Me!” Contesting and Contrasting the 
Modern in Tibetan and Hui Communities 
The high popularity of the shouji among the monks is first a collective 
reflection of the conception of modern in the monk community. My fieldwork also 
shows that the conception of modernity has been conceived quite differently by 
Tibetan and Hui. These differences have further complicated the ethnic and religious 
revival in this borderland community. 
In 2003 a mobile phone alone without any bundled plan cost more than a 
month’s salary of a local government clerk. Owning a mobile phone in Taktsang 
Lhamo was both a flashy symbol of the modern and it could also be a financial burden 
for most locals. However, based on my own estimation in the field, it was the lowest 
income group among all locals—namely Tibetan monks—who has the highest 
ownership rate of mobile phone.311  
After getting a mobile phone, Tashi became more socially respected among 
monks while at the same felt more financial pressure than before. One night after 
dinner he was talking on his mobile phone with a friend when suddenly the phone was 
cut. His mobile phone needed to be recharged with another card in order to be 
functional again. The phone card costs 50 to 100 yuan which represents a large 
amount of money for a monk who has no regular income—even donations he receives 
are often not in cash. Frustrated as he was Tashi threw the phone heavily on the table 
and complained loudly: “I have already had two disciples [to feed]. Now I have to 
                                                 
311 My estimation was made through interviews with numerous persons in Hui and Tibetan 
communities. More than half of the Tibetan monks I have talked to have or used to have a mobile phone 
in 2005. But in the Hui community this percentage was significantly lower. 
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feed him [shouji] too. And this shouji eats more than me!” Tashi told me that ever 
since he had this mobile phone he often ended up spending the only cash he had on a 
phone card and then “eating tsampa three times a day” as he had no money left to buy 
anything else. As I noticed more monks started to carry a mobile phone, it is true to 
nearly everyone that their mobile phone “eats” more than themselves. At that time I 
always wondered why they would keep a mobile phone (and still many others were 
still so eager to have one) if they could not really afford to use it.  
The answer is certainly beyond what can  and cannot be afforded. Shouji, along 
with other new things, has become part of new social status and unofficial political 
status in the monastic community—as opposed to the official monastic hierarchy. 
When the cheap local mobile phone XLT became a second rave in the monk 
community it has created a visible mobile phone hierarchy. Monks who use XLT are 
mostly young novice monks and those who can not afford a shouji. As Sangwu 
explained to me, the expensive shouji is for Akhu and the relatively cheap XLT is 
mostly for young novice monks or those poor Akhu. “So what kind of shouji should 
the Lamas have then?” I asked. “They all have more advanced shouji (Ch: xianjin de 
shouji).” Sangwu answered seriously, “Don’t you see that Alak Jigme’s shouji can 
take photos (Tib: shouji dbar lan gi)!” While the traditional monastic hierarchy has 
cast an ideological projection on the mobile phone the social stratification in the monk 
community can now be quantified through its material site of the mobile phone. 
Meanwhile these new changes in the monk community take the Chinese material 
standard of modernization as an assumption and criteria to prove, at least to 
themselves, that they (Tibetans) are as modern as everyone else (Chinese or others). 
Hui in Taktsang Lhamo also like to think of themselves as modern. They have 
taken both local Tibetans and the Chinese state as an index against which to contrast 
their own vision of modernity. On the one hand, Hui apply the official government 
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standard of modernization to identify themselves as the advanced leading part—along 
with the Han—among all the nationalities in China. On the other hand, they 
differentiate themselves unambiguously from the Han by their belief in Islam. Indeed 
their universal standard of modernization comes directly from what is believed to be 
the modern nature of Islam which makes all its believers, Hui in this case, just 
naturally modern. In other words, people who have modern belief are no doubt 
modern themselves.  
In a casual talk with a Hui shop owner, the young man in his 30s answered my 
questions about Hui-Han difference with rather curiosity: “Why? Aren’t we just like 
you [Han]? Hui and Han are [ethnically] the same—only that we believe in Islam. 
Therefore so called Hui are just Han who believe in Islam.” To go on with his 
explanation on Islam, this young man with high-school level education gave me a 
speech on Islamic religion and modernization:  
 
For outsiders who don’t know anything about us [Hui] and our belief [Islam] 
they always ask [me] why you Islamic people are all bellicose and aggressive. 
This is a big misunderstanding. Let me tell you something more about Islam. 
Islam is actually not a religion. [Because] religion is [to certain extent] related 
to superstition. Islam only teaches you the best way to be in the world. These 
ways of being (Ch: zuoren de daoli) include everything from disciplining 
yourself and being kind to others to keep a hygienic everyday living habit. For 
example, we only eat sheep that were killed by an Ahong (Imam) and we 
wash ourselves everyday. That’s why SARS has never reached the Hui area. 
Islam is a universal truth at all times (Ch: yisilan jiao shi yongheng de zhenli). 
It is the most modern thought (Ch: zui xiandaihua de sixiang). 
 
The Hui self alignment with the Chinese at this point should be understood as no more 
than a cultural statement of being non-exotic in contrast to the local Tibetans who are 
exotic in both Chinese and Hui eyes—that is why tourists come here to see those 
Tibetans but not the Hui. Many scholarly works on Chinese Muslim communities in 
post-1980s China have documented the same trend of Hui applying Islamic ideology 
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as an alternative to the Chinese official discourse yet still sharing the same 
materialistic standard of Chinese modernization (Gillette 2000; Gladney 1998b). This 
was particularly salient when my Hui neighbor Min talked about the education of his 
two children. He first contended that among all the nationalities in China the Hui 
emphasize education the most. When I asked how he identified this Hui emphasis on 
education Min gave me his conception of modern education and of modern Hui by 
comparing the Chinese school education with the Tibetan monastic education and Hui 
religious education in mosque.  
 
To be a modern person one’s education has to consist two parts. One is the 
ability part (Ch: nengli bufen) which one acquires from school. This [part of 
education] gives you the ability to make a living in society. The other is the 
quality part (Ch: suzhi bufen) which one gets from his tradition. Both Tibetan 
monastic education and Hui Mosque education are the quality part [of 
education]. But that alone is not enough. We also need our kids to go to 
[Chinese] school in order to acquire modern knowledge. Nowadays China has 
entered the modern age (Ch: xiandaihua de shidai) because of its change to 
the market economy. But everyone knows that we Hui have always been good 
at doing business [thus modern] since ancient times! 
 
By showing Hui as an advanced nationality with inherited modern nature—in 
contrast to the Han Chinese who have just become modern recently, Min’s 
comment has shown an internalized discourse of Hui as a national minority in 
China with a distinctive culture. Paradoxically this internalization process of the 
Chinese materialistic standard of modernization also shows the revival of ethnic 
Hui identity that used to be suppressed in the Han Chinese state. 
 
6.5.3 Hui Tsampa Eaters and Tibetan Stomach-ache 
The Hui have always been well known in China for their strict regulations in 
their religion as well as in their everyday life, particularly their diet restrictions (Ch: 
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qingzhen).312 For this reason the boundary between Hui and others all over China is 
primarily based on diet restrictions (Gillette 2000: 114-132). Despite the dietary 
difference there has been a general consensus among both the Hui communities and 
the non-Hui communities in China that Hui food served in Hui restaurants is both 
delicious and hygienic because of their religious restrictions.313  
In Taktsang Lhamo Hui people are visibly different from the Tibetans with 
their Chinese style dressing, plus their white hat for men and turban for women. At the 
same time living in Taktsang Lhamo for generations has also given most of them some 
distinct physical features as well as some social customs that are characteristic to 
highland people. For the Hui adaptation to the Tibetan social environment Robert 
Ekvall (1939) contended early in the 1930s that the longtime trading interaction with 
the Tibetans has even changed their (Hui) ethnically “bigoted” character and their 
“truculence and religious intolerance.”314  
Since the first time I came to Taktsang Lhamo what surprised me the most—
besides the fact that every Hui resident speaks excellent Tibetan—was that many local 
Hui have tsampa for their daily meal. One winter afternoon in 2003 I paid a visit to the 
Hui restaurant owner Zhang and his wife Wu in their restaurant as they were having a 
late lunch of tsampa. Both in their 40s, the Hui couple was each using one hand to 
                                                 
312 Food restrictions have been an important aspect in Hui religious life. For many Hui communities in 
China the religious revival after the 1980s meant first of all resuming their diet restrictions, notably the 
prohibition of pork. See, (Gillette 2000: ch. 4-5) for a detailed discussion on Islamic diet restrictions in 
a contemporary urban Hui community in China; Gladney described as “no pigs for the ancestors” 
(Gladney 1991) in the religious resurgence in a Hui community in the northwest province of Ningxia; 
and (Hillman 2004) on the religious revival and pork restriction in a Hui community in the Southwest 
province of Yunnan.  
313 In northwest China where Hui population concentrates a local popular Chinese saying goes “the food 
Hui cooks to good to eat but the word they say is not trustworthy” (Ch: huihui de fan keyi chi, huihui de 
hua buneng ting), which is the Chinese confirmation of the tasty Hui food. 
314 Robert Ekvall was obviously not a fan of Hui Muslims even though he has been living on this ethnic 
borderland for a long time. When describing the relation between Hui Muslims and Tibetans on the 
Sino-Tibetan borderland in 1930s, he said: “the experience and influence of Tibetan trade and travel 
seem also to have modified the truculence and religious intolerance of the Moslems, for those Moslem 
communities which have had much trade and contact with Tibetans are not so bigoted as their co-
religionists of the Hochow [Linxia] district” (Ekvall 1939: 62). 
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hold a bowl and using the other hand to mix barley flour with some fresh yak butter 
and hot Tibetan tea in it until it was made into a kind of flour patties by clasping the 
mixture—the traditional Tibetan way to make tsampa. They did not seem to be 
embarrassed with my curiosity. On the contrary they answered me with even some 
pride.  
 
We have been very used to it [tsampa] since we have been living here for 
generations. Our ancestors have been eating tsampa because it was the 
cheapest way to eat while traveling. It never went bad no matter how long you 
kept it. 
 
Indeed since the pre-Communist time Hui traders have been trading in nomad Tibetan 
areas (Tib: rtsa sa, Ch: caodi) during which tsampa has been their principal food. It 
was the cheapest and most convenient food to carry with—they just need to ask for 
some tea or even water wherever they travel to prepare a fast meal. More importantly, 
speaking the nomad Tibetan dialect (Ch: caodi hua) and eating tsampa made those 
Hui traders more welcome and easily accepted in nomad Tibetan tents, which in turn 
also made their business in these Tibetan regions easy. These days despite Hui style 
food constitutes the main part of their daily diet, Wu said: “If we don’t eat tsampa for 
some days we would surely miss it.”315
In many Tibetan borderland places with Hui inhabitants, Hui restaurants are 
often the dominant local restaurants. Hui style food thus has had a major influence on 
the local diet over time. Meanwhile I have also noticed that no matter how many Hui 
restaurants or teahouses there are, their customers are always Tibetans or Chinese. I 
have never seen one Hui customer in a Hui restaurant or teahouse. Hui themselves 
usually give an easy short answer to this—since every Hui wife cooks well at home 
                                                 
315 Fieldnotes December 2003, interview with a Hui couple in their restaurant. The Hui adoption of 
Tibetan traditions, including food, was also recorded by Robert Ekvall (1939).  
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there is no need for Hui to go to the restaurant. For most Tibetans Hui restaurants are 
here in the Tibetan land first of all because of the Tibetan benevolence. It is thus 
natural that they provide a service to Tibetans, which is a symbolic continuation of the 
tax and contribution that the Hui mtha’wa (subject family or village) had to pay to the 
Tibetan monastery on a regular basis in the pre-1950s era. For that reason I have 
always found local Tibetans enjoy the Hui food and being served in the Hui 
restaurants—until the final days of my fieldwork when I suddenly started to hear some 
negative rumors among the Tibetan monks about the Hui restaurants and their food. It 
all started with my friend Tashi who came to my place one day asking me if I have 
any medicine for hokhu or “stomach sickness” (Tib: pho ba kho’i).  
Ever since the three monks (including Tashi) started to work in the ticket office 
they started to frequent the nearby Hui restaurants more often than before. As ticket 
collectors they don’t have to comply with the monastic schedule for routine gatherings. 
With the ticket office on the border of monastery and non-monastery territory they 
also have more chances to go out of the monastery without being easily caught by the 
Geke. Tashi told me that many Chinese tourists are very interested in talking to them. 
Sometimes these Chinese tourists would invite them for an extended talk out of their 
office—usually in the nearby Hui restaurant. Sometimes they would also go by 
themselves in order to save their lunch time by not walking back home and cooking. 
Besides the three ticket collectors, other monks from the Kirti monastery also go to the 
Hui restaurants more often these days—mostly on monastery Sunday. It is the only 
day of the week that monks are officially allowed to go out of the monastery. Most 
young monks would go in groups to the Hui restaurants in town spending this leisure 
time over a Hui meal and a cup of Muslim tea.  
When Tashi first came to ask for medicine I did not realize that there was a 
phenomenon of “Tibetan stomach-ache” in the monk community. Later, when I asked 
223 
him if the medicine I gave him actually worked, he told me that many monks have had 
the same problem and many of them started to take Tibetan medicine that is provided 
by the monastery owned clinic. Soon after that rumors became rampant in the monk 
community. More monks claimed to have the same symptom of stomach-ache after 
they ate in the Hui restaurants. All blamed the Hui restaurants and their food for the 
“Tibetan stomach-ache.” One story circulating at the monks’ dinner was that, Hagei’s 
restaurant (one of the most popular Hui restaurants in town which often gathered a lot 
of Tibetan customers) always has too many customers to serve. In order to make more 
noodles at a time Hagei’s wife used her feet to make the dough. They used the dish 
washing water to boil the noodle. Every Hui knew this. That’s why you never see even 
one Hui eating in a Hui restaurant. The story used a deliberately derogative way—
women and feet—to describe Tibetan monks as the victims of dirty and ill-disposed 
Hui business.316 Yet despite the obviously fictional account many stories like this have 
been widely circulated among the monks in a half serious-half joking way.  
After this “Tibetan stomach-ache” incident Tibetan monks stopped going to 
the Hui restaurants for a while. Many monks were still rather pessimistic about the fact 
that ultimately they can not avoid the presence of Hui and Hui restaurants. As my 
friend Tashi told me, “after all we have been eating Hui food for so many years. There 
is nothing we can do about it.” Meanwhile after this incident many monks have found 
the magical effect of Tibetan medicine to cure the stomach sickness from dirty Hui 
food. Tashi still goes to the Hui restaurants from time to time when he has to deal with 
the Chinese tourists. But after he comes back from the Hui restaurants he always 
passed by the monastery clinic for some stomach medicine. “These are not really 
medicines,” Tashi explained to me, “they are just some medicine powders that you can 
take regularly for the benefit of your health.” At the same time I also noticed that he 
                                                 
316 Both woman and feet are derogative concepts for Tibetans monks in this context.  
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had resumed the habit of drinking cheap Tibetan tea—this time not to save money but 
to save his health. The local Tibetans believes that Chinese green tea has a tasty flavor 
but it does not do any good to your stomach because it is “cold” in its nature. On the 
contrary Tibetan tea does not taste very good in mouth but it is “warm” in nature. 
Tashi told me in a joking way: “our stomachs have taken too much Hui food, drinking 
Tibetan tea would be good for our stomach.”  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
TIBETAN SPLITTISTS AND BIN LADEN’S THINGS: A BORDERLAND 
PERSPECTIVE ON THE LOCAL, NATIONAL AND GLOBAL 
 
 
7.1 September 11th in Taktsang Lhamo: Local, National, and Global 
In summer 2001 I went back to China for a semester-long stay in Taktsang 
Lhamo as part of my pre-dissertation fieldwork.317 In the evening of September 10th 
(Bejing time, the morning time of September 11th US Eastern Time) I was visiting my 
Tibetan friend Cairang at his home that he was temporarily using as his office. Cairang 
was the head of a local government administrative office. The main office building 
was under construction by a Hui construction group from Linxia. Cairang’s office had 
one of the few television sets in town at that time. That night the official Chinese TV 
channel very briefly broadcasted the breaking news of the September 11th attack in 
New York City. As a norm for Chinese media towards a breaking event like this the 
first report was delayed in time with much reservation as regards explanation since 
they were waiting for higher authorities to decide for the official tone that every news 
media in China would have to follow. Cairang and I looked at the short clip on TV and 
neither of us could believe what we saw.  
It seemed to have taken longer than usual for the Chinese authorities to decide 
on an official tone this time. For the next few days the Chinese media showed 
surprisingly little exposure of this event that was shocking the whole world. In sharp 
contrast to the Chinese official reservation, the local Tibetan monk community 
immediately responded to this event based on their daily news feed from the short 
                                                 
317 See map figures for references of different names and locations. 
226 
wave radio. With the exploding spread of the news in the monk community, lots of 
new terms such as “Osama Bin Laden” and “terrorist attack” quickly became the most 
talked-about subjects on many occasions, from the monks’ dinner tables to the random 
gatherings on the road. What surprised me first in this response of the monks was that 
despite the apparent geographical and political distance between an event like this and 
monastic life on a remote Tibetan borderland, talks like these among the monks were 
hardly rhetorical. Indeed they were closely related to the contemporary Tibetan 
politics and the ethnic religious relations in Taktsang Lhamo. Most monks would 
express their condemnation not only of Bin Laden or terrorists as the representative of 
Muslim people but they also openly directed their criticism towards Islam as a 
problematic religion. As one monk started up the topic during a group dinner in monk 
Roba’s house, “Islam is the worst religion in the world. Wherever there are Muslims 
and Islam there is problem.” Therefore the American response to the terrorist attack 
was seen as both morally right and heroic against something evil. While the 
degradation of Islam and moralization of America in this particular event might have 
more to do with many other things,318 the impact of this global event in a remote 
Tibetan borderland was reflected directly on the local ethnic awareness and ethnic 
relations vis-à-vis the Chinese nation. 
As I have shown in the previous chapters, the transition of this region from the 
pre-nation state of de facto independence to the incorporation in the Chinese nation 
has radically shifted the social political context for Tibetan and Hui in this ethnic 
borderland. The Chinese incorporation and the subsequent Cultural Revolution had 
actively sought to suppress ethnic differences by dissolving them in the communist 
notion of class. While the post-1980s political relaxation have since then relieved the 
                                                 
318 For example, Charlene Makley has cogently argued that gender has played a significant role in both 
the Tibetan Buddhist revival in the post-1980s period and the reconstruction of a Tibetan culture 
centered on masculine power (Makley 2007). 
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cultural and ethnic expression by separating them from class struggle it has also 
gradually waken up the long suppressed ethnic differences along with the ethnic 
tensions. Brackette Williams (1989: 429) has pointed out early to understand the 
relation between nationalism and ethnicity—or as she puts it, “why ethnic groups must 
have distinctive cultures” in nations—we must start from nation-building as a 
mythmaking and “the material factors that motivate and rationalize its elements.” 
Most Tibetans and Hui in Taktsang Lhamo contended to me that they were never 
thinking of each other in terms of “Tibetans” or “Hui” in the old days (before 1950), 
even before the 1980s. The ethnic tension between Tibetan and Hui has become 
visible mostly since the ethnoreligious revival started in both communities from the 
beginning of 1980s. Although it has often resolved around economic issues, this 
tension has its root in both ethnic and political demand in the new Chinese state 
reflecting a continuous dilemma of the multiethnic policy in China. In an ethnic 
borderland like Taktsang Lhamo the increasing disjuncture between the political and 
ethnic advantage of the local Tibetan majority and the economic advantage of the local 
Hui minority against a political economic shadow of a Chinese state has not only 
challenged the ethnic equality policy by fueling the tension between the two ethnic 
groups, but increasingly it has put this tension under the magnifying glass of a national, 
and sometimes global, forum. 
After the September 11th incident the local Tibetan community, particularly 
monks, started to absorb many new loanwords, most of which are Chinese translation 
of English terms such as kongbu fenzi (terrorist) or benladeng (Bin Laden), both in 
their political discussion and in their daily life. One day after a joyful chat in the 
teahouse we were on our way back from Gyago (downtown) with three monk friends 
Dongzhu, Darji and Tashi when Dongzhu suddenly thought of something that he 
forgot to buy for dinner. As we were just passing by a Hui grocery shop I went in 
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almost without thinking until I realized my three friends were still hesitating outside. 
Dongzhu called me out from the outside and suggested that we go to the small Tibetan 
shop by the monastery. Out of the Hui shop I was still puzzled as we, including many 
other monks in the monastery, often went to this Hui shop because they offered much 
more choices than the small Tibetan one. To continue the joyful atmosphere Dongzhu 
said to me half joking and half serious in Chinese: “we don’t buy Bin Laden’s things 
(Ch: women bu mai benladeng de dongxi).” Then the three friends immediately 
laughed together. Apparently it was one of the popular jokes among the monks at that 
time—to refer to the local Hui with the new Chinese loanword benladeng (Bin Laden). 
On the other hand the Hui in Taktsang Lhamo reacted to this September 11th 
incident in a more subtle way. In the following weeks the Chinese official media 
started to show their condemnation of this terrorist attack. In keeping with the Chinese 
official position of anti-imperialism (namely American imperialism) and also to avoid 
any political undertone that might potentially go against its own interests, the official 
TV channels in China showed images and reports from both the Western media and 
the anti-Western Arabic media, which is rare on Chinese TV. On the Chinese national 
media various government and non-government associations in China started to 
announce their anti-terrorist position. Among all the carefully crafted media responses, 
it was noticeable that the Chinese National Muslim Association (Ch: zhongguo 
yisilanjiao xiehui) was the first religious and non-government association to publicly 
announce their stance toward this incident on behalf of all Muslims in China. 
Following the official Chinese line, the announcement emphasized “the condemnation 
on Bin Laden and the terrorist attack by all the peace-loving Muslims in China” thus 
deliberately separating the terrorists from the majority Muslims and Islam.  
As I was visiting my friend Cairang the following week, I noticed the 
television set in his room had been gone from time to time. Cairang told me it was the 
229 
Hui construction group working next door that had been borrowing the TV everyday 
after work, since September 11th. He then said to me secretly: “They [the Hui workers] 
just like to see the Arabic script on the TV.” Out of curiosity I visited the construction 
site next door for the first time. This working site for the Hui workers was also their 
dinning place during the day and sleeping place at night. When I went in it was their 
dinner time and I found they were doing their daily prayer in front of the TV that was 
broadcasting some Arabic TV images with Arabic scripts.  
The day after my visit to the Hui construction site, I was again in Cairang’s 
place when a young Hui man from the construction group came in to borrow a knife. I 
handed him the Swiss army knife that I often carried in my pocket. The young man of 
my age took the knife and looked at it with a bit surprise, then said to me: “Oh, I know 
this knife. It is a Swiss army knife. It is the most famous knife in the world.” Although 
a Swiss knife was no longer something to show off in most Chinese metropolitan areas, 
knowledge about a modern object surely could be a connection between a Hui from 
the ethnic borderland and a Han from the city. I quickly got into a conversation with 
him as he was also curious about me and many modern things that he presumed I was 
connected with.   
 
A: Where are you from? [presumably I was not local because of my 
possession of a Swiss army knife] 
 
B: I’m from Beijing and I’m here doing research. 
 
A: I have been to Beijing too.  
 
B: Really, what did you do there? 
 
A: I stayed there for one year learning Arabic language. 
 
B: Then what did you do? 
 
A: I came back home and joined this construction group led by my uncle. 
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B: So why did you go to Beijing and learn Arabic then? 
 
A: Well, you Han learn English for practical reasons. But we Hui learn Arabic 
for ourselves (Ch: women huizu shi wei ziji xue de). To be a Muslim is not just 
to believe in a religion. Islam teaches you first how to be a modern and 
civilized person (Ch: xiandai de wenming ren). Only Americans [Westerners] 
believe that Muslims are all terrorists.  
 
Our conversation then immediately touched upon the current affairs of the terrorist 
attack. The Hui young man used the official Chinese media tone to defend Muslim and 
Islam and to criticize Western countries and Western media as always anti-Muslim. 
He first claimed that Bin Laden does not represent Muslims. Then he immediately 
turned to the guilt of America and the Western world towards all the developing 
countries, especially towards the Islamic world and Muslim culture, which somehow 
justified the terrorist attack as something inevitable for those who deserved it. 
Throughout our conversation he had been at the same time playing with the different 
functions of my Swiss knife. From time to time he also tried it on the wooden table 
and praised the good quality of the knife. At the end he returned the knife to me with 
some reluctance and said: “foreign products are good though (Ch: waiguo de dongxi 
haozhe ne).”319
The Hui and the Tibetans in Taktsang Lhamo experienced this global incident 
in their own way. The contrast between the interpretations and reactions of the two 
ethnic groups diversified this global event in the local context by drawing upon the 
traditional local values and meanings as well as the official state discourse. In the 
recent years while some scholarly works have started to think about the “crisis of the 
nation state,” “post-national social forms,” (Appadurai 1996) or “the place left empty 
by the historical collapse of socialism,” (Mignolo 2000) others suggest that 
                                                 
319 The modernization through consumption after the 1980s has been seen in many Hui communities 
over China, see (Gillette 2000).  
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“transnationality […] does not simply reduce state power, […] it also stimulates a new, 
more flexible and complex relationship between capital and government” (Ong 1999) 
and that contrary to the “expansion of transnationalism at the expense of nation-state, 
[…] we have been perhaps too hasty to herald the retreat of the nation-state” 
(Vasantkumar 2006). Through the case above I would argue here that not only has the 
state resituated itself in this new global discourse with “graduated sovereignty,” (Ong 
1999) but the localization process of the global incident has also stimulated new 
multiple relationships between the state and different ethnic groups against the 
backdrop of a global influence. On the one hand, Islam as a transnational religion with 
a transnationally imagined community (Anderson 1983) has been clearly confined 
within the Chinese nation by the Muslim Hui in Taktsang Lhamo. Not only have the 
Hui used the national discourse to defend their religion and ethnicity but they also 
actively backed up the nation as a member of this nationally, instead of transnationally, 
imagined community. On the other hand, while Tibetan Buddhism has always been 
territorially marked and confined, it has apparently taken a new divergence to show its 
universal appeal in the age of globalization. Furthermore the local ethnic tensions as 
well as the role of state in this tension has made the localization of the global incident 
like this unique and complex, i.e. the Hui response in Taktsang Lhamo could be quite 
different from the Hui in other Hui majority regions (Gladney 1991). 
This complexity of religion and ethnicity in the national and global context 
challenges the dominant western approach of a “celebration of ethnic resistance.” As 
Bulag (2002) has indicated, the “celebration of ethnic resistance” often tends to 
essentialize ethnicity as the exclusive definition of identity for minority people and 
thus to de-contextualize ethnicity from its complex and fluid socio-economic and 
political conditions. By looking into the multiple dynamics among the Hui, the 
Tibetan and the Chinese state I intend to demonstrate the localization process as an 
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alternative base of power and ideology which both offsets state power in one way, and 
yet reinforces it in another (Gillette 2000; Jing 1996). 
 
7.2 Tibetan Splittists, Colonialism, and Internal Colonialism 
During the Monlam Chenmo in 1999 an unexpected incident cast a 
shadow on the festival atmosphere in Taktsang Lhamo. One day during the two-
week ceremony I suddenly found that there seemed to be more police than usual 
appearing around the monastery. Evening is usually the time for monks to get 
together and pass around the news of the day. It was then when I got to know that 
during the day some Tibetan independence slogans were found on the walls of the 
monastery circumambulation route. Political censorship in China strictly prohibits 
any symbolism that could be related to the separation of the motherland. Those 
who carry or show that symbolism are doomed as “splittists” (Ch: fenlie fenzi) 
and are subject to severe punishment. It is well known that traditional religious 
events, particularly grand events like Monlam Chenmo, often trigger the 
immediate and fundamental nationalist emotions among the Tibetan public. As 
such, although these newly revived public religious events have been officially 
permitted by the Chinese government—to a certain extent even promoted as local 
tourist attractions—they nonetheless attract the enthusiastic surveillance from the 
Chinese government and Chinese police at the same time. I was thus not surprised 
at what happened until one of my monk friends swore on the monastery that it 
was absolutely not the monks in the monastery who did that. Although no one 
was actually arrested, many monks in the monastery were called to the local 
police station to be interrogated, which created a very tense atmosphere in the 
monk community.  
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Several days later the police who had come from the higher regional 
authority left Taktsang Lhamo without finding any evidence or arresting anyone. 
But it was said that they would continue investigating this incident. At least for 
the moment the atmosphere in the monastery returned to the festival. However 
soon after the police left, a rumor started to spread quickly in the monk 
community that this whole Tibetan splittist incident was actually a set up by the 
local Hui. A young monk said to me with a very sure tone: “Who else can it be if 
we did not do that? They [Hui] all know Tibetan very well.” Besides the apparent 
impossibility for me to verify this rumor either from Tibetan side or from the Hui 
side, I found it much more intriguing to ponder the context and consequences of 
such rumors and beliefs—rather than determine their authenticity—and more 
importantly the stakes involved and the implication for each party in this event, as 
well as those for the state.   
The incorporation of this region into the new Chinese state in the 1950s 
has changed the local political organization and thereby economic structure. The 
ownership of land has been transferred from the former monastic power to the 
new Chinese state. After the 1980s with the state shift to a market economy both 
local families and the Tibetan monastery have at least partially regained their right 
to local land without the official change of state ownership of land. With the 
increasing economic development based primarily on the market economy and 
privatization the ambiguities left in terms of both the ownership of land and the 
right to use it have become the source of tensions between local Hui and Tibetan 
as well as the state (Pirie 2005a, 2005b)—one of which is the Hui claim of their 
former Tibetan monastery land based on their now equal ethnic rights in the new 
Chinese state. These ambiguities regarding land tenure have become more 
significant after the 1990s as tourist income has increased significantly. The 
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increasing popularity and accessibility of Taktsang Lhamo have brought more and 
more Tibetan pilgrims and Chinese tourists each year to this once remote 
borderland. These Tibetan pilgrims and Chinese tourists have immediately 
benefited the local businesses that are mostly owned by Hui families. The initial 
success of local Hui businesses have further encouraged the growth of more new 
businesses which have eventually changed local social political context and thus 
challenged many traditionally setup boundaries—for example, between the 
monastery and town, Tibetan and Hui, tourist and local, etc.—in the new post-
socialist Chinese context.  
With the expectation of more tourist income, a local Hui family started 
about a year ago to build a new family hostel right across from the Tibetan 
monastery. This new Hui hostel irritated both many local Tibetans and the 
monastic authority that had already reclaimed the Hui occupation of the Tibetan 
land. Tibetans in Taktsang Lhamo see this land as unambiguously Tibetan 
through both the traditional Tibetan cultural authority and the contemporary 
Chinese political nomenclature of Tibetan autonomous prefecture—thus 
downplaying the national ideology of ethnic equality that has been equally 
propagated by the Chinese state. Through ethnic Tibetan power in the local 
government, the Tibetan monastery and lay Tibetan community successfully 
intercepted the construction of the Hui hostel in “Tibetan” land and suspended it 
indefinitely. The Hui community tried to appeal to the higher levels but the appeal 
did not attract attention from the higher Chinese authorities who only put the 
superficial stability and prosperity of the local situation over everything else. This 
tension between the equally propagated national policy of ethnic equality and 
minority autonomy has finally ended with the Tibetan “splittist” incident. The 
independence slogan found during the Tibetan New Year had immediately drawn 
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the highest concern from the top Chinese authority to this remote borderland. 
Despite of the end result, that no evidence was found and no one was arrested, the 
incident itself along with its political implications had at least temporarily 
decreased local Tibetan power. As a result the Hui hostel construction was 
silently resumed. 
The multilateral relations among the Tibetan, Hui, Han Chinese, Chinese 
state and forces of globalization illuminate such concepts as colonialism, internal 
colonialism, orientalism and identity politics vis-à-vis state politics in a specific 
Chinese context.320 In recent research on both imperial dynasty China and the 
modern Chinese nation-state, many have advocated a reconsideration of the 
colonial nature of Chinese imperial power (i.e. Manchu Qing), and by extension 
Chinese state power today.321 In a discussion of the post/colonial experience in 
China, Dru Gladney questioned the so-called semi-colonial status of China and 
argued through an ethnic minority perspective that “there is nothing ‘semi’ about 
their [Hui] colonial experiences [in the Chinese state]” (Gladney 2004). 
Vasantkumar (2006: 89) concluded his discussion of the colonial expansion in 
Chinese history by saying “it becomes clear that the PRC is not post-colonial in 
some fuzzy 1990s theoretical sense but is emphatically, to this day, a colonial 
regime.” In a slightly different fashion Louisa Schein (2000: 103) carefully 
differentiated the connotations between colonialism and orientalism in her 
thought provoking ethnography of Miao in China. She argued that her borrowing 
                                                 
320 The term “internal colonialism” originated from a political antithesis of the diffusion model against 
the backdrop of core-periphery social/political/economic structure (Hechter 1975).  
321 Qing as a colonial power towards central Asia has been explored widely in the recent years (Elliott 
2001; Hostetler 2001; Millward 1998). David Goodman treated the development of Guizhou in early 
1950s as an “internal colony” by the Communist Chinese State (Goodman 1983). Dru Gladney 
indicated the colonial nature between the Chinese government and the ethnic minority peoples in China 
(Gladney 1994a; Gladney 2004). See also two case studies of Chinese colonization in minority areas of 
southwest and northwest China from the local Han migrant point of view (Hansen 2005). Most recently 
Christopher Vasantkumar, after a long discussion of Qing colonial expansion and Republican transition, 
has asked “[w]hy is it so hard to see China as a colonial power anyway?” (Vasantkumar 2006: 80) 
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of the term orientalism from Said (1978) was meant to avoid the intrinsic flaw in 
the colonialist discourse in which “the East [the colonized or orientalized] is 
muted and therefore, by extension, rendered incapable of othering.” In other 
words by using the term orientalist instead of colonialist, Schein seeks to 
emphasize that, just as China could be colonial power disguised as the colonized 
to the West, those internal Others in China, treated by many as the colonized, 
could also exercise their power of othering towards China and the West. This 
mutual influence of colonial relations reflects the Tibetan-Hui relationship in 
Taktsang Lhamo vis-à-vis the Chinese state.  
In chapter 1 I have argued that a subaltern perspective in Tibetan studies 
(and by extension the studies of other marginalized groups in China) should be 
applied with a critique to the isomorphism of “the subaltern” and such single 
category as ethnicity, race, religion, that has been taken for granted without a 
reflexive critique. I view this debate on subaltern, colonialism and orientalism in 
China as an extension of identity politics in relation to power and resistance. 
Identity politics have generally been perceived by many as a threat or resistance 
to both the dominant power (i.e. that of the nation-state) and the majority identity 
(i.e. a unified national identity) particularly in the context of newly formed 
modern nation-states.322 James Scott (1990), for example, has famously theorized 
the “art of resistance” on an intermediate ground between what he called “public 
transcripts” and “hidden transcripts”—a middle ground which is officially 
sanctioned by the dominant power and yet has been constantly contested, 
sometimes manipulated, by the subordinate groups towards subversive ends. 
Many scholarly works have recently pointed out, however, that identity politics 
                                                 
322 See (Gupta and Ferguson 1992; Hobsbawm 1990; Malkki 1995). For a general theoretical 
framework on domination and resistance see (Comaroff 1985; Scott 1990). Dru Gladney gives the 
ethnographic case of the Hui resistance to the Han Chinese state (Gladney 1994b).   
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do not always go against the state. Indeed they may be seen as much supportive to 
the state authority as destructive.323 To use “internal colonialism” and “subaltern” 
as single ethnic/racial/religious category, in my view, is a continuous “celebration 
of ethnic resistance” as I mentioned above. I further argue that in the 
contemporary context of China these ethnic/racial/religious categories among 
others have become rather flexible—or might be called “empty signifiers”324—
and open to many new constructions and dialogue, such as ethnic interaction, 
political economy, global consumerism, and thus are not properly located simply 
through such conceptions as “subaltern” or “colonial/colonized.” 
Furthermore as shown in the Tibetan “splittist” incident above, global 
influences were deliberately reworked through the lens of national and local 
cultural/political context and were then taken in as part of the local dialogue. 
Although I have no way to verify if those independent slogans actually had 
anything to do with local Hui or not, it seems to me more important and 
interesting to see different beliefs held by different parties about what actually 
happened and the consequential impact of these different beliefs on the ethnic 
relations vis-à-vis the Chinese state. The single category of colonialism, internal 
colonialism or subaltern falls short of accommodating such a complex scenario 
where religion, ethnicity, and politics intersect with each other without sacrificing 
any one of them. One must go well beyond the dichotomy of colonial/colonized to 
explain, for example, the change of Hui in Taktsang Lhamo from being a 
“Tibetan accomplice” in the 1950s rebellion against the Chinese incorporation to 
                                                 
323 See for example a case study of Bai in Yunnan (McCarthy 2000). While arguing for the colonial 
status of ethnic minorities in China, Dru Gladney (2004) also asked the question why some minorities 
desire to be recognized—consider the official ethnic minority population grows three times greater than 
that of Han—while others oppose to it. 
324 I got this inspiration from my colleague Eric Henry who first used this concept of “empty signifier” 
to accommodate the ever-changing cultural meaning of English learning in today’s Chinese society 
(Saussure 1966). 
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rivaling with their Tibetans neighbors by adopting official Chinese discourses 
after the September 11th. Recent works on Han Chinese in ethnic minority areas 
can provide more insights on these points (Harrell 2001c; Hansen 2005). As these 
works show us many Han living in ethnic minority areas, whether temporarily or 
permanently, are actually “not better or worse than their minority neighbors.”325 It 
is rather a sense of being a member of an imagined powerful majority—
condensed and symbolized in the name “Han”—that keeps the superior feeling of 
those poor Han over their economically richer and politically more powerful 
minority neighbors. To understand today’s multi-cultural/multi-ethnic China is to 
understand China—including both the condensed symbol of Han and its 
ideological antithesis of ethnic minority—from both external and internal limits of 
those multi-facets of its body. 
  
7.3 Ethnicity, Belonging, Trans/nationalism: The Civilizing Project Revisited 
The subject of this project changed over the period of my fieldwork. My initial 
proposal was to do my research in this Sino-Tibetan borderland town focusing 
exclusively on local Tibetan Buddhist revival, namely the monastic rituals and public 
festivals year around that have been revived after the Chinese Cultural Revolution. 
While the Tibetan case has been taken by many as a perfect example of resistance, 
colonialism, and ethnic nationalism—in both a political and cultural sense—it seemed 
to me that ethnicity itself as a category has often been over privileged. In fact over the 
centuries ethnicity has been “promoted” to a highly contested ground where race, 
nation, nationalism, politics have all struggled to play a role in the former symbolic 
expression of a primordial group marker (Barth 1969; Williams 1989). As such I 
intended, in my fieldwork, to contextualize the Tibetan ethnicity in a broader and 
                                                 
325 See (Harrell 2001c), particularly chapter 14 on the Han as default ethnicity but also on what he 
called “majority as minority.” 
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deeper background through both observable factors such as religion, history, political 
economy, and more subjective factors like everyday practice, personal narratives, and 
collective memories. Such an approach unavoidably reveals the nuances of a heavily 
loaded and politically polarized situation by showing a mix of social, cultural, 
economic, and political impacts on both a local and national level. It was my intention 
to contribute to the existing scholarly works on the contemporary Tibetan Buddhist 
revival in China, which have been scarce and less than satisfactory to accommodate 
this complex and wide spreading phenomenon.   
Throughout my two-year fieldwork in Taktsang Lhamo, however, I found 
myself being increasingly caught in between the two local ethnic communities. This is 
not just because of my growing awareness of the Hui presence as long-term local 
residents in this Tibetan land, the predicted difficulties of doing fieldwork in a 
culturally and politically sensitive site, or the actual dilemma when working with two 
complicatedly related communities at the same time. But all these difficulties, 
dilemmas and complexities have ultimately complicated my original idea on the 
re/construction of ethnic religious identities and boundaries in the nation-state.  By 
relating this idea to the social production of different boundaries, inclusive/exclusive 
politics, and multiple senses of ethnic and national belongings I find it worth an 
academic revisit to Stevan Harrell’s groundbreaking introduction of “civilizing 
project” back in 1995. While the unequal relationship between the center and 
periphery was not unfamiliar to most,326 Harrell’s conceptualization of this relation as 
a “civilizing project” has made it more nuanced by basing it on at least three 
assumptions.  
Firstly it assumed an inclusive politics of the civilizing center by excluding the 
periphery. This is a drastically different point from the previous studies on the 
                                                 
326 See for example (Shils 1975).  
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center/periphery or majority/minority relations. In Barth’s well-read piece on ethnic 
groups and boundaries (Barth 1969), he asserted that many minority situations are the 
ones that are rejected by the majority, or as he called “host population.” This is 
because, according to Barth, “[i]n a total social system, all sectors of activities are 
organized by statuses open to the members of the majority group,” while the minority 
system does not provide the same basis for action in the same system. Harrell however 
emphasized the nuanced part of this both exclusion and inclusion process. In all three 
cases of the civilizing projects he provided in the Chinese history—Confucian, 
Christian, Communist—the civilizing center has all intended to transform the 
periphery and to include into the “civilized” world. Yet for that sake it has to first 
single out the periphery and to hegemonically define it as the “uncivilized,” thus 
precluding an imagined area, both geographical and ideological, from the assumed 
civilized world dominated by the center.  
Second, during this process of inclusion and exclusion different kinds of 
boundaries are produced between center and periphery, majority and minority, the 
default ethnicity and those who are ethnically identified, the “civilizer” and “those to 
be civilized.” By discerning these boundaries the conception of civilizing project has 
juxtaposed two seemingly parallel boundaries: the geographical hierarchy between a 
center and its periphery and the ideological hegemony between the superior and the 
inferior. Harrell pointed out the tentative attraction to relate the geographical periphery 
to ideologically constructed ethnicity. To push his critique to this juxtaposition he also 
used three metaphors—sexual (peripheral peoples as women), educational (peripheral 
peoples as children), and historical (peripheral peoples as ancient)—to challenge the 
complex existence of these boundaries.  
Lastly, the most nuanced part of this argument is the consequences of this kind 
of civilizing project, or what Harrell called the “peripheral peoples’ reactions to 
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civilizing projects.” He argued that in the majority of cases “the peripheral peoples, 
while resenting the attempts to civilize them, nevertheless accept the general premise 
that they are less civilized or morally less worthy.” This is in line with the scholarship 
on power/resistance (Scott 1990) or ethnic boundaries (Barth 1969). Although it was 
later criticized as potentially assuming and reinforcing the very existence and purity of 
a Han majority (Gladney 2004), Harrell’s treatment of the peripheral peoples’ reaction 
still stands alone by leaving space for the usually ambiguous and complex feeling of 
ethnic and national belongings in this process. In fact this complex feeling of 
belonging has become especially salient with the emergence of the modern nation-
state which has changed the former “frontier peoples” into the “peoples within 
borders” (Keyes 2002). One of the direct byproducts in this changing process, as 
Charles Keyes indicated, is “a clear distinction between the nation and the peoples or 
ethnic groups that are taken as belonging to this nation” (Keyes 2002: 1193, emphasis 
in original). This mixed and sometime conflict feeling between ethnic and national 
belonging has become even more complicated when contextualized within 
transnationalism, displaced groups such as diasporas, “border-crossing peoples or 
peoples across borders” (Keyes 2002). Even within the context of one nation-state, i.e. 
China, recent scholarly work on ethnic minorities in China has discovered “a hiding of 
a history of negotiation behind a narrative of unfolding” of the Chinese nation (Harrell 
1996). One of these negotiations reflects on the dilemma of many minority elites who 
have to work both within the state and at the same time within their own traditions. 
Litzinger (2000: 238), for example, shows this dilemma of the Yao intellectuals and 
their politics of belonging by asking if they “were driven by the same desires as their 
Han intellectual counterparts” and what were their findings in their own tradition. 
Similarly Janet Upton has demonstrated a Tibetan intellectual elite’s new 
interpretation of Tibetan history that can be treated as a sign of the revival of Tibetan 
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ethnic nationalism within the official discourse of a Chinese social political framework 
(Upton 2000). 
By revisiting the civilizing project, my intention is less to argue for a grand 
framework for my own research—not to mention for whichever studies, which I 
consider as a limit to the research scope. But on the contrary I intend to open up new 
horizon by addressing the nuances and spaces that have been initiated in the 
conceptualization of civilizing projects. Indeed many scholars have contributed to this 
process. Charlene Makeley (1999, 2007), in her highly innovative studies on gender 
and Tibetan Buddhist revival in post-Mao China, pointed out the gendered nature of 
the Tibetan revitalization of their traditions—both religious and non-religious alike. 
Thus to contextualize this process is to explore the ways in which Tibetans (men and 
women, lay and monastic) have struggled to define their locality through the 
re/construction of a male-centered power and space ultimately rooted in the monastery. 
This argument is very insightful for understanding both the logic of Tibetan everyday 
practices and the enormously politicized and destructive changes after the Chinese 
incorporation. As she argued cogently, these changes are most accurately seen as not 
an erasing of Tibetan culture in their homeland but rather an emasculating of an 
essentially masculinized culture (Makley 2007: 31-32). Through her analysis of the 
relation between gender and Tibetan Buddhist revival it becomes clear that the 
Chinese incorporation of Tibet and the subsequent changes in Tibet have gone well 
beyond a dualist view of either “cultural protection” as claimed by the Chinese 
government or “cultural genocide” as claimed by the Tibetan government-in-exile.  
 In my case I try to approach the same question through religion, ethnicity and 
nation. The overlap and conflict between the ethnic belonging with the national 
belonging of Tibetan and Hui have been produced through the dynamics of religion 
and ethnicity in the Chinese nation-building process. I started this dissertation by 
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introducing two ethnoreligious revivals—the prominent Tibetan Buddhist revival and 
the almost invisible Hui Islamic revival—in an ethnic borderland town of Taktsang 
Lhamo. My own position as a Han Chinese working on the subject of ethnic minority 
has been reflected both in my fieldwork and later in my writing. To write on ethnic 
borderland and boundaries in the national and international context I have not only 
challenged the bounded identity (such as a pure Tibetan core hidden behind a 
collaborative face with the Chinese colonial power) and arbitrary boundaries (such as 
Tibetan-Hui separation both in religion and ethnicity), but I have also intended to 
recover a variety of peoples’ voices through their concrete everyday practices. The 
arbitrariness of the boundaries and the active role of a peripheral borderland have in 
turn brings back the question of civilizing project as a unilateral hierarchy. My study 
on consumerism and modernization in this ethnic borderland shows, on the one hand, 
the new consumerist practices can be treated as both an individual practice and a new 
form of governmentality (Ngai 2003). On the other hand, these practices might also be 
treated as a voluntary civilizing project in which the peripheral peoples (or the 
minorities) have actively participated, even to a certain extent manipulated, the whole 
civilizing process but for their own causes.327  Furthermore, in the contemporary 
transnational context and global influence this civilizing process has been further 
nuanced and diversified in its representation. I then conclude with a Tibetan-Hui 
rivalry today that has drawn upon both the discourses of national politics as well as a 
transnational and global influence through a local/national filter.  
 
 
                                                 
327 See (Postiglione, et al. 2004) for his concept of “voluntary minority.” Harrell has made a similar 
argument in his study of the Yi intellectuals writing their own history in the context of a multi-ethnic 
Chinese nation building. Gillette (2000) similarly argued that Hui in Xi’an have diverted the official 
civilizing direction through Arabization and applying the Islamic ideology of modernity. This 
manipulation of civilizing process has nevertheless been resolved in the negotiation of modernization 
and consumption. 
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The Religious and Political Organization of the Tibetan Monastery in Amdo 
Before the 1950s 
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The Religious and Political Organization of the Tibetan Monastery in China 
Since the 1980s 
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